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ABSTRACT 
 
As cyber attacks become more sophisticated, the risk to all networked computer 
systems increases. Whether public or private, whether federal, state, or local, the threat 
is equally real. Consequently, local governments must respond accordingly to 
understand the threats, take measures to protect themselves, and determine how to 
respond in the event of a system breach. Additionally, since cyber criminals do not 
respect geographic or administrative boundaries, local leaders must be prepared to 
instantly interact with other governments, agencies, and departments to suppress an 
attack.  
Guided by the theory of intergovernmental management (IGM), this exploratory 
research investigated how Information Technology (IT) Directors in Florida county 
constitutional offices use intergovernmental relations and management activities as part 
of their information security efforts. Specifically, this research sought to determine: 1) 
which IGM activities do county IT Directors most often perform; 2) do county IT 
Directors make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships; 3) is there a 
relationship between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors 
most often perform?  
To answer these questions, an electronic survey was distributed to 209 directors, 
of which 125 responded. Overwhelmingly, the findings indicate that these Directors 
rarely engage in IGM activities regardless of the purpose or type of 
government/department contacted. However, when seeking intergovernmental 
assistance, it is most often horizontally with other Departments within their own 
 iv
government and least often vertically with Federal offices. The most frequently 
performed intergovernmental activity is seeking technical assistance, however seeking 
program/project information is also perform more frequently than the other activities 
explored in this research. The least frequently performed activities involved seeking to 
modify established IT partnerships. Further, there was evidence of relationships 
between certain office/county demographics and IGM activity. The discovery of these 
patterns and relationships can be used to aid policy and program development, as well 
as to stimulate deeper inquiry into the intergovernmental dimensions involved in 
protecting local elements of the U.S. Critical Digital Infrastructure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this research was to explore the roles intergovernmental 
management, activities, and communication play in protecting the information systems 
of our critical infrastructure. As cyber attacks become more sophisticated, the risk to 
ALL computer systems increases (White House, 2003; Computer Science & 
Telecommunications Board, and National Research Council, 2002; Information 
Assurance Advisory Council, 2001; McCarthy, 1998). Whether public or private, whether 
federal, state, or local, the threat is equally real (Misra, 2003). Consequently, local 
leaders must respond accordingly to understand the threats, take measures to protect 
themselves, and determine how they will respond in the event an attack occurs. As 
such, the focus of this research was to investigate how county-level Information 
Technology Directors and their staff use intergovernmental relations and management 
activities in securing critical information systems under their charge.  
From maintaining medical records to tax filing, computers and the Internet have 
come to play a role in most every sphere of modern life (Careless, 2003; Nye, 2003; 
Long, 2000; Libicki, 1995). As such, it should not come as a surprise that a well-
coordinated large-scale cyber attack has the potential to disrupt daily life in America and 
across the global (White House, 2003; Walker, 2002; Noonan, 2001; Brock, 2000a, 
2000b). Given that our social, health, economic, justice, and military systems 
increasingly depend on networked information systems, any person or group, public or 
private, regardless of Internet access, would be affected if critical computer systems 
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were rendered inoperable (Freund, 2003; Hansell, 2003; Reames, 2000; Stanton, 2000; 
Everett et. al., 1997). In a post-9/11 report to Congress, the Gilmore Commission (2001) 
clearly made this point when it wrote, 
Our banking and finance systems, our just-in-time delivery 
system for goods, our hospitals, our state and local 
emergency services… all of these critical services rely upon 
their information connections and databases… each is 
critical to the American economy and health of our citizens… 
and each can be shut down or severely handicapped by a 
cyber attack (p. 53).  
Amid increased global terrorist activity, a growing body of research and 
intelligence information suggests that the probability of terrorist–orchestrated cyber 
attacks on U.S. critical information systems is extremely high (Computer Science & 
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002; Deibert, 2002; 
Kremmen, 2002; Verton, 2002; Berkowitz 2001; McWilliams, 2001). Yet, the ability and 
authority to prevent such a threat surpasses any lone industry or level of government. In 
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Homeland 
Security the U.S. Comptroller General stated the indisputable need to “…clarify the 
appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities and build a 
framework for partnerships for coordination, communication, and collaboration” (Walker, 
2002, p. 4). Per 2001 Executive Order 13231 section 5(a), the President’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board (CIPB) is charged to work with state and local 
governments “…to ensure that systems are created and well managed to share threat 
warning, analysis, and recovery information among government network operation 
centers…”. Yet three years later, the information security of local and county 
governments remains a major concern among security experts (Misra, 2003; Barrett, 
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Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Public Technology Inc., 2002). Adding to this concern is the 
reality that local governments, such as counties, serve as first responders to crisis 
(National Association of Counties, 2001A, 2001D; U.S. General Accounting Office, 
2001c). As such, county communications and computer systems were rendered 
inoperable by a cyber attack during a simultaneous physical crisis, the ability for officials 
to coordinate relief efforts would be severely effected. 
In 1999, the Emergency Response and Research Institute conducted a non-
scientific survey of local/county/state administrators, supervisor, technology 
professionals, and first-line responders which revealed that 85 percent believed more 
research into computer attacks on local government offices needs be conducted 
(Staten, 1999). Further, 85 percent believed hacking local, county, or state government 
systems will become more of a problem in the future. Indeed, in the years since this 
survey local governments, specifically counties, have been increasingly plagued by 
Internet worms, viruses, and denial of service attacks. Mary Reynolds, Chief 
Technology Officer for Illinois, states that cyber attacks occur “all the time", noting that 
some government systems are attacked hundreds of times each month (Perlman, 
2002b). She speculates that the majority of local governments remain unsuccessful at 
fending off attacks and intrusions because they fail to patch software, properly configure 
firewalls, use intrusion-detection systems, or scan their networks.  
Despite the recent efforts of local officials to improve these practices (Barrett, 
Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Monroe, 2002; Posner, 2002; Gonzales, 2001), poor 
information security remains rampant in county governments (Kouns, 2003; O’Connell, 
2003; Brock, 2000; Dacey, 2001; PDD-63, 1998; Smith, 1998; Crescenzi, 1996). This 
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reality was made publicly obvious during the summer of 2003 when a series of viruses 
and worms penetrated county computer systems across the nation. For instance, nearly 
the entire computer system for the Hillsborough County Florida school system 
(approximately 10,000 computers) was shut down for several days late August due to a 
virus (ABC Action News, 2003). In Christian County Kentucky, poor information security 
forced the shut down of computers at the clerk's office and health department for 
several days after falling victim to a computer worm known as "Nachi" or "Welchia" 
(Leazer, 2003). This shut down completely halted numerous services, including motor 
vehicles registration, voters registration, food stamp benefits, child support, Medicaid, 
and payroll. Again in August 2003, poor county-level information security proved equally 
damaging in Maryland where citizens were temporarily unable to renew drivers licenses 
or register motor vehicles at 23 centers throughout the state (WBAL-TV, 2003). The 
cause was cited as the "lovsan" or "MSBlaster" worm that exploited a Microsoft 
vulnerability for which a software patch had been released a month prior as part of a 
large public campaign to limit potential damage. The MSBlaster worm also forced ill-
prepared officials in Riverside County California to shut down county web sites and 
Internet services while they patched security holes throughout the county’s vast network 
of 12,000 personal computers. For nearly 48 hours, Riverside County employees were 
unable to access email, the database of court cases was no longer assessable online, 
and jurors could not check their status online.  
Further demonstrating the severe damage and disruption cyber attacks cause 
county governments, consider the stealthy computer worm "NIMDA" which virtually 
froze Fairfax County Virginia in the summer of 2001 (Perlman, 2002b; Gilmore 
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Commission, 2001). For a nearly a week, county officials had to lock network access to 
the outside world to allow nearly 150 IT technicians to "scrub" the entire network of 
9,000 PCs and 300 servers to remove the virus and repair the system. The severity of 
the worm forced the county to shut down its web site which receives more than a million 
hits a day as residents log on for a variety of services, from paying fines and purchasing 
permits, to renewing library books. Making matters worse, county IT professionals 
believed they had eradicated the virulent worm only to have it resurface and re-infect 
the system. In an unrelated series of events during March 2002, an unauthorized private 
information security analyst informed Harris County Texas that its wireless network was 
completely open leaving sensitive information vulnerable to illicit access (Juhnke, 2002). 
The independent analyst demonstrated for county officials how easily the system could 
be tapped using a basic laptop and an inexpensive wireless card. The demonstration 
prompted the county to disable its entire wireless network (Dornan, 2002). 
Numerous aspects of local government depend on communication between 
citizens and officials. The Internet and network-enabled computer systems have made 
that process much more efficient (Bowser, 1998). As cyber criminals become more 
sophisticated, the risk of an attack targeting or at the very least compromising local 
systems increases (Misra, 2003). As noted earlier, local leaders must respond 
accordingly to understand the threats and take measures to protect themselves from an 
attack. A 2002 survey by the National League of Cities reported that cyber attacks are 
among the top three terrorist related concerns of city governments. In an effort to tend 
to these concerns, all survey respondents indicated that their city had increased 
intergovernmental cooperation with other cities, counties, state, and federal bodies 
 6
since 9/11. Yet the study found that only 43 percent of large cities and 26 percent of all 
cities have developed strategies to specifically address cyber-terrorism. Speculating on 
these findings, the National League of Cities noted that federal agencies still provide 
relatively little direct guidance and training regarding cyber terrorism compared to 
biological and chemical threats. These disparities suggests that protecting localities 
from cyber attacks needs more attention at all levels of government. 
Despite efforts, this researcher was unable to locate any similar studies focusing 
on county government. American City & County Magazine (2002) also addressed this 
research lacuna noting that there is very little available data on county information 
security efforts. However, without an understanding of county leadership and the 
pervasiveness of vertical and horizontal communication with regard to information 
security, our national security remains vulnerable. In a response to this need for 
understanding and given the importance of critical digital infrastructure protection, this 
research sought to observe the reality of information technology security as it occurs in 
the trenches; county government. Again, the focus of this research was to investigate 
how county-level Information Technology Directors and their staff use intergovernmental 
relations and management activities in securing critical information systems under their 
charge.  
Due to the breath of issues stemming from safeguarding information technology, 
information security research is not married to any discipline, let alone one theory. 
However, in an effort to increase the practical utility and efficacy of this research, this 
study was guided by the public administration theory of intergovernmental management 
(henceforth, IGM). This theory was selected because at its core, it focuses on the 
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degree to which “…officials strategically interact with various actors for the purpose of 
successfully designing and administering policies” (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983, p. 5). The 
concepts, classification schemes, and propositions put forth by this theory were drawn 
upon to shape definitions, operationalize concepts, and aid in linking variables through 
the use of its established taxonomies.  
Because the of role intergovernmental activities in county level information 
security had yet to be studied, this investigation was exploratory. As such, this research 
did not expressly set out to test hypotheses or establish causal relationships. Instead, 
theory was used to guide research questions in an effort to discover and explain 
patterns of activity (Chafetz, 1978). To that end, this research sought to answer the 
questions: 1) which IGM activities do county IT Directors/staff most often engage in on 
behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 2) do county IT 
Directors/staff make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships on behalf of 
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 3) is there a relationship 
between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors/staff most 
often engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure 
protection? By uncovering patterns of similarities and differences in the type and use of 
IGM activities, these preliminary finding can be used to stimulate deeper inquiry and 
generate dialogue into the intergovernmental and administrative dimensions involved in 
protecting the U.S. critical digital infrastructure.  
While disciplines such as criminal justice, legal studies, and computer science 
have been actively involved in information security research; the results are often 
fragmented and discipline-specific. Further, little attention and even less research has 
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been given to roles intergovernmental relations, communications, and management 
play in information security. This research, however, recognizes that critical digital 
infrastructure protection is a complex social, economic, and administrative issue that 
affects the health, welfare, and security of the citizens in all communities. As such, a 
unique aspect of this research is that it approaches what is seemingly a technological 
concern as a public affairs issue were understanding and solutions require an 
interdisciplinary approach.  
Again, the aim of this research was to explore the roles intergovernmental 
management and interorganizational communication in protecting county information 
systems. To this end, the literature of this study begins by discussing network and 
information technology and the connections and interdependencies they create. Next, 
the nature of the U.S. critical digital infrastructure is explained, including why it is 
vulnerable and to what. Focus then turns to general government use of network 
systems with specific emphasis on local and county governments. After discussing the 
inadequate state of these systems, information security and the critical role of 
management is highlighted. 
Following the literature review, the theory of intergovernmental management is 
explicated. Then a discussion clarifies the intrinsic and critical relationship between 
information security and intergovernmental management activities. Following is an 
explanation of the methodology used, the analysis, and a presentation of findings. 
Finally a discussion of the implications for the public affairs arena complete this 
research endeavor. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The Internet: A Network of Networks 
The 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace released by the White House 
declared the Internet “…the nervous system of our country” (p. 6). Yet few comprehend 
how it works or its inherent vulnerabilities. In order to understand these matters, it is first 
important to have a basic understanding of computer networking. To begin with, a 
computer, or single system, is usually controlled by a single owner and is located in a 
known physical location. With the addition of specific software and hardware to provide 
communication protocols and physical channels, several single systems can be 
connected to create a network of systems. Individual systems can be added or removed 
from a network at any time, making it dynamic in structure and operations. The size of a 
network can range from two systems to thousands of systems and these different 
systems can be housed in different physical locations, manufactured by different 
vendors, and even owned by different organizations (Committee on the Internet in the 
Evolving Information Infrastructure, 2001; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1998). 
When a network remains private, as a “closed system of systems”, it is called an 
intranet (Phoha, 2002; Sunshine, 1999). Intranets are most often used to share 
information between employees as part of day-to-day business operations. This type of 
network is the most secure as it does not directly connect to the Internet. A variation of 
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this is an extranet, which occurs when a private network connects to the larger Internet 
to provide public access to a limited amount of content which is sectioned off from the 
rest of the main intranet (Jordan, 1997). There are few physical limitations to the scope 
and breadth of either category of network as they can traverse organizational and 
national boundaries if resources are available. However, it is the joining of extranets and 
public networks into a “network of networks” which serves as the foundation of the 
Internet (Miller & Gregory, 2002).  
Linking computers from distant locations to share information was only brought to 
fruition in the early 1960s (Everett, Dewindt, & McDade, 1997). The RAND proposal, 
written by Paul Baran in 1964, outlined principles of a non-local network designed to be 
robust and flexible (Mayr, 1995). The original impetus for this project was to preserve 
the integrity of the military command and control network under warlike conditions, even 
a nuclear attack. This new network would have no central authority, all the ‘nodes’ 
would be equal in status, and each node could send and receive messages. In principle, 
if one node was destroyed, the rest of the nodes would still be able to communicate.  
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded the first test 
of the concept in 1969 and the first nodes were installed at UCLA, Stanford, University 
of California at Santa Barbara, and University of Utah at Salt Lake City (Lipson, 2002; 
Sewell, 2002). The network was fundamentally simple, consisting of scientists at these 
remote locations passing findings and research notes back and forth. ARPAnet, as it 
was initially known, was successful and rapidly adopted. By the end of the first year, it 
was increasingly being used like a data mailbox and in the years to follow its uses 
continued to evolve and expand. In 1983, the military and nonmilitary elements were 
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split apart and the nonmilitary section grew into what is now called the Internet 
(Sunshine, 1999; Everett, Dewindt, & McDade, 1997).  
The Internet is a collection of thousands of networks linked by a common set of 
technical protocols which make it possible for users on any one of the networks to 
communicate with, or use specified services of any of the other networks (Committee on 
the Internet in the Evolving Information Infrastructure, 2001; Fraser, 1997). To operate, 
the Internet requires several layers of technology, some of which are obvious and 
physical; while others are logical and operational. As such, the Internet is the sum of all 
of the information and communication technologies that support its sundry protocols. 
This includes such elements as computers, peripheral components, telephone lines, 
fiber optic cables, satellites, hosts, users, Internet Providers, data standards, 
applications, protocols, routers, code, servers, hubs, and of course, the information 
content contained therein. 
Information sent across the Internet from one computer to another is broken into 
small packets of data that contain information regarding the origin/destination of the 
data, as well as a portion of the total data (ISC2.com, 2003; Zakon, 2003; Phoha, 2002; 
Smart Computing, 2001). These packets travel separately through telecommunication 
channels which connect the Internet and then are reassembled at the destination or 
receiving computer. There are two primary protocols, referred to collectively as TCP/IP, 
that enable these data packets to traverse the complex networks and arrive in an 
understandable format (Lipson, 2002; Miller & Gregory, 2002). First, Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) decomposes the data into packets. Next, Internet Protocol (IP) 
guides or routes the data packets across the Internet. Upon arriving at the final 
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destination, TCP ensures that all of the necessary packets are properly reassembled. 
However, TCP and IP are but two of the many protocols that govern the network 
transfer of digital information (Collins, 2001; Fraser, 1997; Ruthfield, 1995). Others 
include File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Post Office Protocol (POP3), Simple Mail Transfer 
Protocol (SMTP), Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), to mention a few. Yet it was the 
1990 development of an experimental protocol known as Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) that transformed the Internet into the social and economic backbone of 
modernized nations in less than a decade (Roos, 1998).  
HTTP works by the use of web enabled pages (i.e. files written in Hyper Text 
Markup Language or HTML), web servers (which “serve up” or deliver the web enabled 
pages), and web browsers (which present the “served pages” to the end user) (Zakon, 
2003; Phoha, 2002). The key to the World Wide Web is “hyperlinks” which are 
embedded in web enabled documents. The advent of hyperlinks provided a new way of 
conceptualizing and organizing information and enabled users to exchange documents 
regardless of the protocol they were using (Bowser, 1998). Webpages accessed using a 
web browser or client, such as Netscape Navigator or Internet Explorer, proved an 
easier way to navigate the Internet than older protocols such as gopher and FTP (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1998). Both computer programmers and the public quickly 
embraced the combination of user-friendly web browsers and the easy to learn coding 
language HTML. In 1992, the World Wide Web was comprised of only 50 web servers, 
by 2003, just a decade later, there were over 35.5 million (Smart Computing, 2001). 
The Internet and World Wide Web continue to grow and recent numbers estimate 
that globally 500 million people go online in a given month (CyberAtlas.com, 2003; 
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Digital Divide Network 2003; Nielsen NetRatings, 2002). While this is a staggering 
number, it actually represents less than 10 percent of the world’s entire population. Yet 
of those half-billion users, 41 percent are located in the United States and Canada. 
Perhaps this is not entirely surprising considering that the United States operates more 
computers than the rest of the world combined (Digital Divide Network, 2003). A 
national telephone survey conducted by Pew Internet and the American Life Project 
(2003) found that U.S. Internet penetration rates have remained around 60 percent 
since late 2001. Of this population, 49 percent use the Internet at least once a day 
either from home, work, or both. This means that on an average day, about 61 million 
Americans go online to do such things as send email, read the news, and make 
purchases. With so many users, there is much potential for irresponsible use, abuse, 
and exploitation (Doddrell, 1996). 
To demonstrate the global presence and dominance of the U.S. Internet 
infrastructure, consider some of the following numbers. According to the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (henceforth, OECD) (2002a), the relative 
development of a country's Internet infrastructure can be measured by the number of its 
Internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants1. In late 2000, the United States far outpaced any 
other OECD country2 by maintaining more than 234 hosts per 1,000 inhabitants (OECD, 
                                            
1 A host is a domain name that has an IP (Internet Protocol) address associated with it. In an inter-
network environment, a host is any computer with full two-way access to other computers on the Internet, 
or a computer that runs a web server for one or more web sites (Phoha, 2003; Sans.org; 2003). Since 
some systems can not be detected because of the use of firewalls, an estimate of hosts should be 
thought of as an indicator of the minimum size of the public Internet (OECD, 2002a). 
2 The 30 member countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
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2002a). The average for the European Union was only 37.4 hosts per 1,000 inhabitants. 
Additionally, of the 90 million Internet hosts registered to OECD countries in 2000, a full 
70 percent were registered to the United States. The second largest concentration of 
registered hosts was in Japan, which maintained only 4.6 percent of the OECD total, 
followed by the United Kingdom with 3.5. 
While the number of Internet hosts gives an indication of the size of a country's 
Internet infrastructure, the number of active web sites provides information on a 
country’s relative development of Internet content. Again, the United States leads web 
site hosting with 12.6 million sites hosted as of July 2000 (OECD, 2002a). This figure 
translates into 46.5 web sites per 1,000 U.S. inhabitants. Germany and the United 
Kingdom were the only other OECD countries hosting more than one million sites, with 
1.8 million and 1.4 million hosted sites respectively. Collectively the European Union 
only maintains 12.7 web sites per 1,000 inhabitants. 
Another measure of the depth of a nations’ information and communication 
infrastructure is the use of the Internet as a transaction channel for electronic commerce 
(henceforth, e-commerce). While e-commerce has revolutionized economic activity, it 
has taken off more slowly than predicted (Council for Excellence in Government, 2002; 
Denby, 2000; Reames, 2000; Sager et al, 2000; Litt, 1997). Despite the turbulence 
resulting from collapsed “dot.coms” in the late 1990s, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (2003) reported that domestic Internet retail trade (the general focus of e-
commerce attention) grew rapidly both in volume and share of total U.S. retail trade 
                                                                                                                                             
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States (OECD, 2003). 
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from 1999 to 2001. Its share increased from 0.7 percent in the fourth quarter of 1999 to 
1.3 percent in the fourth quarter 2001. During 2001, approximately 38 percent of U.S. 
Internet users ordered products online (OECD, 2002b) which translated into $35 billion 
in sales (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003)3. In terms of both dollar value and share 
of economic activity, e-commerce varies markedly among key U.S. economic sectors. 
For example, manufacturing leads all industry sectors with e-commerce shipments that 
account for 18 percent ($725 billion) of total manufacturing shipments. Merchant 
wholesalers rank second with e-commerce sales that represent 10 percent ($270 billion) 
of their total sales. Forrester Research (Global Reach, 2001) predicted that by 2004, 
global e-commerce would reach $6.8 trillion and that 47 percent of that could be 
attributed to the U.S.  
Much of the success of e-commerce depends on the security of cyber 
transactions. Yet the more the Internet is used to transfer funds, the more likely data 
transmissions and the underlying infrastructure itself will become targets (Moteff, 2002; 
Rathmell, 2000; Reames, 2000). Both industry and government appear aware of this 
growing threat as the number of secure servers in OECD countries increased by 223 
percent from July 1999 to January 2002 (OECD, 2002b). However, a full 65 percent of 
all OECD secure servers are located in the United States. To put that number in 
perspective, the United Kingdom boasts the second largest concentration of secure 
servers with only six percent of the total. This disparity is quite alarming as the Internet 
                                            
3 The total value of on-line retail sales should be considered as a lower bound, as certain categories that 
are included in other surveys, such as on-line travel services, financial brokers and dealers and ticket 
sales agencies, are excluded. 
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is borderless and the vulnerabilities of one system can adversely affect the security of 
all others to which it is connected (Moore, 1997). As such, no one nation or government 
can alone secure cyberspace (White House, 2003; Institute for Information 
Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Frank, 2002; Hecker, 2002; Sewell, 2002; Tritak, 2001b; 
Rathmell, 2000). 
 
Borderless and Connected 
Cyberspace, a term coined by William Gibson in his 1984 sci-fi novel 
Neuromancer, is a metaphor to describe the non-physical terrain created by networked 
computer systems (Zakon, 2003). In the topography of cyberspace, national boundaries 
have little meaning (Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Tyrrell, 
2002). Supported by information and communication technologies, the Internet 
seamlessly links nations across the globe (Held et al, 1999). Yet as Everett, Dewindt, 
and McDade (1997) ominously point out, “History has given evidence to the fact that 
when some new technology brings mankind brightness, a shadow is cast 
simultaneously”. The Internet has proven no exception. For while it is highly efficient; it 
is alarmingly vulnerable. Recent history has proved that a well-executed cyber attack 
can breach computer systems globally in a matter of hours, in some cases minutes, with 
no regard for organizational or sovereign borders (White House, 2003; Freund, 2003; 
Lipson, 2002; Tritak, 2001b; Vatis, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001c; 
Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection & 
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the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 1998; Litt, 1997). As such, by using the 
Internet, a malicious actor can compromise literally millions of systems, thousands of 
miles away, at very little cost.   
Case in point, in January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm (also known as 
“Sapphire”) exploited a known Microsoft vulnerability for which a repair patch had been 
available for six months prior to the attack (Fisher, 2003a; Associated Press, 2003). Due 
to widespread neglect for installing the patch in such counties as South Korea, the 
worm caused considerable damage internationally via cascading network outages, 
canceled airline flights, and automated teller machine failures. The worm infected more 
than 90 percent of vulnerable computers worldwide within 10 minutes of its release on 
the Internet. The U.S. General Accounting Office (Dacey, 2003a) reported that the worm 
doubled in size every 8.5 seconds and achieved its full scanning rate (55 million files 
scanned per second) after about 3 minutes, making it the fastest computer worm to 
date.  
The ease with which this worm spread was directly due to the rampant presence 
of vulnerable systems within larger networks, demonstrating the adage “security is only 
as strong as its weakest link” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999, p. 4). Doddrell 
(1996) expands on this adage by offering a likely scenario whereby a government office, 
for instance, within a larger network implements security measures such as a firewall, 
while another office within the same network simply connects to the Internet with no 
protection. A hacker could theoretically enter the network via the insecure office and 
navigate to the more secure office rendering the best efforts ineffective. This plausible 
situation leaves governments in a precarious position; each one can do only so much to 
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secure its own presence in cyberspace as the connectedness of the Internet presents 
vulnerabilities that cannot always be controlled, let alone foreseen.     
In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, there has been a greater awareness of 
importance of network security, not only for each individual organization, but also for the 
vitality of the nation as a whole. As Charles McQueary, Undersecretary for Science and 
Technology at the Department of Homeland Security pointed out, "September 11 didn't 
make us more vulnerable, but made us more aware of our vulnerabilities” (Amarelo, 
2003). However, the United States' increasing dependency on the Internet and 
information technologies to manage and operate its critical infrastructures provides 
terrorists with a tactical target (Vatis, 2001). 
 
The Critical Digital Infrastructure 
The US Critical Infrastructure (henceforth CI) consists of public and private 
physical and cyber assets that are considered vital to society, commerce, and national 
security (White House, 2003; Isenberg, 2002; Allor & Lindley, 2000; Dearth, 2000; 
Tyrrell, 2000). The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP, 
1997) declared that the critical infrastructure constitutes the life support system of the 
United States and Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63, 1998) referred to it as 
the structural foundation of a society. A well-executed physical and/or virtual attack on 
major infrastructure elements could affect millions of people, both domestically and 
abroad.  
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Specifically, the U.S. Critical Infrastructure consists of eight sectors, namely, 
information and communications; electrical power systems; gas and oil transportation 
and storage; banking and finance; transportation; water supply systems; emergency 
services; and government services (Moteff, 2002; Tritak, 2001a; PDD63, 1998). While 
identified as separate sectors, they are highly interdependent. For example, the banking 
and finance sector relies on the telecommunications and computer sector, which in turn 
relies on electrical power systems, which are dependent on oil & gas transportation and 
so on. In an interview with The New Atlantis (2003), a journal for technology and 
society, former vice chairman of the White House’s Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Board, Howard Schmidt discussed the complex interrelationship between the 
information and communication sector and seemingly disparate elements of the national 
CI. He gave the following scenario to illustrate the critical linkages,  
For example, if a computer system is down for the national 
rail system, you could still physically move trains, but you 
wouldn’t want to, because you won’t know where perishable 
items are supposed to be delivered. Or perhaps chemicals 
that need to be moved to help water treatment plants won’t 
get there—so within a matter of time, water treatment 
facilities would be having problems. The underpinning of all 
these critical infrastructures are computers that must be 
protected (The New Atlantis, 2003). 
Increasingly, each sector is reliant upon networked computers, the Internet, and 
the larger information and communication infrastructure to provide CI services (White 
House, 2003; Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Lipson, 2002; 
Moteff, 2002; Executive Order 13231; Death, 2000; Long, 2000; Tyrrell, 2000). As a 
result, the Department of Justice (1998) recognized the Internet as the single most 
important critical infrastructure element today. The information and communication 
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sector, also referred to as the critical digital infrastructure (henceforth, CDI) consists of 
and connects many different elements, systems, and networks, which are owned by an 
array of governmental, private, and commercial entities. These networked elements 
play an instrumental role in the day-to-day operations of both public and private 
organizations with regard to such tasks as managing payroll; tracking inventory and 
sales; as well as research and development activities (Executive Order 13231; Dacey, 
2001). Yet, our reliance on information technology is far more profound than just the use 
of spreadsheets or network-enabled communications like telephones, fax, and e-mail 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003; Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 2002; 
Lipson, 2002; Rathmell, 2000). For years, computer systems have been used to 
manage and operate such essential CI components as power grids; gas and oil 
distribution pipelines; water treatment and distribution systems; nuclear power plants; 
hydroelectric and flood control dams; oil and chemical refineries; air traffic control 
system; elements of the financial infrastructure; and other physical systems (Dacey, 
2003a; Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research 
Council, 2002). Further, the last decade has seen the control and execution of 
numerous critical functions and procedures shift to publicly networked computers 
without a great deal of thought for security (White House, 2003; Nye, 2002; Collins, 
2001). Additionally, in an effort to reduce costs, SCADA systems (supervisory control 
and data acquisition systems) have been widely adopted (Graham-Rowe, 2003; 
Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection & 
the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 1998). These programs, which allow supply 
systems to be managed from a central and often remote control point, used to be 
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custom-built software for isolated systems. Increasingly however, they are now largely 
stock versions which are internationally available. On discussing this shift, Bill Flynt, 
former director of the Homeland Infrastructure Security Threats Office for the US Army, 
noted that it has “…left us with generic SCADAs gateways to the companies operating 
on publicly accessible networks. These days, one cyber-attack fits all" (Graham-Rowe, 
2003). This likelihood is not lost on terrorist groups. In early 2002, the FBI’s National 
Infrastructure Protection Center issued a bulletin stating it believed members of al 
Qaeda were trying to gain remote control of U.S. water supplies and wastewater 
treatment plants (Isenberg, 2002).  
By networking vital control systems via the CDI, organizations have been able to 
reduce operational costs by supporting remote maintenance, control, and update 
functions (Dacey, 2003a; Graham-Rowe, 2003). Yet these efforts have created many 
interdependent architectures that cross organizational boundaries such that often no 
single entity has sole control or responsibility for security (Sewell, 2002; Anderson, 
1999). Because of the highly connected nature of intranets, extranets, and the Internet, 
unrelated networks and systems have potential access to one another which increases 
access points for would-be attackers (Tyrrell, 2000; Jordan, 1997). The United States' 
increasing dependency on information technology to manage and operate such a wide 
array of critical infrastructure services from power supplies to health and social services, 
provides terrorists with a tactical target and has inadvertently created a national 
Achilles’ heel (Computer Security Institute, 2002; Isenberg, 2002; Moteff, 2002; Dearth, 
2000). Operating in such an unsecured environment presents tremendous challenges 
when one considers that our economy and society rely on the secure transmission of 
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data, whether command, control, proprietary, intellectual property, financial, or 
otherwise.  
Although U.S. governments only control roughly 15 percent of all U.S. 
infrastructure systems, they nevertheless perform essential services that rely on the CDI 
-whether to interface with the other infrastructure elements or the public (Sarkar, 2003; 
Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Sewell, 2002; Worthen, 2002; 
Bettelheim & Adams, 2001; Tritak, 2001a). As such, national debate has emerged over 
where to focus security efforts; on physical structures or on cyberspace (Council for 
Excellence in Government, 2002; Nye, 2002; National Infrastructure Protection Center, 
2002). As the tragic events of 9/11 demonstrated, physical attacks can result in massive 
damage and loss of life in a very short period of time. Although the damage from a 
cyber attack is unlikely to manifest in such a manner, the potential damage is high 
(Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 
2002; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001a). For example, military officials are acutely 
aware that a compromised computer system could kill people just as effectively as 
bombs or bullets (Krebs, 2003). Consider that an enemy could infiltrate a vulnerable 
military network to inject misleading information about the location of allied and enemy 
forces, leading to friendly fire casualties or an ambush. Further consider that the U.S. 
military's use of networked and satellite communications increased by more than 3,000 
percent from the first Gulf War to the second (Shachtman, 2003). 
 While an isolated cyber attack can be severely damaging (Computer Security 
Institute, 2002; Moore, 1997), the impact of a successful attack on CDI elements is 
likely to have a global reach (Stanton, 2000; Anderson, 1999; Roos, 1998; Everett et al., 
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1997). Evidence has shown that a cyber attack can spread so rapidly through the 
nation’s networks that many victims rarely have a chance to respond (Drogin, 2000; 
Clarke, 1998). Even when forewarned, it is unlikely that networked organizations would 
have sufficient time to protect themselves as effective defenses can take months, even 
years, to develop, test, and implement (White House, 2003).  
An attack targeting the CDI would likely cost lives by interfering with medical 
information systems and devices; rendering communications and electric distribution 
difficult or impossible by disabling control systems; compromising financial transactions; 
and disrupting transportation and shipping (National Infrastructure Protection Center, 
2002; Nye, 2002). Fire, EMS, police, and others might be unable communicate to one 
another at the scene of critical incidents. Dangerous fugitives or potential terrorists 
could unknowingly be admitted into the country or released from custody because 
police are unable access databases containing criminal histories. Overall, numerous 
daily functions could grind to a halt which would likely impact both local and global 
economies. As such, the question presents itself; is the nation prepared and capable of 
operating “off-line” on short notice? 
While the impact of a CDI attack could be shocking, simultaneous cyber and 
physical attacks, referred to as swarming attacks, would endanger lives directly-
affecting both physical safety and well-being (Dacey, 2003a; Hennessy, Patterson, & 
Lin, 2003; National Infrastructure Protection Center, 2002; Verton, 2002; U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2001a). A swarming attack would be used to worsen the effects of a 
physical attack. For instance, a cyber attack could be used to trigger the release of fuels 
or gas from a pipeline in the area of a planned physical attack thus stalling or even 
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stopping emergency efforts. If the airline hijackings of 9/11 were accompanied by a 
successful cyber attack on the air traffic control system efforts to clear the skies and 
scramble fighter jets would not have been as effective. Had those terrorists launched a 
coordinated cyber attack on communications channels, rescue teams would not have 
been able to coordinate responses or evacuate first responders from the towers. 
General panic among the public would have been even more likely. 
While an increase in malicious cyber activity in recent years has been widely 
reported (White House, 2003; Department of Homeland Security, 2003; Freund, 2003; 
Deibert, 2003), the issue remains whether national leaders believe that cyber attacks 
are truly a threat to national and economic security. They may feel that we should stay 
focused on protecting the physical security of our citizens from terrorism believing that 
future threats will most likely take similar forms. However, if anything, these recent 
events point to the need for us to be prepared for the unexpected; to recognize that our 
enemies have the will and ability to coordinate large scale sophisticated attacks.  
 
Breadth of Criminal Cyber Activity 
 
A national telephone survey conducted by Pew Internet and the American Life 
Project (2001) found that Americans are deeply worried about criminal activity on the 
Internet. While their revulsion at child pornography is by far their biggest concern (92 
percent of Americans say they are troubled by child pornography on the Internet), 87 
percent of Americans say they are concerned about credit card theft online; 82 percent 
are concerned about how organized terrorists can wreak havoc with Internet tools; 80 
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percent fear that the Internet can be used to commit wide scale fraud; 78 percent fear 
hackers getting access to government computer networks; 76 percent fear hackers 
getting access to business networks; and 70 percent are anxious about criminals using 
computer viruses to alter or wipe out personal computer files. The question arises: how 
realistic are these fears? 
For the last seven years, the Computer Security Institute has teamed up with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Computer Intrusion Squad to conduct a nationwide 
survey of computer crime and security (Computer Security Institute, 2002). This 
longitudinal effort has helped researchers and industry alike understand the baseline of 
such activities. The numbers released for 2002 found that for the fifth year in a row, 
more respondents cited their Internet connection as the point of attack (74 percent) 
versus their internal systems as a point of attack (33 percent). Forty percent detected 
either Denial of Service attacks and/or outside penetration attacks on their systems. 
Seventy-eight percent detected employee abuse of Internet access privileges (for 
example, downloading pornography, use of pirated software, or inappropriate use of e-
mail) and a full 85 percent detected computer viruses. 
Computer Security Institute further reported that during 2002, 90 percent of 
respondents (primarily large corporations and government agencies) detected some 
form of computer security breach and 80 percent acknowledged that they suffered 
financial losses as a result. Of the 44 percent of respondents willing to quantify their 
losses, the total figure eclipsed $455 million for 2002 alone. Yet only 34 percent of those 
that experienced a security breach reported the intrusion to law enforcement. Figures 
released by the Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie Melon University 
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stated that nearly 35,000 attacks were reported in the first 10 months of 2001 alone. 
This proved a 60 percent increase over the entire previous year (McWilliams, 2001). 
Further, a 2001 study by researchers at the University of San Diego found that Denial of 
Service attacks, such the one that froze Internet traffic in 2000 to such large sites as 
CNN.com and Ebay.com, are currently being launched at a rate of nearly 4,000 per 
week (Costello, 2001). Collectively these findings indicate that there is much more 
unauthorized and criminal activity going on in cyberspace than commonly 
acknowledged.  
Further, an overwhelming number of sources (Department of Homeland Security, 
2003; Costello, 2001; Vatis, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001c; European 
Committee on Crime Problems, 2000; Reames, 2000; Stambaugh et al., 2000; Stanton, 
2000; Triagaux, 1998; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998) note that the 
speed, virulence, and maliciousness of cyber attacks have increased dramatically in 
recent years. Criminals have used the Internet to penetrate such high profile 
organizations as the Pentagon, the White House, the FBI, the Department of Defense, 
NASA, Los Alamos, Microsoft, and AT&T (Computer Security Institute, 2002; Bettelheim 
& Adams, 2001; Costello, 2001; Dacey, 2001; Vatis, 2001; Cheney, 1999). Additionally, 
in recent years powerful worms and viruses have been used to launch numerous cyber 
attacks globally including the widely publicized ‘Melissa virus’, ‘I Love You virus’, 
‘SirCam worm’, ‘Code Red I/II worm’, ‘Nimda worm’, ‘SQL/Sapphire worm’, to name a 
few (Symantec.com, 2003; Dick, 2001; McDonald, 2001; Rhodes, 2001). According to 
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (White House, 2003) the Code Red worm 
infected 150,000 computer systems in just 14 hours. Conservative estimates of 2001 
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corporate losses from the Code Red and Nimda worms are over $3 billion due to lost 
productivity and costs to disinfect systems (Freund, 2003). The SQL Slammer worm (IT-
ISAC, 2003; Fisher, 2003a), infected over 200,000 computers and generated more than 
7 million error events in North America alone. Worldwide it affected between 400,000 
and 700,000 computers, clogged networks, and stalled Internet-enabled devices.  
Despite the evidence, some critics (Koerner, 2003; Deibert, 2003; Shachtman, 
2002; Verton, 2001; Roos, 1998; Smith, 1998) still speculate that the actual threat to the 
critical digital infrastructure is over inflated, much like the dot.com technology market of 
the late 1990s. Indeed, attacks targeting the CDI itself remain rare (Computer Science & 
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002). However, in October 
2002, NIPC reported that the 13 root-name servers that provide the primary roadmap 
for almost all Internet communications were targeted in a massive Denial of Service” 
attack (Dacey, 2003a; Associated Press, 2002). Seven of the servers failed to respond 
to legitimate network traffic, and two others failed intermittently during the attack.  
Howard Schmidt, former vice chairman of the White House’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board, avers that the threat is undeniably real and indeed 
serious, stating, “…the more we depend on the critical infrastructure being run by IT 
systems, the harder we’ll have to work to make sure we don’t fall into the situation 
where these threats become more than just an inconvenience” (The New Atlantis, 
2003). So what exactly are the threats to CDI elements and who is vulnerable to them? 
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Exploiting Vulnerabilities  
 
In order for a threat to exist two conditions must be present. First, there must be 
the capability for a threat to occur, such as the presence of a vulnerability. Second, it 
must be possible to exploit the vulnerability (Anderson, 1999). As a principle of 
computer security risk management, a vulnerability is “the absence or weakness of a 
safeguard in an asset that makes a threat potentially more harmful or costly, more likely 
to occur, or likely to occur more frequently” (Miller & Gregory, 2002). As such any 
information and communication technology element from information systems and 
internal controls, to implementation methods and design could potentially contain an 
exploitable vulnerability (Phoha, 2002; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996b). Often 
even the best security systems are unknowingly vulnerable. Only a few years ago a 
private research and development company was hired to covertly determine the security 
of the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) network systems (Goodman, 1997). Within 
the first week, the ‘hacking team’ successfully broke into 65 percent of all DoD systems. 
Further, the DoD only detected 4 percent of the occurrences.  
According to many sources (White House, 2003; Department of Homeland 
Security, 2003; Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research 
Council, 2002; Noonan, 2001; Wulf, 2001), vulnerabilities are surfacing faster than the 
country's ability and willingness to respond. Between 1995 and 2003, Computer 
Emergency Response Center (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University documented over 
10,000 computer technology vulnerabilities. While certainly an alarming number, 
remedies known as “patches” or “fixes” have been made widely available to correct 
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many of these vulnerabilities (Fisher, 2003a; Computer Science & Telecommunications 
Board and National Research Council, 2002). Even still, the technology research firm, 
the Gartner Group (Associated Press, 2002) projected that through 2005, 90 percent of 
computer attacks will continue to succeed by exploiting known vulnerabilities for which a 
corrective patch is available but simply not installed.  
 The most recent Internet Security Threat Report (2003) released by Symantec 
Corporation, a global leader in Internet security technologies, states that approximately 
60 percent of all documented vulnerabilities remain easily exploitable either because 
exploit tools are widely available or are not required at all. The report further notes that 
of the vulnerabilities newly identified during 2002, a full 85 percent were recognized as 
moderate or severe. It has been estimated that as much as 95 percent of today's 
successful attacks exploit these commonly known flaws using widely available 
automated tools (Forman, 2003). As such, a savvy attacker with a modest degree of 
sophistication can easily exploit numerous vulnerabilities found in today's commercial 
software products. Addressing this state of affairs, a security bulletin on the Microsoft 
website (2003) offered a somewhat bleak and condescending suggestion to network 
administrations ”…don't hold your breath waiting for a patch that will protect you… 
sound judgment is the key to protecting yourself…”. 
The Internet Security Threat Report suggests a trinity of events has led to the 
dramatic increase in system vulnerabilities of recent years. First, the IT industry has 
come under increased pressure from media coverage of high-profile attacks which has 
creating a push for responsible disclosure of known flaws. Second, researchers are 
using new methods to discover software bugs and fix vulnerabilities before would be 
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attackers exploit these defects. Finally, the report along with other research (Verton, 
2003a; 2003b; Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Computer 
Science and Telecommunications Board, and National Research Council, 2002; 
Denning & Baugh, 2000) suggest that a significant portion of software and hardware 
flaws can be squarely attributed to vendors, who, in the rush to get commodities to 
market, fail to make security a priority during product development.  
The critical digital infrastructure is dependent on the availability of reliable and 
secure networks (Anderson, 1999). Yet it is well documented that many of the features 
that make the underlying information systems so successful, such as distributed 
networking and plug-and-play compatible software/hardware, make the CDI inherently 
vulnerable to attack (Dacey, 2003b; Information Assurance Advisory Council, 2001; 
Public Technology, 2000; Sunshine, 1999). For example, consider that electronic mail 
systems, commonly referred to as email, have long been a source for intruder break-ins 
(Rhodes, 2001; Fraser, 1997). This is because by its very nature, an email system 
requires access to the outside world and most email servers accept input from any 
source. A 1999 study found that 84 percent of respondents admitted to regularly 
sending and receiving personal email at work (Naughton, 1999). By digitally interacting 
with so many potentially unsafe sources, employees unknowingly introduce threats into 
otherwise protected networks- and would be attackers know this. For instance, 
concerns about instant messaging security were heightened by the recent disclosure of 
six vulnerabilities in America Online Inc.'s instant messaging software ‘Mirabilis ICQ’. 
Cnet.com (Lemos, 2003) reported that the most recent version this software has been 
downloaded from its site more than a quarter of a billion times; no doubt a countless 
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number of these were onto government computers. If left unpatched, exploiting these 
ICQ vulnerabilities could create dangerous holes in enterprise firewalls, leaving 
sensitive data exposed on public networks resulting in the unprotected transfer of files 
(Vijayan, 2003). 
Another seemingly innocuous technology is the Domain Name System (DNS) 
that is used to match and verify network names to host addresses (Phoha, 2002; 
Fraser, 1997). This one system is absolutely vital to the secure operation of any 
network. An attacker who is able to successfully control or impersonate a DNS server 
can re-route or divert network traffic to a compromised system. Likewise, they could 
trick users into providing confidential information such as passwords or credit card 
information. Finally, consider wireless technologies that are being widely adopted 
because they allow users to move handheld devices or laptops from location to location 
without wires and without losing network connectivity. Forecasts made by IBM and 
Symantec at the 15th Annual Canadian IT Security Symposium warned that by the 
decade's end viruses, hacking, and security breaches of wireless-based systems will be 
a top problem for IT administrators (Careless, 2003). The inherent vulnerability and risk 
to wireless technologies lies in the underlying communication medium, the airwaves, 
which is virtually open to snooping intruders. This makes wireless communication more 
prone to loss of confidentiality and integrity. Among the biggest challenges of wireless 
connectivity is that an infected device can upload viruses or malicious code directly into 
an organization’s network whenever it is synced (NetScreen Technologies, 2003b).   
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Threats and Attacks 
 
Just as each technology has inherent weaknesses as well as distinct security 
safeguards, each is also accompanied by an array of unique threats (Institute for 
Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Fraser, 1997). In other words, means and 
methods of exploiting vulnerabilities have become as diversified and specific as the 
targets. For instance, email servers are highly vulnerable to viruses and worms. 
Commonly used threats and techniques include sniffers, backdoors, DoS, worms, logic 
bombs, social engineering, probing, false authentication, tunnels, spoofing, Trojan 
horses, malicious applets, war dialing, password crackers, et cetera (Hansell, 2003; 
Freund, 2003; Hobbs, 2000; Sager et al, 2000; U.S. Department of Justice, 1999; 
Trigaux, 1998).  
The same as the means of each threat differs, so do the aims. Yet 
fundamentally, there is a limited number of archetypal threats to information security, 
namely, denial of service; unintended disclosure of information; unauthorized disclosure 
of information; and unauthorized access to resources/information (Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1998; Moore, 1997; Fraser, 1997). Depending on intentions, 
compromises due to threats can be either observable, such as an active virus, or 
clandestine, such as espionage in search of classified information. Would be attackers 
could use a combination of both to plot future cyber strikes or swarming attacks by 
mapping U.S. information systems, identifying key targets, and lacing infrastructure 
elements with back doors and other means of access (Goldberg, 2003).  
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Additionally, threats can either be deliberate or accidental (Computer Science & 
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002; McWilliams, 2001; 
Moore, 1997; Mills, 1995). Accidental compromises occur because of either natural 
causes, such as a lightning surge that causes part of a network to fail, or human error, 
such as a programming mistake that creates a weakness in a network or unintentionally 
cutting a communications cable during excavation. However, deliberate compromises 
are the result of conscious human action. Security experts often refer to the efforts of 
these malicious actions as attacks.  
As the number of individuals with computer skills has increased, so to have the 
number of readily available and relatively easy to use intrusion and hacking tools. 
Security experts note that there are thousands of websites that offer free digital tools 
that let people snoop, crash, modify, or even hijack computers (Dacey, 2003a; Tritak, 
2001a; Bissett & Shipton, 2000; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998). 
As such, a person's technical skills o not have to be very sophisticated to cause 
damage (Wulf, 2001; Sager et al, 2000). However, in recent years it seems the goals, 
methods, and means of attacks have been changing (Computer Science & 
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002; Anderson, 1999). 
During the 1990s, most hackers operated like vandals,  
…attacking vulnerable targets with an experimental, shotgun 
approach. Malicious hackers concentrated their efforts on 
destructive viruses and swiftly spreading worms that crawled 
haphazardly across the Internet, infecting individuals and 
corporations indiscriminately (Freund, 2003).  
Today there are far more dangerous and targeted attacks carried out by highly 
skilled hackers motivated by financial gain and armed with the expertise to cause 
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serious damage (Freund, 2003). Hackers have moved beyond basic tools like viruses 
and port scanners to more sophisticated techniques that use such tools in concert 
(Hobbs, 2000). For instance, there are now computer worms that can remotely open 
back doors on networks. These mechanisms monitor traffic, intercept passwords, and 
establish secret communication channels for the hacker to use to pluck sensitive 
information at will. Additionally, recent attacks involve ‘rapid mutation’, where the level 
and source of cyber-threat changes rapidly in unpredictable ways. This is generally 
combined with the characteristic of ‘diverse origin’ where an attacker need not be 
localized in relation to the target. Aas such an attack can be orchestrated by any 
number of globally distributed actors. While attacks have always exhibited this quality, 
greater experience combined with more sophisticated attack strategies and techniques 
have made the identity of cyber-attackers increasingly difficult to ascertain (McDonald, 
2001). Further, attacks are increasingly utilizing stealthy attributes of criminal espionage 
to launch more effective and destructive attacks with minimal warning. As such, not all 
attacks are created equal as some are more destructive than others. 
Despite the real and growing threat from cyber attacks, most cyber offenses fit 
under the umbrella of “internet fraud” (Cheney, 1999). These offenses involve “any type 
of fraud scheme that uses one or more components of the internet, chat rooms, 
message boards, Web sites, or e-mail, to present fraudulent solicitations to prospective 
victims, to conduct fraudulent transactions, or to transmit the proceeds of fraud to 
financial institutions or to others connected with the scheme” (Department of Justice, 
May 8, 2000, p. 1). In 2002, 47 percent of all fraud complaints filed with the Federal 
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Trade Commission were Internet-related, up 16 percent from just three years earlier 
(Shim, 2003). 
Until recently, the majority of computer fraud and network intrusions were 
committed by current or former employees, referred to as insiders (Nash, 2003; 
Computer Security Institute, 2001; McCarthy, 1998; Goodman, 1997; Charney, 1994; 
Hurewitz & Lo 1993). Katz and Carter (1998) state that the reason for this is that 
“…insiders are familiar with their employers’ data processing operations and the type of 
data each system and application is storing and processing… and therefore know 
exactly where to look for information” (p. 224). These criminals often act because they 
feel the company owes them something. As such, motivation could be for profit by 
stealing and selling intellectual property or the offender might feel that the organization 
wronged them and thus destroying data and software would be revenge (Dacey, 2001; 
Dick, 2001). Additional motivation exists as mere opportunity.  
Upon addressing the threat of insiders, the National Manager of NITSSC, 
Michael Hayden, reminds how information systems contain “…vast amounts of sensitive 
and classified mission critical data. The potential for abuse is obvious” (NSTISSAM 
INFOSEC, 1999, forward). Yet criminals continue to obtain sensitive IT jobs because 
organizations, including elements of the US government, often fail to require 
background checks on new technology workers. For instance, the leader of an 
international hacking ring credited with a series of attacks against U.S. computer 
security organizations between 2000 and 2002 was found working as a support 
technician in a U.K. office of Siemens Communications (Roberts, 2003). While currently 
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it is not know whether the man compromised his employer or client systems, the point is 
criminal hackers work right under our nose within the information infrastructure. 
The 1997 report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection recommended allowing limited exemptions for private employers to request 
consensual background checks and to administer polygraphs to employees in sensitive 
positions. Yet background checks and polygraph examinations are not the industry 
standard. In an interview for Computer World Magazine (Verton, 2003a), the CEO of a 
U.S. executive search firm remarked, "I'm surprised at how few of my clients actually do 
background checks on their information security professionals... at most, they require 
me to do a reference check." This alarming habit demonstrates the potential ease with 
which ill-intending individuals can get hired into sensitive positions.  
Complicating the issue, consider the serious challenges and vulnerabilities 
accompanying the growing reliance the U.S. software industry has on overseas 
developers in such countries as India, Pakistan, Russia, and China. A recent study by 
Gartner Inc. predicted that by 2004, more than 80 percent of U.S. companies will 
consider outsourcing critical IT services, including software development to foreign 
companies. Opportunistic foreign employees could potentially program backdoors into 
vital software that can later be exploited. In light of recent changes in the global security 
environment, this scenario poses a very real threat (Verton, 2003a). 
While insiders will continue to pose a threat to information security for these and 
other reasons, a recent study by Deloitte & Touche found that 90 percent of network 
and system attacks are now coming from external forces and only 10 percent from 
inside sources. This shows a marked change from recent years were 60 to 70 percent 
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of attacks were internally sourced. When asked about this shift, a spokesperson with 
Deloitte & Touche commented, "As organizations become more connected there are 
more doors people can rattle to get in" (Nash, 2003, online). According to Symantec 
Corporation (2003) attacks originating from within the United States accounted for more 
than 35 percent of all of the attacks reported during 2002. Rounding out the top five 
sources of cyber attacks were South Korea, China, Germany, and France. Launching 
23.7 attacks per 10,000 Internet users, South Korea appears to have the most attackers 
per capita among countries with large online populations. The U.S. is not in the top 10 
of this list.  
The FBI (Dacey, 2003a) notes that increasingly terrorists, transnational criminals, 
and foreign intelligence services are using information exploitation tools to destroy, 
intercept, degrade, or deny access to data. As of yet, the White House (2003), does not 
believe that any traditional terrorist group has used the Internet to launch a assault on 
the US infrastructure. However, former White House cyber-security czar Richard Clarke 
recently said, "…[information technology] has always been a major interest of al-Qaeda. 
We know that from the laptops… we've recovered that have hacking tools on them. It is 
a huge mistake to think that al-Qaeda isn't technologically sophisticated, a fatal one" 
(Fisher, 2003b). 
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Government and the CDI 
Increasingly, government units at all levels are turning to information and 
communication technologies to improve and increase the services they provide (Council 
for Excellence in Government, 2003; Dunn, 1999; National Research Council, 1999; 
Center for Technology in Government, 1997a). A certain extent of this technical 
migration is mandated by federal legislation (Committee on the Internet in the Evolving 
Information Infrastructure, 2001; Government Electronics and Information Technology 
Association, 2001; McDonald, 2001; Tritak, 2001a), for example, the Federal Paperwork 
Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. §3501) and more recently, the Government Information 
Security Reform Act (NetScreen Technologies, 2003a). In some instances, state 
legislatures impose their own technical mandates on subunits of government, as is the 
case in Florida with statute 282.5004 which required Y2K compliance; statute 943.08 
which mandates the coordinated sharing of criminal justice and other public safety 
system data; and statute 408.913 which requires the development of a comprehensive 
health and human services eligibility access system (Florida Statutes, 2002). By and 
large, however, updating services and procedures through the implementation of 
advanced digital and communication technologies remains at the voluntary discretion of 
each individual government, often at the departmental level (Council for Excellence in 
Government, 2002).  
One of the more publicly touted government uses of IT is known as “electronic 
government” (henceforth, e-government). E-government is “…the use of technology, 
particularly web-based Internet applications, to enhance the access to and delivery of 
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government information and services to citizens, business partners, employees, 
agencies, and other entities” (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 2003, p.6). The wide-
ranging goal of e-government is to seamlessly integrate back-end business processes 
involving suppliers, contractors, and partners with front-end processes aimed at clients 
and customers (FTAA, 2002; Anderson, 1999). Such efforts often necessitate the 
creation of new departments and procedures; hiring IT and security experts; and 
regularly call for multi-year initiatives (Kayyem & Howitt, 2002). When these matters are 
successfully addressed, e-government can provide citizens and businesses with 24/7 
self-serve access to services in the areas of income taxes, social security, 
un/employment, official records, passport applications, drivers licenses, car registration, 
building permits, public libraries, and more (Arrison, 2002; Dacey, 2001; Deloitte 
Research, 2000; Dunn, 1999). Electronic services to businesses are equally vast and 
generally deal with permits, records, taxes, licenses, declarations, and procurement, 
among other services. In 2002, the Center for Digital Government predicted that state 
and local governments would spend $78.1 billion on IT in that year alone (Pratt, 2002). 
The benefits of e-government are numerous and documented (FTAA, 2002; 
Council for Excellence in Government, 2002; Rathmell, 2000; National Research 
Council, 1999). For example, a 2003 report released by Intergovernmental Advisory 
Board found, "States that implemented E-government programs for grants management 
streamlined their processes, eliminated paperwork, reduced application processing time 
and saw their staff costs reduced by as much as 35%" (p. 13). However, incorporating 
networked information and communication technologies into government is far from a 
service-delivery panacea as it introduces numerous issues pertaining to data privacy, 
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accessibility, and of course security. For example, in a recent report prepared for the 
House of Representatives, the U.S. General Accounting Office revealed that a review of 
Internet security of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exposed almost 900 
weaknesses across the 11 IRS organizations (Dacey, 2003a). The report stated that 
while most of the weaknesses were in the areas of access and authorization, all of the 
weaknesses could be traced to the incomplete implementation of an agency-wide 
security program. Corroborating these findings was former White House cyber security 
czar Richard Clark (Fisher, 2003b) who criticized that the government is actually less 
capable of securing its networks that it was a year ago and additionally it is doing an 
unacceptable job of helping the private sector lock down critical infrastructures.  
Perhaps the most disconcerting account of the state of overall government 
computer security is the annual congressional report card on computer security 
conducted by the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 
Financial Management & Intergovernmental Relations in conjunction with the General 
Accounting Office (Dacey, 2002). The 2002 analysis reported that the computer security 
of nearly two-thirds of the federal government's 24 major agencies earned failing marks. 
Among the failing department were the Justice Department, State Department, Office of 
Personnel Management, Treasury Department, Energy Department, Defense 
Department, Interior Department, Agriculture Department, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, and Transportation Department. The analysis concluded: 
…federal systems were not being adequately protected from 
computer-based threats, even though these systems 
process, store, and transmit enormous amounts of sensitive 
data and are indispensable to many federal agency 
operations (p 12). 
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Commenting on the report, Rep. Stephen Horn (R-CA) stated "September 11 
taught us that we must be prepared for attacks. We cannot allow government 
operations to be compromised or crippled because we failed to heed that lesson" 
(Krebs, 2002). Indeed these attacks have spurred a detailed re-evaluation of many 
spheres of life as Americans have become acutely aware of how vulnerable and 
interconnected all of infrastructure systems are (Hecker, 2002; Kayyem & Howitt, 2002; 
Bettelheim & Adams, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001c).  
As outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (1998), the basic federal 
approach to critical digital infrastructure protection has remained a strong policy 
preference for consensus-building and voluntary cooperation rather than regulatory 
actions (Tritak, 2001a). Yet experts have long warned that local, state, and national 
agencies have yet to fully achieve consensus or truly function in the spirit of cooperation 
(Whitehouse, 2003; Dacey, 2003a; Monroe, 2002; Posner, 2002; Collins, 2001; 
Willemssen, 2001; McCarthy, 1998; Dalrymple, 1998; Center for Technology & 
Government, 1997a; 1997b). Further, they do not share enough information and 
generally lack a working plan to deal with cyber attacks (Bettelheim & Adams, 2001). 
Among the challenges is that the nature of security concerns for the federal 
government, local governments, the military, and industries differ. This has led to 
problems since these sectors often share infrastructure elements for reasons of 
efficiency and economy (Schumacher & Ghosh, 2000).  
The U.S. General Accounting Office (Dacey, 2003a) reports the need for federal 
agencies to provide outreach efforts to state and local government to increase their 
infrastructure protection efforts. The current Homeland Security initiative designed to 
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meet this need is The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which endorses 
partnership, exchange, as well as local and private buy-in, which are all seen as 
essential to success (White House, 2003). Supported in large part by the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security, the strategy calls for coordination and outreach to 
state and local governments through collaborative pubic-private activities, such as 
sharing best practices; evaluating and implementing new technologies; raising 
cybersecurity awareness; increasing criminal justice activities; and developing national 
security programs to deter future cyber threats (Hecker, 2002; Walker, 2002). 
Billed as a strategy rather than a plan it calls for a change in thinking on the part 
of computer security professional and the public. Yet realizing this strategy will involve 
more than jargon. It will call for grants, regulations, tax incentives, regional coordination, 
and accountable partnerships. It will require the systematic identification of the unique 
resources and capacities of each government unit followed by an accurate matching 
between these capabilities and specific tasks (Posner, 2002; National Research 
Council, 1999). It will also entail identifying and then tackling weaknesses. 
 
Local Government 
 
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at 
what is weak (-Sun Tzu, The Art of War). 
 
Typically, local government information systems are not directly attacked 
because they do not yield enough valuable information commiserative with the effort 
and risk involved (Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003; Public Technology, 2000). Yet as 
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local governments continue to connect more systems to the Internet and offer more 
services via these networked systems the amount of “exploitable information” will 
increase. Conversely, so to will the return from breaching these systems. Currently, 
however, local systems are generally attacked because successful breaches create 
media attention, and/or quite simply, because these systems are generally weak 
(Gartner Consulting, 2000).  
According to Symantec Corporation (2003), opportunistic attackers often locate 
and strike any vulnerable system connected to the Internet regardless of who owns the 
system or the specific function of the system. In this situation a victim is not targeted but 
rather selected after being recognized as vulnerable. Targeted attacks, however, are 
directed at a specific organization. In theory, individuals who launch these types of 
attacks have identified a target and have made a deliberate attempt to gain access to its 
network. In this situation, an attacker looks for ANY weakness that will enable him/her to 
gain access to the targeted organization (Institute for Information Infrastructure 
Protection, 2003; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998). Therefore, in 
both cases weak systems are targeted. 
State and local government information systems and security procedures have 
increasingly come under fire for being weak links in the larger national infrastructure 
protection efforts (Dalton, 2002, Yim, 2002a; Davies, 2001). A study by Gartner 
Consulting (2000), noted that for most small and medium size local governments 
information security is not approached as a full time job thus leading to the creation of 
significant security issues. Public Technology Inc. (2000) also noted that local 
jurisdictions often have either inadequately trained staff or simply lack an adequate 
 44
information security staff. This, in combination with insufficient security budgets, creates 
vulnerable systems.  
Weak information security efforts among local governments have been 
documented for years and continue to be highlighted (Brock, 2000; Dacey, 2000; PDD-
63, 1998; Smith, 1998; Crescenzi, 1996; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996a; 
Solomon, 1995; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). As a case in point, the “2002 State of America’s 
Cities Survey” revealed that only 26 percent of city officials (n=725) indicated that cyber 
threats were addressed in their city’s planning; even though 85 percent indicated that 
they were concerned or very concerned about cyber attacks as a form of terrorism 
(Hoene, Baldassare, & Brennan, 2002). Several reasons are regularly cited for why the 
information security of local governments continues to lag behind including smaller 
budgets, lack of available skilled personnel, entrenched cultures, parochial concerns, 
general inertia, and fragmentation of local and state governments among others 
(Hecker, 2002; Yim, 2002b; Davies, 2001). Like many small organizations, local 
governments often lack the experience to adequately inform themselves about cyber 
threats to their networks and systems. Operating from this uninformed position, they 
often cannot justify allocating the resources for protective measures (Information 
Assurance Advisory Council, 2001).  
 
County Government 
 
Among those facing these challenges are county governments (Gonzales, 2001; 
U.S. General accounting Office, 2001c). Often called ‘invisible governments’, counties 
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are generally responsible for maintaining such diverse services and programs as natural 
resources; fire protection; water supply; housing and community development; 
sewerage; cemeteries; libraries; parks; roads and highways; hospitals; education; 
airports; utilities; and records (National Association of Counties, 2001c; Altshuler, et al. 
1999). More than states or cities, counties interact with differing levels of government on 
a day-to-day basis (Barrett, Greens, & Mariani, 2002). With limited power, counties are 
continually squeezed by the governments above and below them. According to the 
2002 Local Government Directory released by the U.S. Census Bureau there are 
87,849 units of local government identified as being either general-purpose (3,034 
counties, 19,431 municipalities, and 6,506 townships) or special purpose (13,522 school 
districts and 35,356 special districts). As such, an average county has 28 
general/special purpose sub-county governments operating within its jurisdiction.  
All but two U.S. states (Connecticut and Rhode Island), and the District of 
Columbia have operational counties governments4 (National Association of Counties, 
2001c). The number of counties per state ranges from three in Hawaii to 254 in Texas. 
Geographically, counties span an equally broad range varying in size from just 67 
square kilometers (Arlington County, Virginia) to the 227,559 square kilometers of North 
Slope Borough, Alaska. The mean county population is just under 80,000 people yet 
three-fourths of all counties have populations smaller than 50,000. Despite the 
averages, counties remain as diverse as the populations they serve. For instance, 
Loving County, Texas, serves approximately 150 inhabitants, while Los Angeles 
                                            
4 Alaska and Louisiana refer to their counties as boroughs and parishes respectively. 
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County, California, serves more than 9 million. In addition to the 3,034 traditional U.S. 
counties, 31 are chartered to operate as city-county governments where functions are 
consolidated (i.e., Duval/Jacksonville, Florida; San Francisco, California; and New York, 
New York). Regardless of charter distinctions, administrative rights and responsibilities 
are generally vested by state constitution or statute (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002a; 
Altshuler, et. al. 1999). 
According to the National Association of Counties (2001c), there are three main 
types of county governance, Commission/Administrator, Council Executive, and 
Commission. The commission form of government, the oldest form of government in 
America, remains the most widespread (72 percent). A descendent of the old English 
shire-moot system (Iowa State Association of Counties, 2003), counties are 
characterized by an elected governing board, usually comprised of three to seven 
members, which holds both legislative and executive powers. The board serves as the 
governing body for the county and is responsible for the budget, passing resolutions, 
and enacting locally relevant ordinances and regulations.  
Strained interorganizational communication and cooperation are commonplace 
within county government, whether between officials, departments, or municipalities 
(International City/County Management Association, 2002). These relationships can be 
difficult and even acrimonious. Among the greatest challenges is the structural reality 
that counties are run by numerous elected officials who do not have to report to the 
Board of Commissioners or single county administrator. For in addition to the board, 
several constitutional posts are filled through general elections to head major county 
offices. These often include Sheriff, Property Appraiser, Supervisor of Elections, Tax 
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Collector, and Clerk of Court, though this varies considerably from county to county. 
These department officials often claim that their mandate comes directly from the voters 
and as such they do not need direction from an external administrative body (Barrett, 
Greene, & Mariani, 2002). This is especially true with regard to IT related issues were it 
is common for agencies to invest in solutions aimed specifically at meeting only their 
needs without general thought to the interplay between the agencies themselves 
(National Research Council, 1999). For example, in Palm Beach County Florida, the 
Property Appraiser, Tax Collector, Clerk of the Court, State Attorney, Sheriff, Public 
Defender, and Supervisor of Elections all have their own autonomous IT staffs and 
systems (Governing.com, 2002). Compounding these IT challenges are the barriers 
which exist between local, state, and federal governmental bodies. According to one 
county official, 
Inter-jurisdictional coordination and cooperation is a major 
challenge. Many government services and work processes 
transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Despite the willingness 
of the parties, it is often difficult to align the focus, priorities 
and capabilities of the agencies (Governing.com 2002). 
Many counties are beginning to assess how to restructure relationships among 
contiguous local entities to take advantage of economies of scale; promote resource 
sharing; and improve coordination of preparedness and response on a regional basis 
(Monroe, 2002, Posner, 2002). Counties are also rethinking roles and responsibilities 
with regard to information security as they are becoming increasingly aware of the 
vulnerabilities of their information technology systems (Kouns, 2003; O’Connell, 2003; 
Barrett, Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Gonzales, 2001). In recent years, counties across the 
nation have created steering committees and appointed information security executives 
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(known as Chief Information Officers, Chief Technology Officers, or Chief Information 
Security Officers) to work towards greater IT security (Lee, 2001; West & Berman, 2001; 
Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). These information security executives are 
generally brought in to provide technological vision and management. In addition, they 
are often responsible for technology planning such as sponsoring collaborative planning 
processes; establishing strategic partnerships; coordinating divisional initiatives; general 
infrastructure and application development; ensuring ongoing investment; and 
outsourcing (Gartner Group, 2002; Frazer, 1997).  
Along side national and state leaders, county IT directors work on the front lines 
to balance public demands and entrepreneurial growth with cyber security and national 
defense. An online survey conducted by CIO Magazine (2002) revealed that the 
majority of IT executives spend more of their time engaged in strategic planning than 
pure technology. While they take an obvious leadership role in terms of the 
organization, systems, and the underlying IT infrastructure; they dispense a 
considerable amount of energy attempting to steer knowledge management and the 
valuation of intellectual capital. It is often the case that IT directors report to senior 
executives, commissioners, and elected officials who do not necessarily have a great 
deal of technology-related knowledge (Sarkar, 2002; National Research Council, 1999). 
As Gartner Consulting (2000) reported in a recent study, ”The cold hard fact is that most 
elected officials, city managers, and chief administrative officers do not understand the 
internet or its profound influence on government operations and citizen demands” (p. 9). 
As such, part of the job of an IT director is selling not only the value of technology but 
also the value of security (Forman, 2003; Perlman, 2002a).   
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Information Security: More than Technology 
Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not 
the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army 
without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence (-Sun Tzu, 
The Art of War). 
 
The nature of the Internet is an intrinsic trade-off between utility and security 
(Computer Science & Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 
2002; Information Assurance Advisory Council, 2001; McCarthy, 1998). As a rule 
(Collins, 2001), the best and most secure systems are the ones built with security in 
mind from the ground up. However, security is not built into the Internet itself, thus, as a 
society we are now tasked with retroactively securing a living system that was designed 
to be open for easy connectivity with few controls (Bettelheim & Adams, 2001; Cohen, 
2000). Consequently, information security remains an unpredictable circle of action and 
reaction (Doddrell, 1996). When vulnerabilities are corrected, attackers look for new 
paths to exploit and so on. Yet security is still practiced only half-heartedly throughout 
much of the government and corporate America (Dacey, 2001; Willemssen, 2001). In 
the journal Issues in Science and Technology, author George Smith (1998) frankly 
suggested, “If organizations don’t intend to be serious about security, they simply 
should not be hooking their computers to the Internet”. While undoubtedly a valid 
suggestion, this option is simply not realistic. 
To understand information security, it is important to note that information 
systems, both automated and manual, are composed of three basic elements: 
information transfer links, information processing nodes (including storage), and human 
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factors (Phoha, 2002; Transition Office of the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection & the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 1998). 
Fundamentally, information security is the protection of information systems, whether 
transfer or processing, against unauthorized access, modification, or denial of service to 
authorized users (Schumacher & Ghosh, 2000). Information security includes those 
measures necessary to prevent, detect, document, counter, and mitigate such threats 
(Guel, 2001; Center for Technology in Government, 1997a). It involves “…determining 
what you need to protect, what you need to protect it from, and how to protect it. It is the 
process of examining all of your risks, then ranking those risks by level of severity” 
(Fraser, 1997, p. 4). The more complex a system is, the more likely critical 
vulnerabilities will exist and potentially be overlooked (Collins, 2001).  
If for a moment one assumed that all technological holes could be secured today, 
there would still be the introduction of new vulnerabilities at some future point and of 
course human error (Wulf, 2001). Many compromises result from improper configuration 
(Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003; Computer Science & Telecommunications Board 
and National Research Council, 2002). For example, a system firewall may be 
improperly configured to allow web access when, in fact, the system should only 
transmit and receive e-mail or an operating system may lack a critical "patch" because 
the system was restored from a backup tape that did not include the patch in the first 
place. In light of the numerous points for error, information security is best approached 
holistically bearing in mind how technological, managerial, organizational, regulatory, 
economic, and social aspects interact (Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 
2003; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003; Everett, Dewindt, and 
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McDade, 1997; Korzyk & Wynne, 1997). With so many aspects involved in executing 
even the simplest functions, points for error are potentially innumerable. Consequently, 
maintaining a holistic vantage to information security is vital as one weak link can topple 
even the strongest systems.  
At the heart of information security are three ideas commonly referred to as the 
information security triad (Miller & Gregory, 2002; Wulf, 2001; Fraser, 1997). These 
ideas are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality can be thought of as 
privacy, secrecy, or control of information. When a system lacks confidentiality, there 
can be a “leak” of information and resources. Integrity commonly refers to the quality 
and reliability of data. When integrity is lacking, system data can easily corrupted or 
modified by attackers. Data integrity includes protecting data/systems from 
unauthorized modification and ensuring that transferred data is safely sent/received 
between known reliable sources. Availability is simply that; having systems and 
functions available when needed by those authorized to use them. The opposite of 
availability is commonly referred to as denial of services, denial of use, denial of 
information, or simply denial. Taken collectively, an IT manager is therefore concerned 
with the level of risk associated with loss of privacy (i.e. unauthorized individuals 
reading of confidential information), loss of data (i.e. corruption or loss of information), 
and the loss of service (e.g. running out of data storage space; denial of network 
access; or overburdening computational or processing resources).  
To simultaneously achieve these three qualities, information security is layered 
whereby some layers are designed to protect, some to detect, and others offer fail-safes 
(Collins, 2001). Additionally, security is compartmentalized, like a honeycomb with trap 
 52
doors, where flexible layers are set up as defense barriers to contain breaches to the 
smallest area possible. The “Common Body of Knowledge” (henceforth, CBK), also 
referred to as the “ten domains of information security”, encompasses the breadth and 
base of knowledge deemed necessary for information security professionals to 
successfully apply and integrate these vital layers (Miller & Gregory, 2002). The CBK, 
maintained and amended by the nonprofit organization International Information 
Systems Security Certifications Consortium (ISC2), is the international compilation and 
distillation of security material relevant to IT security professionals. Briefly described, the 
10 areas are (ISC2.com, 2003): 
1. Access Control Systems and Methodology: Mechanisms that work together to 
create a security architecture for protecting information system assets. 
2. Applications and Systems Development: Security as it applies to application 
software development. 
3. Business Continuity Planning: Preservation and recovery of business operations 
in the event of outages. 
4. Cryptography: Principles, means, and methods of disguising information to 
ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.  
5. Law, Investigation and Ethics: Computer crime laws and regulations as well as 
technologies used to investigate computer crime incidents. 
6. Operations Security: Controls for hardware, media, and the 
operators/administrators with access privileges to said resources. 
7. Physical Security: Protection techniques for an entire facility from the outside 
perimeter to inside office space, including all information system resources. 
8. Security Architecture and Models: Concepts, principles, structures, and 
standards to design, monitor, and secure operating systems, equipment, 
networks, applications, and controls used to enforce confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. 
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9. Security Management Practices: Information assets and definitions for the 
development, documentation, and implementation of policies, standards, 
procedures, and guidelines. 
10. Telecommunications, Network, and Internet Security: Network structures, 
transmission methods, and transport formats used for transmissions over 
private/public communications network. 
  
Staying on top of each of these knowledge areas is a near Herculean task for IT 
professionals. Yet, the Computer Science & Telecommunications Board together with 
the National Research Council (2002) report that isolated human error is usually not the 
cause of security problems, rather it is management practice. Indeed, faced with ever-
dynamic technology innovations, IT managers are frequently pressured to make quick 
decisions based on incomplete information, limited staff, short budgets, and imposing 
demands from executive management. Common decisions involve trade-offs between 
services offered, ease of use, and costs on one hand, and security, confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability on the other. In the end, security administrators must not only 
be adept with all areas of the CBK but must also be knowledgeable of government 
regulations, physical security, public-private sector partnerships, and management 
practices (Hennessy, Patterson, & Lin, 2003; Radcliff, 2002; Cohen, 2000).  
Overwhelmingly, the information security literature emphasizes the importance of 
methodical and meticulous management as the key to information security and 
homeland defense (Whitehouse, 2003; Perlman, 2002a; Posner, 2002; Collins, 2001; 
Willemssen, 2001; Anderson, 1999; McCarthy, 1998; Dalrymple, 1998; Center for 
Technology & Government, 1997a; 1997b). For example, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (1996a) cautioned that the “introduction of newer, faster, cheaper technology is 
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not a panacea for flawed management practices or poorly designed business 
processes” (p. 5). The Accounting and Information Management Division of the U.S. 
Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems (Brook, 2001; 2000) avers that the 
underlying problem with government information security is poor management. 
Research by Public Technology Incorporated (2000) found that effective information 
security is not just a technology issue to be left to the ‘technology people’ but rather 
requires strategic and business acumen on the part of IT management. Research by 
West and Berman (2001) conclude that IT officers need to combine their technical 
expertise with management savvy to successfully work across departments and 
functional areas to achieve strategic objectives. Further, the Institute for Information 
Infrastructure Protection (2003) determined that well-designed information security 
“…require[s] expertise in information management and security technologies, as well as 
an understanding of policy requirements, business models, and organizational 
processes" (p. 24).  
Fundamentally, information security management involves ensuring that 
adequate information security tools are properly in place; that staff is trained to use 
these tools; that enough time is available to use them properly; and that all personnel 
are held accountable for their information security practices (Computer Science & 
Telecommunications Board and National Research Council, 2002). Yet it is ultimately 
more complex as administrators are required to interface with processes and 
organizations beyond their immediate functional areas. IT security managers must 
possess a unique understanding of information-related risk and the ability to make 
prudent decisions on the interaction of many divergent elements, often with incomplete 
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information (Cohen, 2000). Mark Forman, Chief of Information Technology for the Bush 
administration, affirms that government IT leaders need to possess three distinct 
knowledge and skill areas, namely, an understanding of the business of government, an 
ability to effectively manage resources, and the possession of solid management skills 
(Frank, 2001). The task then for these individuals is to understand this balance, to 
understand how to leverage the technology, to understand how to instigate change, and 
to be able to motivate action up and down the organization. As such, information 
security strategies lean toward managed progress, rather than natural growth in an 
attempt to control influences (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999).  
Literature on information management (Cowings, 2001; Center for Technology in 
Government, 1997a; Moore, 1997; NIST Bulletin, 1995; August, 1994) highlights three 
responsibilities unique to IT managers, (1) anticipating and understanding technological 
change, (2) anticipating and understanding information security, and (3) maintaining 
effective communication between IT and non-IT divisions. Merging these ideas, Everett, 
Dewindt, and McDade (1997) suggest that managers strategically approach information 
security as a mosaic, whereby each piece, or element, is understood in terms of the 
effect on the sum total. This also includes a mindfulness of elements which exist outside 
of a manager’s immediate area of responsibility or authority, such as other 
organizations with which relations take place. This is perhaps most especially true with 
regard to government information systems, for as the Center for Technology and 
Government (1997a) points out, "No government information system stands completely 
on its own. Each system is implemented in a work environment that includes people, 
processes, organizational relationships, and other systems" (p. 36).  Indeed, the 
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Intergovernmental Advisory Board (1998) has noted that current approaches to 
managing governmental information technology are evolving and key among the new 
approaches is intergovernmental management. Further, Frank McDonough (2002), 
Deputy Associate Administrator of the U.S. General Services Administration, firmly 
states that intergovernmental management will be the challenge for information security 
in the next 20 years. He notes several converging conditions which support this position 
including a Presidential administration focused on improving information security; a 
demonstrated need to integrate distinct databases to meet homeland security needs; 
the presence of program overlap between numerous agencies in a time of budget 
deficits; and the need to acquire/train IT staff after a decade of personnel freezes. 
Collectively, these conditions point toward the growing importance of integrated 
systems and collaboration which are at the heart of intergovernmental management.  
To appreciate the interplay of these activities as they relate to governmental 
information security, it is essential to comprehend the nature and theory of 
intergovernmental management (henceforth, IGM). As such, it is necessary to first 
understand intergovernmental relations (henceforth, IGR) as they are the bedrock of 
intergovernmental management. Therefore, the next chapter discusses IGR as an 
identifiable organizational endeavor at the heart of IGM before presenting contemporary 
applications of the theory of intergovernmental management in the context of 
information security. 
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III. THEORY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
 
Intergovernmental Relations 
The American system of government is a delicate balance of partnerships 
between national, state, local, and private bodies (Carlson, 1988; Elazar, 1964). Since 
inception, this system has been marked by an undercurrent of shared powers and 
responsibilities rather than merely their separation (Stenberg, 1984). In practice, the 
distinctions between governments are often blurred whereby no unit truly operates 
independently (Ellison, 1998). This degree of interdependence requires not only 
increased levels of transparency and accessibility but also the skillful use of 
compromise, negotiation, and coordination on the part of intergovernmental partners 
(Governments Without Boundaries, 2002; Nelson, 2001; Luke & Caiden, 1999; 
Stenberg, 1984). As such, inherent to the American system of government is the 
practice of intergovernmental management; however, as a theory IGM is relatively new 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). 
The origins of IGM can be traced to the notion of intergovernmental relations that 
rose to prominence in the 1930s when the federal government undertook this initiative 
to reduce the turmoil of the Great Depression via innovative intergovernmental 
programs introduced as part of the New Deal (Wright, 1992; Macaluso, 1984). 
Consequently, the term “IGR” came to be associated with liberal, progressive, and 
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active government ideas that defined that era. However, the first official (statutory) use 
of the term IGR did not occur until 1953 when Congress created the temporary 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Wright, 1983). Over time, the subtleties 
and distinctions of intergovernmental relations continued to evolve and reflect the 
political movements and events of the day; proving the scope of IGR to be broader than 
its early characterization.  
Differing from traditional federalism, which emphasizes independent levels of 
government and divided functions (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983), IGR focuses on 
relationships between governments which develop in the pursuit of a common goal. 
However, a review of the literature reveals no singular definition of intergovernmental 
relations. Therefore, a sampling of several definitions will help to provide a framework 
from which to begin this discussion. According to Denhardt (1995), IGR encompass 
“…all the complex and interdependent relationships among those at various levels of 
government as they seek to develop and implement public programs” (p. 75). Cooper et 
al. (1998) aver that IGR consists of the connections and competition which characterize 
the way public sector managers deal with one another and with the body politic. 
Frederickson (1997) contends that IGR is "the wide range of types of organizations and 
institutions that are linked together and engaged in public activities” (p. 84). Regardless 
of how they are defined, intergovernmental activities and partnerships permeate the 
national landscape as they are utilized to deliver an array of federal, state, and local 
programs for everything from food stamps to hazardous waste cleanup.  
While the breadth of situations for which intergovernmental solutions are 
employed is vast (Allen, 1994), often, the legal and political incentives for government 
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units to operate separately are much stronger than the incentives to cooperate. 
According to interorganizational theory, which focuses on the relations between 
organizations by looking at interdependencies and strategies (Kickert, Klijn, & 
Koppenjan, 1997), there are six general drives for relationship formation, namely, out of 
necessity, to balance asymmetry, for reasons of reciprocity, to increase efficiency, to 
foster stability, and to produce legitimacy (Oliver, 1990). The decision to pool resources 
and share authority with another organization is largely based on weighing risks against 
returns (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). The resolution to proceed requires that 
both the structure and dealings of a proposed intergovernmental relation will respect 
existing jurisdictional boundaries (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983). Yet, even when 
agreements on such matters are reached, Turner (1990) suggests that tension between 
governments may remain problematic for power sharing near guarantees that relations 
will remain unstable. 
Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram (2001) note that there are only four ways in 
which IGR are actually created. They are; 1) through formal constitutional change, 
which redefines the roles and responsibilities; 2) through non-statutory agreements that 
set out obligations and commitments for specific policy areas, such as the environment; 
3) via statutory and binding obligations, such as intergovernmental transfers; and 4) the 
final way in which most intergovernmental relationships are created is by means of 
informal agreements among political leaders or managers to undertake a certain course 
of action. Research (Cooper et al., 1998) has found that regardless of how they are 
created, intergovernmental or cooperative agreements usually pertain to a single 
activity; concern services rather than facilities; are not permanent but contain provisions 
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for future renegotiations or termination; have stand-by provisions that come into effect 
when certain conditions arise; and are endorsed by higher levels of government. 
The Intergovernmental Advisory Board (1998) suggests that intergovernmental 
collaboration is warranted when “…no single agency or organization has the authority, 
resources, or expertise to address a problem that cuts across geographic and political 
boundaries” (p. 7).  However, Powell et al. (1996) point out that such collaboration 
should not be viewed simply as a means to compensate for a lack of internal resources. 
Rather IGR can be a means to further develop and strengthen the existing internal 
competencies of an organization as well as “…deepen [its] ability to collaborate, not just 
by managing relations dyadically, but by instantiating and refining routines for 
synergistic partnering” (p. 199).  
Deil Wright notes that once agreements are reached IGRs bear several 
fundamental qualities. In his 1982 book titled Understanding Intergovernmental 
Relations, Wright outlined five distinctive features of IGR that still pervade the literature 
on the subject over twenty years later. First, governmental units of all types and levels 
participate in IRG activities and relationships. As such, IGR encompass not only the 
national-state exchanges at the heart of the federalist system but also the essential 
associations and affairs between national-local, state-local, and interlocal units (Luke & 
Caiden, 1999; Cooper et. al, 1998; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; Agranoff & 
McGuire, 1998).  As explained by Wright (1983), “IGR suggests that the U.S. system 
(singular) is in fact a system of systems (plural)” (p. 423). The second aspect common 
to IGR is the human dimension. William Anderson (1960) pithily addressed this tenet 
over 40 years ago when he wrote; “It is human beings clothed with office who are the 
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real determiners of what the relations between units of government will be” (p. 4). The 
influential, yet highly amorphous human component includes the attitudes, perceptions, 
and general aptitude of the individuals occupying positions in the various governmental 
units (Denhardt, 1995, Gargan, 2000). The third distinctive feature of IGR is that officials 
regularly interact with officials from other jurisdictions. Whether these interactions are 
for the purpose of exchanging resources, information, or views, they are not one-time 
occasional occurrences; rather they underscore day-to-day patterns of contact (Agranoff 
& McGuire, 1999). Further, these interactions are not capriciously or arbitrarily 
undertaken but are instead targeted efforts to realize specific aims (Luke & Caiden, 
1999; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983). A fourth mark of IGR is that from Senators to 
community program directors all public servants are potential participants in 
intergovernmental processes; whether they simply phone another organization to ask a 
question or they design an interlocal service delivery system. The fifth and final aspect 
common to intergovernmental relations is policy. Many researchers (Denhardt, 1995; 
Ellison, 1998b; Bohte & Meier, 2000; Gargan, 2000) contend that public policy is 
formulated and achieved in an interactive and intergovernmental context. That is, 
behind the obvious macro workings of political gears, policy is in large part generated, 
implemented, and maintained by the micro interactions and activities of governmental 
officials (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). These actions also include inactions, 
intentions, discretion, and their combined consequences (Wright, 1983). The melding of 
these mercurial micro-elements into the backdrop of policy-making often produces an 
unpredictable environment for practitioners (Ellison 1998b; Denhardt, 1995; Oliver, 
1990).  
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Wright provides a crisp summary of these five distinguishing attributes of IGR in 
a piece which appeared in the 1983 Handbook of Organizational Management (p. 425): 
IGR encompasses linkages among all governmental entities 
in the U.S. political system, emphasizes the human 
dimension of the cross-boundary relationships, includes 
exchanges among officials (especially administrators), 
acknowledges that the exchanges are frequent and follow 
regular patterns, and incorporates policy or purposive 
behavior as a prominent element in the study and practice of 
the field. 
While IGRs share these fundamental characteristics, understanding modern 
IGRs in this country requires understanding that relationships among governmental 
units are multi-dimensional. Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram (2001) note that each 
individual intergovernmental arrangement may vary on a number of unique structural 
traits, such as, whether the relationship coordinates horizontal (peer) or vertical 
(superordinate and subordinate) groups; is formally mandated or informally voluntary; 
structurally or procedurally driven; or institutionalized rather than ad hoc. IGRs can also 
vary in the number of participants (bilateral, multilateral, or regional); the types of 
participants (bureaucratic, political, private, or nonprofit); or the nature of the interaction 
(consultative or decision-making). Furthermore, a unit of government may have 
simultaneous and overlapping relationships with different jurisdictions, at various levels, 
to address a single issue (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Wright 1993).  
Despite structural differences between IGRs, successful cooperation and 
administration can produce several advantages for participating governments, such as; 
the creation of a united front for building public support for regional programs; increased 
political power through multi-jurisdictional cooperation; shared liability; consistent laws, 
 63
regulations, policies, or practices across affiliated jurisdictions; and efficient 
management of pooled resources (Cooper et al., 1998). In addition, IGR can create 
interagency committees to study various issues; launch or coordinate proactive or 
reactive initiatives; coordinate local developments within the bounds of national or 
statewide plans; provide ways to lessen overhead through merged planning and 
administrative requirements; as well as call attention to fiscal, regulatory, and other 
impacts of pending legislation (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001; Stenberg, 1984). 
The interdependencies which underlie contemporary policies, programs, politics, 
and economics connect governmental units more closely than ever before (Gargan, 
2000; Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Wright, 1998). Through intergovernmental 
collaboration, information, resources, and ideas are exchanged, but for IGRs to be 
successful, participants must think beyond to needs of their immediate organization and 
develop a shared vision. Through concerted efforts or simply via frequent and repeated 
interaction, managers can not only establish rules and patterns necessary for 
intergovernmental collaboration, but can also develop this important sense of common 
purpose (Kickert & Klijn, 1997). Cooper et al. (1998) point out that understanding the 
extent and role of intergovernmental relations facilitates a better awareness of the 
scope of public administration in the American political system; the type of activities that 
public officials regularly perform; the major actors involved in the delivery of public 
goods and services; and the ever-changing administrative structure for addressing 
critical policy issues. This awareness brings into focus patterns of behavior fundamental 
to policy development and program administration that are otherwise obscured. 
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Initiatives that cross government boundaries not only introduce participating 
organizations to new patterns of cooperative behavior to but also to new complexities 
(Nelson, 2000; Luke & Caiden, 1999). The interdependence born of these relations and 
initiatives can impede self-governance and complicates administration. Agranoff and 
Lindsay (1983) note that interdependent governments face challenges arising from 
overlapping legal and statutory authority; issues of agency autonomy or turf protection; 
the  lack of high-level administrative support for or incentives to coordinate; the lack of 
perceived independence; and general difficulties in standardizing interjurisdictional 
procedures. Group Decision Support Systems (2002) points out that cross-agency 
initiatives often lack a comprehensible connection between vision, strategy, and 
management. This can be due to several causes such as; the lack of a detailed 
assessment of the current situation; a lack of clarity of the leader's intent; the lack of 
continuous involvement of the leaders; fragmentation at the top; a general lack of 
communication; and/or the initial rationale is no longer relevant.  
Underlying these intergovernmental challenges is the need to achieve balance 
between the autonomy of subnational government units and the federal need to retain 
control of such units (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). Adding to this complexity, 
each partnering jurisdiction has its own governance, structure, procedures, and 
authority (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983). It is often the case that collaborating governments 
have different budget cycles, application formats, monitoring procedures, decision-
making processes, and reporting procedures. Taken together, these matters force 
program managers and administrators to contend with some difficult tasks such as, 
delineating accountability, determining funding obligations, and standardizing 
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interjurisdictional procedures (Stenberg, 1984; Macaluso, 1984). Addressing these 
matters and meeting the challenges inherent to intergovernmental programs and policy 
implementation are of central concern to government managers and administrators. 
Research (Bolman & Deal, 1999; Luke & Caiden, 1999; Cooper et. al, 1998; Wright, 
1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983) has shown that intergovernmental management can 
provide essential skills, techniques, and direction to minimize these challenges.  
 
Intergovernmental Management 
From overlapping authority, to issues of autonomy and turf protection, the 
intricate issues inherent to operating within and across intergovernmental associations 
create many challenging tasks for managers. Balancing goals against these complex 
challenges requires coordination and cooperation between government units. As such, 
intergovernmental concerns call for intergovernmental management (Gargan, 2000; 
Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997). According to Wright (1998), the 
most distinguishing and apparent feature of IGM is its emphasis of the management 
process. For that reason, it is important to briefly discuss management in the classic 
sense before addressing the details of IGM. 
In the purest form, management has been described as “…the organization and 
direction of resources to achieve a desired result” (Allison, 1999, p. 16). Yet managing 
is more complex than just determining a goal and enrolling actors towards achieving 
that end. Peter Drucker (1973) describes management as “…the organ of leadership, 
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direction, and decision…” in an organization (p. 17). He explains that management is 
equally a function, a discipline, and a task to be done. Existing within the dovetail of 
these roles, management is simultaneously concerned with knowing and predicting the 
future; being analytic and quantitative; as well as being rational and systematic 
(Wakeley, 1983). The breadth of these concerns compels, if not requires, managers to 
be functionally involved in near all aspects of the organization or department under their 
charge. It involves implementing multifarious strategies, often amid disagreement and 
under inconsistent conditions, to achieve cooperative solutions that affect both senior 
and staff elements of an organization (O’Toole, Hanf, & Hupe, 1997).  
In a classic piece from 1937, Gulick and Urwick outlined seven general 
management functions: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, 
and budgeting. These functions translate into activities such as structuring and 
designing an organization; setting goals for an organization; and ensuring that goals are 
met (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). Exactly which specific actions fall out of these 
key management functions depends on a matrix of variables not limited to the character 
of an organization, decision-making patterns, and the distribution of authority (Allison, 
1999; Wright, 1983). 
With increasing frequency, managerial activities often need to be carried out 
across formal legal jurisdictions and involve different public and/or non-profit 
organizations. The routine occurrence and observance of such interjurisdictional 
managerial activities is generally referred to as “intergovernmental management” 
(Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 2003, 1998; Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental, 1996; Mandell, 1979). Like intergovernmental relations, 
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intergovernmental management has been characterized many different ways causing 
scholars to acknowledge that there is no set or consensual definition (Wright, 1998; 
Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). Agranoff & McGuire (2001) posit that the reason for this 
variation is that, as a term, IGM is “…of recent vintage, specialized usage, limited 
visibility, and uncertain maturity because it includes so many disparate actions…” (p. 
672). Indeed, a review of the literature reveals several descriptions whereby 
researchers fix upon different components of IGM. Some emphasize the role of 
managerial activities (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 1999, 1998; Bolman & Deal, 1999; 
Wright, 1998, 1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983; Mandell, 1979); others focus on the 
importance of strategy and policy (Gargan, 2000; Radin, 2000; Ellison, 1998); while still 
others highlight structural integration and collaboration (Nelson, 2001; Perry & Kraemer, 
1999; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998).  
Despite the various points of emphasis, interpreted collectively, IGM is the 
melding of interorganizational communication, strategic planning, and management 
actions to achieve collective goals and manage interdependencies that arise from 
intergovernmental relations. While IGR delineate connections and outline obligations 
between government units, IGM goes further by employing activities aimed at 
maximizing goal attainment and minimizing the challenges inherent to these 
associations. Whereas IGR identifies who the actors are and how they relate, IGM is an 
action-oriented process that allows administrators at all levels the wherewithal to act 
constructively (Mandell, 1979). Intergovernmental management provides the capabilities 
to take useful actions to enable intergovernmental relations to succeed. As such, 
intergovernmental management is an extension of intergovernmental relations.  
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Typical IGM actors are managers, such as information technology managers, 
program officers, and elected officials who are charged with maintaining intricate public 
programming (West & Berman, 2001; Cooper et al., 1998). However to one degree or 
another, most public managers and officials have engaged in some form of IGM 
whether or not they were consciously aware of it (Wright, 1999, 1983; Anderson, 1960). 
Agranoff & McGuire, (1998) assert that IGM techniques are enacted when three 
elements converge namely, strategic activity, interdependence, and multiple actors. 
That is, when conditions are uncertain and complex (requiring strategic activity); when 
problems and/or solutions have a direct effect on other governments (evidence of 
interdependence); and when collaborative efforts span multiple governments, sectors, 
or organizations (multiple actors). Striving to solve problems and meet goals in such an 
environment requires balancing and accommodating the mercurial political, legal, and 
technical idiosyncrasies of simultaneous and even conflicting formal relations and 
informal entanglements. Doing so commonly includes the complex execution of 
decisions and the mutual adherence to agreements as determined by participants. 
In and of themselves, the outcomes of IGM activities generally do not change 
social structures or eliminate complex problems. The reason is that intergovernmental 
management is less concerned with macro changes that amend the larger political, 
economic, and social equilibrium (Radin, 2000; Bolman & Deal, 1999). Rather IGM 
regards policies, programs, systems, and structure principally as given and 
concentrates more on “…incremental adjustments in managerial activities that enhance 
service delivery” (Wright, 1998, p. 420). The foremost objective of IGM is achieving 
positive results through skillful public management. In practice the “nuts and bolts of 
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substantive issues” are of principal importance in intergovernmental management 
(Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983, p. 229). Because of this utilitarian nature, intergovernmental 
management can be employed ad hoc in response to conditions that arise across 
affiliated governmental units.  
While the unstructured application of IGM techniques are seemingly common, as 
a developing theory several distinctive functions of IGM have been identified. In the 
manner of Gulick and Urwick’s 1937 assessment of the general functions of classic 
management, Wright (1983) identified three general, yet not wholly mutually-exclusive 
functions of IGM. He posits that the most prominent courses of action in 
intergovernmental management are 1) problem solving; 2) networking; and 3) providing 
coping mechanisms.  
 
Problem Solving 
 
Among the tasks common to all managers is to solve problems in a responsive 
and responsible way (McGowen, 1998; Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997). Yet Wright (1983) 
suggests that in an intergovernmental context problem solving is more than a task; it is 
the driving force of all activity. From this vantage, intergovernmental management is “an 
effort and a process where problem identification and strategies to problem resolution 
are the guiding notion” (Wright, 1983, p. 431). To be successful, participants must 
assume a joint-task orientation to problem solving because eventually, technical 
problems, authoritative issues, and political pressures must be overcome so that 
working solutions can be produced. Yet rising above these matters to arrive at viable 
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solutions can be challenging. Research by Ellison (1999) has found that cooperative 
rather than coercive mechanisms work better when intergovernmental associates share 
similar objectives. When intergovernmental linkages are grounded in reciprocity they 
are typically characterized by balance, equity, and mutual support, rather than by force 
and conflict (Oliver, 1990). 
While technological and logistical issues are comparatively easy to resolve, the 
more thorny points to working intergovernmentally involve bridging different 
governmental cultures (Nelson, 2001). Among the leading concerns for problem solving 
within multi-jurisdictional settings are the legally established roles and relationships. 
Such jurisdictional demarcations regularly connote separate political, fiscal, and 
bureaucratic systems. To deal with these challenges, IGM actors must proceed slowly, 
incrementally, and on an issue-by-issue basis to devise jointly-owned solutions. This 
involves developing “…perceptions of similarities and common concern, relatively open 
exchange of information, and search and selection of alternatives that benefit more than 
one party” (Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983, p. 235).  
Research by Agranoff & Lindsay (1983), which indirectly explored problem 
solving as an undertone of IGM, found that intergovernmental collaboration appears to 
be the most successful when the driving force behind cooperative efforts is developing 
solutions to specific matters at hand. Keeping the collaborative focus on a common 
issue(s) instead of on the morass of cooperation imbues efforts with a purposeful 
directive that appeared to be a particular component of success. Also essential was 
regular testing and renegotiating of resolutions, as well as the willingness of key actors 
to make adjustments and even submissions in the service of reaching solutions. 
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Intergovernmental problem solving often involves extensive 'nuts and bolts’ work, 
such as, in-depth analyses of the current state of a problem, examining similar 
experiences in other communities if possible, investigating the current and potential role 
of various partners, and budget permitting, hiring consultants (Nelson, 2001; Radin, 
2000; Oliver, 1990). Regardless of the various ways and potential means, for 
intergovernmental problem solving to be successful eventually decision makers must 
reach agreement, put it on paper, and implement the resolutions in the relevant 
jurisdictions. Jurisdictions and the actors representing them should remain focused on 
real issues while working toward reaching decisions that produce courses of action to 
ultimately solve problems (Stever, 1993; Stenberg, 1984). According to Agranoff & 
Lindsay (1983) two of the most important ingredients enabling distinct governments to 
effectively cooperate are maintaining a consistent focus on the problem at hand and 
making adjustments to resolve that particular problem.  
Through intergovernmental problem solving, government bodies often make 
arrangements with other governments whereby the solutions require subsequent and 
regular interaction (Wright, 1990). As such, an essential element of IGM problem 
solving is coordination. The lack of measured coordination and cooperative interaction 
can damage, stall, or even halt seemingly well-designed solutions and/or polices during 
formation or implementation (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). In order for 
coordination to succeed, intergovernmental initiatives demand an understanding of the 
needs and wherewithal of all participating organizations (Governments Without 
Boarders, 2002). These insights can be developed and harnessed via networking.  
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Networking 
 
The swift evolution of communications, transportation, and information 
processing have connected governments such that the problems and programs of one 
government can have both immediate and delayed effects on another (Luke & Caiden, 
1999). Notions of wholly-autonomous or isolated government operations have been 
displaced by intricate networks of interdependence. Whether joined through subtle or 
explicit interdependences, government units at all levels find themselves enmeshed in 
intentional and unintentional intergovernmental relationships (O’Toole, 1997). 
Consequently, working within and across multiple intergovernmental relations are now 
key public management undertakings (Posner, 2002; Frank, 2001; Osborne, 2001). As 
a result, intergovernmental networking and managing interdependencies have become 
undeniably more widespread and routine. Therefore, in addition to problem solving, a 
major function of intergovernmental management is to deal with these network-like 
circumstances, that is, to navigate interdependencies (McDonough, 2002; Davies, 
2001).  
Successful management in a world of complex intergovernmental problems, 
programs, and policies requires that jurisdictions locate actors who possess the 
additional  resources that they need to achieve their goals. To this end, 
intergovernmental managers will find themselves regularly networking with numerous 
agencies, managers, and directors to stay abreast of the exploitable strengths and 
transmittable weakness of each but will only actually collaborate with the ones that can 
provide targeted or categorical resources (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998). As such, a 
 73
critical element in intergovernmental problem solving, and hence goal achievement, is 
employing networking techniques and strategies to strengthen intergovernmental 
relationships whereby a jurisdiction is well-positioned to quickly and successfully 
interact with critically positioned or endowed actors.  
Minimizing barriers, such as local political opposition, misunderstandings, and 
lack of information is a critical component of successful IGM activity (Chi, 2000). 
Intergovernmental management makes use of networks and networking strategies as 
positive means with which to navigate intergovernmental relations and 
interdependencies (Mandell, 1979). Increasingly, public administrators recognize that 
quality intergovernmental management includes being attuned to the subtleties of 
partner governments. As such, intergovernmental initiatives should be preceded by a 
thorough understanding of the needs and capabilities of all participating governments 
(Nelson, 2001). While developing this insight requires a large investment of time and 
resources, understanding the challenges and functional realities of intergovernmental 
allies can clarify misperceptions, which in turn, can augment trust (Dearth, 2000; 
O'Toole, 1997). As such, whether formal or informal, dealings with intergovernmental 
partners are just as important as internal dealings from the vantage of 
intergovernmental management (Denhardt, 1995). Research by Agranoff and Lindsay 
(1983) found that awareness of partisan issues, differences, ideological stances, and 
political undercurrents contributed to successful intergovernmental cooperation and 
coordination. 
Networks and networking, within the context of intergovernmental management, 
should not be confused with network management. Technically,  network management 
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could be an intergovernmental activity if it occurs in a government setting where no 
single central authority or hierarchical ordering exists. However, in essence, network 
management is enlisted to maintain structural stability among formally recognized 
linkages and policy-driven connections (Kickert & Klijn, 1997; O’Toole, 1997). As Kickert 
& Koppenjan (1997) point out, network management assumes three general purposes, 
namely, intervening in existing patterns of relations, consensus building, and problem 
solving. It is important to note that these purposes are in the service of the network; that 
is to maintain the network. Intergovernmental management, however, enrolls 
networking strategies and fosters networking connections in situations where multiple 
stakeholders need to agree on goals and strategies (Luke & Caiden, 1999). As such 
networking activities, as used via intergovernmental management,, are in service of 
solving an intergovernmental problem rather then in service of general coalition building 
and maintenance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Wright, 1998; O’Toole, 1997). 
Although similar, network management focuses on harmonizing strategies that 
exist within a set network; whereas intergovernmental management employs networking 
techniques to foster intergovernmental collaboration to craft joint strategy to address a 
specific problem or utilize others as resources. Network-oriented techniques which are 
regularly employed via intergovernmental management include mediation, arbitration, 
and mobilization (Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997; Oliver, 1990). In practice, these skills 
translate into such intergovernmental management activities as assessing one’s 
connections to make a rough inventory of principle contingencies and alliances; looking 
for opportunities to coordinate resources and goals amongst allied governmental units; 
routinely striving to locate key allies at crucial nodes; and building trust among partner 
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governments to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation in the interest of solving or 
coping with problems (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1993; Stenberg, 1984). 
 
Coping Capabilities 
 
Whether emanating from federal, state, or interlocal sources, not all 
intergovernmental policies and programs emerge with stable or clearly delineated 
procedures to delegate responsibility, allocate resources, or assign authority (Falcone & 
Lan, 1997). Nevertheless, subnational governments are regularly required to comply 
with vague policies and implement ill-fitted programs which filter down through the 
federal system (Agranoff, 2001). Yet local jurisdictions do not just acquiesce to the 
impulse and wish of state and national leadership and mindlessly adopt policies and 
programs as they appear (Stever, 1993; Turner, 1990). Rather they strive to adjust 
policies and programs to best serve their own local social, political, and economical 
needs (Bohte & Meier, 2000; Cooper et al., 1998; Stenberg, 1984). Sometimes local 
governments are successful; sometimes they are not. 
 Coping mechanisms, like such time-honored techniques as bargaining and 
negotiating, are often used to try to facilitate these adjustments. Yet administrators are 
not encouraged “…to exercise bureaucratic discretion since their role is believed to be 
executing policies crafted by legislators” (Chi, 2000, p. 301). At the same time, however, 
public managers are expected to behave like their private sector counterparts and 
“…maximize efficiency, engage in risk taking, and gain reputations as entrepreneurs” 
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(Gargan, 2000, p.649). In an effort to walk this fine line, local managers enroll problem 
solving techniques and call upon networked allies in other governments and/or offices to 
make intergovernmental initiatives as effective and productive as possible. However, 
there are instances and circumstances which can not be ‘solved-away’ or altered. In 
such situations, where a policy must be adhered to as is or a program produces 
unintended negative outcomes, a primary function of intergovernmental management is 
to provide coping strategies and mechanisms.  
Localities often revert to coping strategies when rules, standards, or guidelines in 
and of themselves function as impediments to the general purposes for which higher 
level and local managers are working (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998). As such, coping 
strategies generally attempt to either change official policy/program specifics or seek 
regulatory/statutory relief, flexibility, or waivers (Radin, 2000; Wright, 1983). Yet as 
Falcone and Lan (1997) point out, intergovernmental actors from all levels of 
government routinely draw on an untold number and variation of coping techniques, 
depending on the assembly of subtle nuances unique to each situation. For example, in 
one situation an appropriate strategy might involve continuously assessing one’s current 
strengths and weaknesses to avoid unforeseen outcomes; another set of circumstances 
might call for seeking media attention to invoke public protest concerning, for example, 
unfunded mandates; or a situation could simply require creating or modifying formal 
communication structures.  
From the perspective of intergovernmental management, coping is fundamentally 
a management function, whether it entails the implementation of a minor technique or 
takes the form of a multilateral strategy. Equally, coping can be carried out in isolation 
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by a jurisdiction, such as to achieve its own ends within an intergovernmental 
partnership or to serve its unique needs within the bounds of a compulsory program and 
policy. Field studies conducted by Agranoff & McGuire (2001) found that considerable 
managerial time is spent engaged in intergovernmental transactions trying to fit local 
programs into national or state standards, rules, and regulations. In these instances, a 
jurisdiction might request a suspension or alteration of particular program requirement 
or regulation; it might attempt to redefine its program as a model or experiment; or it 
might seek to trade off strict compliance for increased flexibility.  
Mounting interdependencies linking legally separate and distinct jurisdictions 
simultaneously generate problems and opportunities (Luke & Caiden, 1999). Whether 
used to stave off emerging and seemingly unavoidable problems or to seek a closer fix 
betwixt policy/programs and localities, coping strategies, as a function of 
intergovernmental management, are vital to the success and maintenance of 
intergovernmental relationships and initiatives. Yet, employing coping techniques and 
mechanisms do more than just accommodate jurisdictional idiosyncrasies; they 
inadvertently test and refine the details, structure, and overall viability of the very 
relationships and initiatives they preserve.  
By challenging policies, rules, procedures,  and relationships, coping strategies 
enacted via intergovernmental management extend the principle of checks and 
balances and enliven experimentation and innovation. Radin (2000) expressed a similar 
sentiment when he wrote that regulatory discretion was not only “a way to meet the 
unique needs of individuals states, [but] it has also been closely tied to a research and 
development strategy, providing latitude to non-federal jurisdictions for experimenting 
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with new innovations and new ways for delivering services” (p. 154). By implementing 
reactive coping techniques, intergovernmental managers can more effectively and 
efficiently fulfill mutual goals without a prolonged period of laboring through legislative 
channels (Chi, 2000). However adaptation and innovation require an investment of time 
and resources which often works to discourage such endeavors.  When these barriers 
can be overcome, the coping function of intergovernmental management has the ability 
to generate more mature initiatives and foster progress (Falcone and Lan, 1997). 
While presented here separately, the primary intergovernmental management 
functions of problem solving, networking, and implementing coping strategies naturally 
overlap in practice. And in recent years, the scope and complexity of these functions 
have risen significantly due in large part to external circumstances that directly impact 
the shape of intergovernmental relationships (Governments Without Boarders, 2002; 
Nelson, 2001; Gargan, 2000; Ellison, 1998). Among these influences are the increased 
prevalence of polices/programs that demand unconventional forms of organization and 
management; more willingness from federal /state governments to accommodate local 
conditions; the resurgent role of state governments in creating intergovernmental 
programs; and finally, increased local sophistication and capacity to work within the 
larger intergovernmental system. The theory of IGM suggests that navigating these 
conditions occurs within two distinct planes or environments, vertical and horizontal, 
with each often employing specific management activities (Schiavo-Campo & 
Sundaram, 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 1999; Wright, 1983). 
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Vertical and Horizontal Environments 
 
The vertical environment includes interactions between lower and higher levels of 
governments, such as local interacting with state, local interacting with federal, and 
state interacting with federal (McDonough, 2000; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 
1998). The nature of federalism, combined with a historical perception of inferior local 
government management, has made vertical the dominant environment in American 
intergovernmental relations and management (Stever, 1993). In addition, as the federal 
government oversees the intergovernmental system from the apex of this hierarchy, 
state and local governments are controlled more than they are controlling and 
dependent more than they are autonomous (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998).  
Vertical interaction is often facilitated by the propagation of national norms, goals, 
and funding guidelines (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). This ‘top-down model’ is 
seemingly predicated on “…the growth of national programming and tipping the balance 
within the federal system toward executive control, with the federal government 
somehow "managing" its programs through state and local government managers” 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, p. 672). Through such vertical intergovernmental 
management the different levels of government seek to assure top-down policy 
coherence from lower governments.  
In a vertical environment, local governments primarily contact state political 
entities, such as the legislature; governor; or state agencies (i.e. the Office of Statewide 
Technology or State Department of Law Enforcement); and federal agencies (i.e. the 
Federal Communications Commission or Department of Defense) (U.S. Advisory 
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Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1993). Activities mainly include 
information and discretion seeking behaviors, such as seeking general program 
information or funding; interpretation of standards or rules; program or project guidance; 
regulatory relief, flexibility, or wavier; changes in official policy; or technical assistance 
(Agranoff and McGuire, 2001, 1999, 1998; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998).  
The horizontal environment includes interactions among units operating within 
the same level of government and the corresponding civic levels of nongovernmental 
organizations (Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001; Wright, 1998, 1983). Consequently, 
there are several horizontal planes where interaction occurs, such as between federal 
agencies; between the government bodies of different states; between agencies within 
the same state; as well as between local governments, such as counties, townships, 
special districts, cities. Local horizontal interaction can also occur between local 
governments and semi-private agencies, such as chambers of commerce, foundations, 
neighborhood associations; and with quasi-governmental organizations, such as utilities 
commissions, public-private partnerships, and private industry councils (Leach, 1998).  
Horizontal or bottom-up jurisdiction-based IGM activities primarily involve 
policy/strategy making, resource exchange, and project based behaviors (Nelson, 2001; 
Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Cooper et al., 1998; Oliver, 1990). Managing horizontally 
means working within an interdependent setting and can encompass a broad range of 
activities, such as building bases of support; agreeing on viable courses of action; 
developing bilateral or even multilateral coping strategies; engaging in both formal and 
informal partnerships; joint policy making; pooling resources and integrating differential 
contributions; consolidating problem solving efforts; employing joint financial incentives; 
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and acquiring technical assistance (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; Turner, 
1990; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983).  
The initial view of intergovernmental management processes was largely vertical, 
focusing on how independent state and local governments worked to achieve nationally 
established objectives (Wright, 1999, 1983; Mandell, 1979; Sundquist, 1969). 
Historically, certain matters have been determined so significant to national interests 
that a commanding federal role is generally accepted, such as with issues of controlling 
contagious disease or defense of critical infrastructures. The vertical environment 
remains equally dominate in situations where a federal role is deemed necessary 
because a problem transcends state lines (U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1996), such as when polluted air from one state traverses 
another state or when governmental information nodes are poorly secured in one locale, 
directly affecting the security of all other nodes to which they are networked.  
Yet, the last two decades have seen a considerable surge in devolution and the 
push for increased responsibility among local and state governments (DiIulio & Kettl, 
1999; Downs & Murray, 1996; Turner, 1990). While senior political and administrative 
decision-makers are involved in the creation of formal and informal intergovernmental 
partnerships, more often, the operational details are left to the operatives 
(Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). With less federal help, states and localities 
have been forced to strengthen their own capacitates and resources to meet this 
transfer of responsibility in the face of increasingly complex intergovernmental problems 
(Radin, 2000; Rivlin, 1999). As a result, the view that vertical situations lead to 
predominately top-down, federally-dictated arrangements has evolved to recognize that 
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vertical environments and intergovernmental relations are actually more interactive as 
subnational governments increasingly make use of techniques and channels to 
negotiate for their own needs (Cooper et al., 1998; Falcone & Lan, 1997). The tug-of-
war over program and policy leadership that has ensued has forced managers to find 
new ways to balance federal accountability and the discretion provided to state and 
local governments.  
As policy responsibilities between the national and subnational governments 
have evolved, authority and influence amid the different levels of government crisscross 
to the point where vertical and horizontal actors often interact simultaneously (Agranoff 
& McGuire, 2001; Schiavo-Campo & Sundaram, 2001). Consequently, vertical and 
horizontal relationships often merge, overlap, or at the very least intermingle when 
issues are complex, such as protecting the critical digital infrastructure. Indeed, the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Allor & Lindley, 2000), U.S. 
General Accounting Office (20021c), and the Department of Homeland Security (2003) 
have declared that protecting America's critical infrastructure is the shared responsibility 
of federal, state, and local government in active partnership with the private sector. 
Frank McDonough (2002, online), Deputy Associate Administrator of the U.S. General 
Services Administration, asks government leaders “Can we afford not to collaborate”?  
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Application of Theoretical Ideas 
As a concept, intergovernmental management conveys an enterprise that 
“…moves beyond federalism's traditional application to a sophisticated contemporary 
understanding of how the many units of government, at all levels, relate to one another” 
(Cooper et al, 1998, p. 101). As a model, it progresses beyond the vertical top-down 
interpretation of the federal system (Rivlin, 1999; Lane, 1999; DiIulio & Kettl, 1999) to 
capture a polycentric arrangement composed of overlapping and differentiated 
authorities (Imperial, 1998; Wright, 1988). However, this research does not focus on 
IGM as either a concept or a model. Nor does it attempt to explore the relative balance 
of power in the intergovernmental system or how jurisdictions act in response to a shift 
in absolute intergovernmental powers typical of IGM research. That is, unlike many 
inquiries into intergovernmental management (Pagano & Johnston, 2000; Radin, 2000; 
Guess, 1998; Ellison, 1998; Allen, 1994; Stever, 1993), this research does not focus on 
IGM as a response to the effects of devolution (the substitution of subnational decision 
making for national decision making), deregulation (reducing regulatory burden on 
subnational governments), or decrementalism (the gradual reduction of federal program 
funding) (Leach, 1998; Turner, 1990). Empirical studies that have approached IGM from 
these perspectives have generally concentrated on the diffusion and management of 
new responsibility through variable incentives, obligations, and controls; or focused on 
how IGM is employed with regard to specific programs which have local impact, such as 
community development block grants or general revenue sharing.  
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Instead this research investigates the prevalence of intergovernmental 
management activities, specifically, the prevalence with which county-level Information 
Technology Directors use such activities in securing critical digital infrastructure 
systems under their charge. This focus is grounded in several theoretical notions 
discussed in the previous chapter. First among these is that managers foster 
intergovernmental relations for reasons including necessity, to promote stability, or to 
increase efficiency (Oliver, 1990). Literature on information security (McDonough, 2002; 
Posner, 2002; Davies, 2001; Osborne, 2001; Tritak, 2001a; Willemssen, 2001) regularly 
highlights these very conditions to motivate managers and leaders to develop 
cooperative relationships, thereby removing interorganizational communication barriers 
enabling the sharing of best practices.     
The second theoretical notion being applied to information security is that IGM is 
the application of such broad activities as problem solving, networking, and coping 
strategies to maximize goal attainment and minimize the challenges inherent to 
intergovernmental interdependencies (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 1998; Nelson, 2001; 
Bolman & Deal, 1999; Perry & Kraemer, 1999; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; 
Wright, 1998, 1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983; Mandell, 1979). Successful 
intergovernmental management involves governments working with other governments 
through informal networks or formal partnerships. Success largely depends on 
participants sharing a common vision and working together under some sort of 
agreement (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). This is especially true of 
information security. Yet developing the coordination capabilities needed to effectively 
deal with threats to the critical digital infrastructure is complex and challenging (Brock, 
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2001a). It involves building trust so that information can be openly shared and 
difficulties can be candidly addressed (Dearth, 2000; O’Toole, 1997). It requires that IT 
managers not only know their interdependencies but also foster the relationships behind 
them (Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, 2000).  
This is essential for several reasons, for instance, the Center for Technology in 
Government (1997b) notes that traditional government services once provided by a 
single agency are giving way to complex service programs that require more intricate 
exchanges of information. These services increasingly necessitate networking and 
innovative management (Monroe, 2002; Nye, 2002). Additionally, as Osborne (2001) 
points out, emergency preparation, contingency planning, and risk management are 
most durable when grounded by a unified decentralized strategy. However, for such a 
strategy to work there must be a nurtured communication network between leaders and 
relevant managers (Posner, 2002; Collins, 2001; Tritak, 2001a). Finally, as pointed out 
by the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (2002), information security 
incidents do not respect geographical or administrative boundaries therefore; 
management must be prepared to instantly interact with other governments, agencies, 
and at the very least departments to contain a system breach. The lack of good 
communication breeds confusion, poor coordination, and frustration (Center for 
Technology and Government, 1997a). As such, this research is interested the extent 
county IT Directors and their staffs use intergovernmental networks. 
Problem solving is an ever present activity in information security. As the Center 
for Technology and Government (1997a) points out, sometimes the best solution is 
found in the common sense and practical experience of the managers involved. In other 
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cases, as West and Berman (2001) note, information technologies present challenges 
that necessitate employees and managers from different departments, fields, or 
organizations to work together in an informal manner. Additionally, fiscal hardships have 
spurred many local governments to find ways to pool resources on technology initiatives 
and share data (Monroe, 2002). Whatever the case, the nature of information security 
provides many opportunities for managing relationships, work, and problems in novel 
ways. From the vantage of information security, intergovernmental management is “an 
effort and a process where problem identification and strategies to problem resolution 
are the guiding notion” (Wright, 1983, p. 431).  
Throughout the literature on IT(Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 
2003; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2003; Miller & Gregory, 2002; 
Dacey, 2001; Information Assurance Advisory Council, 2001; Wulf, 2001; McCarthy, 
1998; Everett, Dewindt, and McDade, 1997; Fraser, 1997), several management 
activities are regularly suggested as means to solve problems specific to information 
security. These include seeking technical and/or non-technical assistance; seeking 
legal/policy guidance; seeking funding/resources; seeking information related to 
information security programs; re-negotiate resource sharing/obligations related to an 
information security agreement; and re-negotiate roles, duties, or procedures related to 
an information security agreement. These activities are the focus of this research. 
Like problem solving, coping activities are an ever present activity in information 
security. Often local governments must comply with one-size-fits-all directives and 
instructions from state and federal agencies (Center for Technology and Government, 
1997a). Practices that are suitable in one county may be very unsuited to another. 
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Making intergovernmental endeavors even more difficult, IT managers often have to 
simultaneously straddle federal, state, and local electoral, budgetary, and legislative 
cycles. To better deal with these and other challenges inherent to information security in 
an intergovernmental setting, managers often seek out coping mechanisms from 
network peers (Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2003; Collins, 2001; 
U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001b). In that no individual government manager is 
likely to change these systemic and environmental conditions, by pooling experiences 
and sharing best practices negative consequences can be ameliorated via well-targeted 
coping actions such as seeking regulatory or strategic flexibility; seeking legal/policy 
guidance; seeking funding/resources or information on information security programs 
(Frank, 2002; Hecker, 2002; Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). 
The third theoretical notion being applied to information security is that navigating 
intergovernmental relations occurs within two distinct planes or environments, vertical 
and horizontal, with each often employing specific management activities (Schiavo-
Campo & Sundaram, 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 1999; Wright, 1983). The breadth of 
concerned vertical and horizontal stakeholders quickly transform digital infrastructure 
protection into a slippery political quagmire. To begin with, there are information security 
managers and directors; security specialists and staff; systems analysts; network 
managers, administrators, and engineers; webmasters; and technical engineers. 
Beyond this technical realm are such state/local intergovernmental players as mayors, 
council members, county commissioners, city managers, elected officials, pubic-private 
partnerships, chambers of commerce, local utilities, private industry councils, regional 
initiatives, community networks, senior executives, appointed administrators, careers 
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service managers, and citizens. Even beyond these horizontal actors are state 
legislators, governor’s office, congressional members, lobbyists, state agencies, federal 
agencies, the military, and the President. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, there are several vertical levels of 
government actors. This research looks at how county IT Directors/staffs interact with 
federal and state agencies above them and sub-county jurisdictions (i.e. cities, 
townships, special districts) below them (McDonough, 2000; Intergovernmental 
Advisory Board, 1998). Also discussed in the previous chapter is that governments 
horizontally interface with external contemporaries (i.e. a county interacting with another 
county). Additionally, they horizontally interact ‘intra-governmentally’ with peer 
departments and offices within their own government. Further, the interaction between 
sub-state governments (i.e. county and local governments) are often treated 
horizontally. This research with explore how county IT Directors and staffs engage in 
each of these vertical and horizontal relationships with regard to several 
intergovernmental management activities. 
Whether enacted vertically or horizontally, evidence suggests that 
intergovernmental management activities are not merely 'add-on' or 'special tasks' but 
rather routine administrative functions carried out by managers operating within the 
intergovernmental system (Cooper et al., 1998; Ellison, 1998; Allen, 1994; Wright, 
1983). Such intergovernmental approaches are necessary when no single agency or 
organization has the authority, resources, or expertise to address a problem that cuts 
across geographic and political boundaries (Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998). 
The intergovernmental hurdles associated with information technology and security are 
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often cited as challenging and complex (Forman, 2003; Dalton, 2002; Collins, 2001; 
Cowings, 2001; Center for Technology in Government, 2000). Many long established 
rules and roles must be reassessed according to new and often confusing technologies 
and emerging laws. Questions quickly surface as to who has the power to determine 
and dictate procedure. 
 Consider for example, a sample of federal computer intrusion cases being tried 
during 2000 under computer crime statute 18 U.S.C. §1030 revealed that 94 percent of 
these crimes were interstate or International in scope (CCIPS, 2000). As such, each 
case has a unique array of variables that involve an assortment of stakeholders  and 
public agencies representing different jurisdictions often with competing objectives and 
different levels of resources. The Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection 
(2003) asks the question “…who is responsible for security in this information 
infrastructure “commons” and who should pay for it” (p. 51). In a case of political equals, 
whose laws or procedures are ultimate, for example, Arizona or Vermont? Turkey or 
Austria? The broad array of issues facing leaders and managers include jurisdiction-
specific problems, rules regulations, policies, agreements, mandates, funding, discretion 
seeking, legitimacy, consensus building, partnerships, task forces, conflicting priorities, 
and clashing authority, to list but a few.  
Compared to addressing technological issues, many consider the details of 
working intergovernmentally to secure cyberspace more challenging (Collins, 2001; 
Willemssen, 2001; Center for Technology in Management, 2000). McDonough, (2000) 
points out, “The risks of failure are greater, and turf issues can be horrendous. The 
incentive system to encourage collaboration does not exist” (p. 5). The 
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Intergovernmental Advisory Board (1998) writes, “There are no structural elements in 
place that encourage different levels of government to work together. Project 
participants are often volunteers, coming from varying backgrounds, who work in 
organizations that have different pay scales and reward systems” (p. 7). And the Center 
for Technology in Government (1997b) notes,  
There are very few incentives for staff to look outside their 
program boundaries to share responsibility or information or 
to integrate their operations with related programs. Even in 
the same agency, programs usually serve to divide rather 
than connect groups of people with similar responsibilities (p. 
14). 
Yet the U.S. General Accounting Office (2001c) avers for infrastructure protection 
to succeed, “It is critical that all participating federal, state, and local agencies interact in 
a seamless manner” (p. 31). Equally, Symantec (2000) urges governments to engage in 
partnerships and improve interorganizational communication and information sharing. 
Similarly, Tritak (2001a) notes that sharing information is necessary for technology 
managers “…to obtain a more accurate and complete picture of their operational risks, 
as well as acquire the techniques and tools for managing those risks” (p. 5). Each of 
these suggestions or activities is intergovernmental in scale and management in 
application. Each involves bridging different governmental cultures to solve problems, 
network, and develop coping skills; the activities at the heart of intergovernmental 
management.  
Given the importance of critical digital infrastructure protection, this current 
research takes a close look at the use of intergovernmental management activities and 
interorganizational communication as they play such an important role in protecting 
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information systems (White House, 2003; Computer Science & Telecommunications 
Board, and National Research Council, 2002; Information Assurance Advisory Council, 
2001; McCarthy, 1998). To that end, this research seeks to answer the questions: 1) 
which IGM activities do county IT Directors/staffs most often engage in on behalf of 
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 2) do county IT 
Directors/staffs make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships on behalf of 
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 3) is there a relationship 
between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors/staff most 
often engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure 
protection? By discovering the intergovernmental management activities county 
managers use to secure the information systems comprising our critical infrastructure, 
we will be in a better position to understand our defenses and better protect ourselves 
from the largely invisible threats of cyberspace. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
As the of role intergovernmental activities in county level information security has 
yet to be studied, this investigation is exploratory. According to Stark and Roberts 
(1998), exploratory research is speculative whereby researchers “…make systematic 
observations of uncharted and little known phenomena in order to get an initial sense of 
what is going on” (p. 17). Babbie (1995) notes that while exploratory studies seldom 
provide complete answers to research questions; they are, however, instrumental for 
providing insight into relatively new and unstudied subjects and serve to direct future 
research. Therefore, the goal of this study was to take the first step, in what will 
hopefully be a series, toward building a body of knowledge aimed at understanding 
county level information security to better protect local elements of the critical digital 
infrastructure. 
 
Observation Unit and Study Population 
The observation unit for this research was county government. As discussed in 
the introduction and literature review, despite the noted efforts of many counties across 
the nation (Barrett, Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Monroe, 2002; Posner, 2002; Gonzales, 
2001), poor information security remains rampant among these units of governments 
(Kous, 2003; Leazer, 2003; Perlman, 2002b; O’Connell, 2003; Brock, 2000; Dacey, 
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2000; PDD-63, 1998; Smith, 1998; Crescenzi, 1996). As such, the information security 
of these governments continues to be a concern among security experts yet it remains 
largely unexplored (Misra, 2003; American City & County Magazine, 2002; Barrett, 
Greene, & Mariani, 2002; Public Technology Inc., 2002; Gilmore Commission, 2001).  
For this research, IT Directors functioned as county representatives. IT Directors, 
also known as Information Technology Managers, Chief Technology Officers, or Chief 
Information Security Officers are generally charged with technology planning; 
applications development; establishing strategic relationships with key IT suppliers and 
consultants; and IT staffing and training (CIO Magazine, 2002; Gartner Group, 2002; 
Perlman, 2002a). As such, they are often the most knowledgeable of all aspects of an 
organization’s information technology and security efforts and therefore the most 
qualified to comment on the activities which their organization engages.  
Specifically, the target population chosen for this research was IT Directors 
responsible for constitutional offices in Florida counties, namely; the Board of 
Commissioners Office, Clerk of Courts Office, Property Appraiser’s Office, Sheriff’s 
Office, Supervisor of Elections Office, and Tax Collector’s Office. The population was 
expected to range between 66 Directors (where one IT Director is responsible for all 
county constitutional offices) to 396 Directors (where a separate Director is responsible 
for each constitutional office). However, a complete population list was not found to 
exist, so during October 2003 the researcher developed one from information provided 
by county Human Resource Departments, as ‘key informants’. Key informants are 
individuals identified by a researcher as possessing unique knowledge on the subject 
under study or some other distinctive information (Babbie, 1995; Kumar, Stern, & 
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Anderson, 1993). Curtin (2003) describes a key informant a subject who is tapped to 
help gain access and guide data gathering.  
Among the advantages associated with the use of key informants is that the 
information gathered comes directly from individuals who are deemed competent to 
speak on the topic of concern (Day, Blue, & Peake-Raymond, 1998). In addition, by 
employing a key informant approach it is possible to acquire rich information from 
relatively few individuals. Often used in qualitative research, a limitation with relying on 
key informants occurs when the role or experience of the informant is not closely 
associated with the phenomena under study (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Denzin, 
1989; 1970). Thus, the quality of the data acquired is dependent upon how 
knowledgeable and objective the key informants are (Day, Blue, & Peake-Raymond, 
1998). Given that county Human Resource Departments are specifically charged with 
maintaining an accurate record of current and past employees (Volusia County 
Government Online, 2003; Bay County Online, 2001; Hernando County Online, no 
date); they possess the unique knowledge sought after, thus minimizing the chief 
limitation of using key informants.  
To develop a population list, the researcher visited all county websites to obtain 
contact information for the various IT Directors. When this information was not available 
on the website but an email address was listed, these offices were emailed weekly for 
four weeks and asked to provide contact information for their IT director. The researcher 
telephoned offices for which no email address was attained. In many instances, it was 
necessary to make several calls to the same office to clarify email responses or obtain 
missing information. Attempts to collect contact information stopped after a total of four 
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weeks. The final number of constitutional offices for which the researcher obtained 
contact information was 255 or 64.4 percent of the total 396 possible (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Sampling Frame Development 
Total Florida County Constitutional Offices 396 
Offices that did not  provide contact information for the IT Director -63 
Offices that outsource their IT needs -72 
Offices that declined to participate outright   -6 
Sub-total 255 
IT Directors responsible for more than one office 33 
Final list of unique IT Directors included in this study 222 
 
Variable Operationalization 
To investigate the three broad research questions of this research (see the end 
of the previous chapter), several conceptual definitions were operationalized. It is 
important to point out that many ethical considerations inevitably arise when studying 
information security and critical infrastructure protection. In that these research findings 
will be available to the public, concerted attention was given to selecting which aspects 
of information security to explore. In an effort to avoid revealing vulnerabilities or 
jeopardizing confidentiality, this inquiry probed only for the frequency that select 
activities are conducted. For this research, frequency was defined as: 
Frequency: the rate at which a condition occurs in a defined time period. 
It was operationalized using an established five-point Likert scale adopted from 
the General Social Survey (1998). The ordinal scale is as follows- “weekly”, “monthly”, 
“several times a year”, “a few times a year”, and “never”.  
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The first question of this research endeavor was “which intergovernmental 
management activities do county IT Directors/staffs most often engage in on behalf of 
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection”. The concepts 
addressed by this question were intergovernmental management activity and 
information security which were defined as:  
Intergovernmental Management Activity: a problem solving, networking, or 
coping activity that melds communication and management to achieve 
goals and manage interdependencies that arise from intergovernmental 
relations. 
Information Security: actions taken to reduce the probability that a threat 
will exploit a system vulnerability. This includes measures to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of system assets. 
Intergovernmental management activity was operationalized into eight activities 
regularly cited in the literature as fundamental to information security management (see 
Chapters II and IV). These activities were: seek technical assistance; seek NON-
technical assistance; seek information on an information security program or project; 
seek funding or resources to improve information security efforts; seek legal or policy 
guidance regarding information security; seek regulatory or policy flexibility regarding 
information security; attempt to modify duties or procedures of an established 
partnership/agreement relating to information security; and attempt to modify resource-
sharing or funding obligations of an established partnership/agreement related to 
information security.   
Although a defined concept in this research, information security was not 
explicitly operationalized for this study. This was because this research did not attempt 
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to directly measure the state of county information security but rather only the use of 
intergovernmental management activities for the purpose of information security. 
Therefore, as noted above, the concept of “intergovernmental management activities” 
was operationalized as “intergovernmental -information security- management 
activities”.  
The second question of this research was “do county IT Directors/staffs make 
more use of vertical or horizontal intergovernmental relationships on behalf of 
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection”. The new concepts 
addressed by this question were vertical and horizontal intergovernmental relationships 
which were defined as: 
Vertical intergovernmental relationships: interactions between lower and 
higher levels of governments. 
Horizontal intergovernmental relationships: interactions between 
governments operating at a similar level. 
In that the unit of analysis was county, vertical relationships were operationalized 
as occurring with: federal units (any office, agency, or department, such as Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Federal Emergency Agency, Department of Homeland 
Security, Computer Emergency Response Team, et cetera) and with state units (any 
office, agency, or department, such as Florida Department of Law Enforcement, State 
Technology Office, Secure Florida, et cetera). Horizontal relationships were 
operationalized as occurring with: other Florida counties (any office or department 
located in county government different than the respondents, such as another county's 
Department of Information Technology, Clerk of Court office, Sheriffs Office, et cetera); 
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other governments located within the jurisdiction of the respondent’s county (any part of 
a government unit located within the jurisdiction of the respondents county, such as a 
city or township et cetera); and with other departments within the respondent’s own 
county government. 
The third question of this research asked whether there is a relationship between 
county demographics and the intergovernmental management activities county IT 
Directors/staffs most often engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital 
infrastructure protection. The new and wide-ranging concept introduced by this question 
was demographics which was defined as:  
Demographics are measured characteristics or attributes used to define a 
population.  
For this research, demographics were operationalized in two ways. First, to 
provide for a more rich analysis, select county data publicly available from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2003) was added into the dataset. The specific attributes were: County 
Population; Percent of Persons in the County with a Bachelor's Degree or Higher (age 
25+); and the Level of Intergovernmental Revenue Received by the County. Second, to 
capture attributes specific to each county IT department, the survey probed for unique 
demographic information. Demographics specific to each county IT departments were 
operationalized as: the county units that fall under the IT Director’s supervision for their 
information security needs for; the online services provided by the county itself, 
outsourced, or not provided at all; the perceived adequacy of funding the IT Director is 
able to apply core information security needs; the percentage of the IT Director’s duties 
that focus on information technology or information security related issues; and finally, 
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the number of employees the IT Director supervises whose job deals only with 
information technology or information security.  
This study also attempted to measure two different dimensions of the 
respondents’ intergovernmental relationships. These dimensions were relationship 
‘importance’ and ‘degree  developed’ which were defined as:  
Importance: Strongly affecting the course of events or the nature of things; 
significant.  
Developed: Caused or influenced to acquire a more advanced or mature 
role, function, or form.  
Relationship importance was operationalized as how important each type of 
intergovernmental relationship is to the success of the county’s information security 
efforts. It was measured with the following five-point Likert scale adopted from the 
General Social Survey (1998), “Extremely Important”, “Very Important”, “Important”, 
“Somewhat Important”, and “Not Very Important”. Degree of relationship development 
was operationalized as how developed the relationship between the county’s IT 
department and each of the five types of governments/departments. It was measured 
with the following five-point Likert scale, also adopted from the General Social Survey 
(1998), “Extremely Developed”, “Very Developed”, “Developed”, “Somewhat 
Developed”, and “Not Very Developed”. 
 
 100
Research Instrument 
The tool of this research was a self-administered Internet survey which was 
emailed to respondents. As one of the most frequently used social scientific research 
technique, surveys are used to make descriptive assertions about particular populations 
(Leedy & Ormond, 2001; Stark & Roberts, 1998). They are particularly appropriate in 
situations where the phenomena under investigation are not accessible via direct 
observation (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992). Self-administered surveys are 
best used in situation were respondents are perceived to possess accurate, ready-
made answers that they can recall and would be willing to reveal  (Dillman, 2000). All 
respondents were surveyed at essentially a ‘point in time’ giving this research a cross-
sectional design (Singleton & Straits, 1998). 
There are several benefits of conducting this research with the aid of the World 
Wide Web. First, because IT Directors are technology workers in addition to managers, 
administering the questionnaire to them in a format they are comfortable with, 
electronic, was an attempt to increase the response rate. Second, using email to 
distribute the URL of the survey and the Internet to host the survey was also intended to 
increase the response rate as individuals working out of town or from home were able to 
receive and complete the survey if they checked their email. Third, using the Internet 
helped to expedite the distribution and collection phases of data gathering. Fourth, like 
traditional mail surveys, email surveys are not beholden to geographic restrictions 
enabling access to dispersed populations. A fifth benefit was that by gathering data 
electronically, responses were automatically entered as raw data into an aggregate flat 
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data file which was imported into statistical software for analysis. By collecting and 
compiling data this way, human error which can occur during data entry (Babbie, 1995) 
was removed, thus producing a cleaner, more precise dataset.  
The survey instrument was developed using the commercial survey service 
Surveymonkey.com. Using established and proven survey-software increased the ease 
and accuracy with which the survey was circulated, completed, and the data was 
complied. The software also tracked in real-time which respondents completed the 
survey and which had not. This allowed the researcher the ability to target only non-
respondents for follow-up contact.  
 
Data Collection and Response Rate 
Data collection employed a multiple contact strategy (Dillman, 2000) involving 
four steps. First, a personalized introductory letter (see Appendix A) was mailed to the 
222 unique IT Directors during the first week of November 2003. The letter introduced 
the purpose of the study, expressed the need for their participation, and provided 
contact information. It also alerted them that in one week they would receive a email 
from “infosec@mail.ucf.edu” which would include a hyperlink to the online survey.  
Enclosed with the letter was an information sheet containing research details 
written with language accessible to participants (see Appendix A). According to the 
University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board (2003) providing participants 
with all the information they might reasonably need to know about a research endeavor 
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is one of the principal researcher’s primary ethical responsibilities. Once participants 
have been advised of their role and rights with regard to a study, it is necessary to 
formally obtain their voluntary agreement to participate. Collectively these two steps are 
referred to as the informed consent process. Specifically, that is “…the process through 
which potential research participants are provided with all the information reasonably 
needed for them to decide whether to participate. The process additionally provides for 
obtaining voluntary agreement to participate in the research” (University of Central 
Florida Institutional Review Board, 2003, p. 7).  
The second stage of contact occurred one week later, when a personalized email 
was sent to each IT Directors (see Appendix B). It briefly reintroduced the research, 
listed contact information, and provided a direct hyperlink to the online survey. 
Additionally, as part of the informed consent process, the email explained that the 
survey begins with a detailed discloser of the research procedures and is directly 
followed by a question asking whether they have read the details and voluntarily agree 
to participate. They were informed that if they agree to participate, they must check a 
box before they begin the survey (see Appendix C). This was included in the email in an 
effort to lessen the likelihood that they would be confused by this section of the actually 
survey.  
Third, one week later, IT Directors who had been identified as non-respondents 
were sent a follow-up email (see Appendix D) reminding them of the value of the 
research and again providing a direct hyperlink to the online survey. Fourth, and lastly, 
the following week, the remaining IT Directors who were identified as non-respondents 
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were sent a second follow-up email (see Appendix E) asking for their participation. The 
survey remained online until the second week of December 2003. 
During data collection, several emails were returned undeliverable due to 
inaccurate addresses. While most were subsequently corrected and resent, the 
researcher was unable to obtain working emails for 13 IT Directors, resulting in a final 
sample size of 209. Of the 209 IT Directors contacted, 125 completed the survey for a 
response rate of 59.8 percent. The 125 respondents indicated that they were ultimately 
responsible for the IT needs of 149 different constitutional offices as 23 respondents, or 
18.4 percent, supervise two or more offices. As such, this response rate represents 37.6 
percent of the total 396 constitutional offices in Florida. 
Further, the respondents represent 52 different counties or 78.8 percent of the 66 
counties included in this study. The 14 counties for which there was no representation 
were: Bradford, Calhoun, Franklin, Gadsden, Glades, Gulf, Hamilton, Holmes, Jackson, 
Okeechobee, Taylor, Wakulla, Walton, and Washington (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Florida Counties with No Representation in this Study 
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Independent Variable Coding 
As the majority of the absentee counties cluster in the panhandle, a new 
independent variable “ZONE”, based on the US Army’s emergency and auxiliary 
communications program MARS (US Army, 2004), was introduced (see Figure 2). The 
goal of creating a variable that clustered counties by regions was to illuminate 
underlying qualities and influential factors not readily perceptible via the standard 
demographics already included in this study, such as population. For instance, does any 
particular zone exhibit unique patterns in intergovernmental contact? If so what 
similarities exist among the counties in that zone versus counties in other zones?   
 
Figure 2: Florida Counties by U.S. MARS Zones 
 
By including this variable, the researcher attempted to capture characteristics 
and behaviors potentially unique to counties in Zone 1 even though this area was 
under-represented (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Frequency for Independent Variable:  
Which zone is the County in 
Zone Cases Percent 
Zone 1 14 11.2 
Zone 2 33 26.4 
Zone 3 39 31.2 
Zone 4 39 31.2 
 N = 125  
 
Additional inspection of the data revealed an overlap in supervisory status among 
several respondents. Specifically, as already noted 23 respondents indicated that they 
supervised two or more offices (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Frequency for Independent Variable:  
“OFFICENU” (Number of Offices Supervised) 
Number of Offices Cases Percent 
1 office 102 81.6% 
2 offices 12 9.6% 
3 offices 4 3.2% 
4 offices 2 1.6% 
5 offices 5 4.0% 
All 6 offices 0 0% 
 N = 125  
 
Twenty-one of these 23 respondents were responsible for the Board of 
Commissioners Office plus another office(s), generally the Clerk of Court (14 cases) or 
the Supervisor of Elections (11 cases). In only four instances did a respondent indicate 
that s/he was responsible for a Sheriff’s Office in addition to another office. To control 
for effects from overlapping responsibility, two independent variables were created. The 
first variable “OFFICE” was created to include only the 102 respondents who supervise 
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a single constitutional office (see Table 4). This categorical independent variable was 
later used to detect difference between the six types of offices.  
 
Table 4: Frequency for Independent Variable:  
“OFFICE” -Which Office do you Supervise 
Board of Commissioners 11 
Clerk of Court 16 
Property Appraiser 15 
Sheriff 30 
Supervisor of Elections 12 
Tax Collectors 18 
 N = 102 
 
The second independent variable “Number of Offices” was created 
dichotomously to capture differences between respondents who supervised two or more 
offices (23 cases) versus those who supervise a single office (102 cases). The full 
dataset of respondents was then used to create six dichotomous independent variables 
to capture specific differences between each individual type of office supervised versus 
all others (see Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Frequencies for Dichotomous Independent 
Variables for Type of Office Supervised (N’s = 125) 
Variable Yes/No 
Board of Commissioners 32/93 
Clerk of Court 30/95 
Property Appraiser 24/101 
Sheriff 23/102 
Supervisor of Elections 34/91 
Tax Collectors 28/97 
 
 As noted earlier, county data collected from U.S. Census Department and the 
state of Florida were incorporated into the final dataset to function as 
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independent/control variables. Again these independent variables were County 
Population; the Percent of Person’s in the County (over 25) with a Bachelor's Degree or 
Higher; and the Level of Intergovernmental Revenue Received. Univariate analysis 
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality in conjunction with normal probability 
plots (normal Q-Q plots) consistently revealed non-normal distributions due to severe 
positive skews in the data. Efforts to correct the variables via data transformations either 
failed or masked the true meaning of the data. For example, many county 
characteristics, such as population, are not normally distributed across Florida counties. 
Since transforming the variables or removing outliers only distorted the data, the 
researcher successfully opted to minimize the skew by recoding each continuous 
variable as ordinal. In an effort to maintain the true sense of the data, and thus the real 
difference between counties, each variable was recoded into groups following natural 
breaks in the data while trying to balance equal groups of cases (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Independent Variables Recoded as Ordinal from the U.S. Census and 
State of Florida 
Variable Groups Cases  Percent 
Population (2000) 99,999 or less 
100k – 199,999 
200k – 499,999 
More than 500k 
30 
34 
41 
20 
24.0% 
27.2% 
32.8% 
16.0% 
Percent of Persons w/ a Bachelor's 
degree or higher,  age 25+ (2000) 
14.9% or less 
15 – 22.9% 
More than 23% 
41 
42 
42 
32.8% 
33.6% 
33.6% 
 
Total Intergovernmental Revenues: 
Federal, State, and Local (Fiscal Year 
2000) 
11.9 million or less 
$12 – 24.9 million 
$25 – 74.9 million 
More than $75 million 
29 
34 
35 
27 
23.2% 
27.2% 
28.0% 
21.6% 
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Data gathered from survey responses were used to form three additional 
independent variables. The first measured the percent of the IT Director’s duties that 
focus on IT related issues (PERCENT; N=124). The original question provided six 
possible options (100%; 80%; 60%; 40%; 20%; and less than 20%), however, in effort 
to lessen the negative skew present in this response distribution, the final three 
categories (40%; 20%; and less than 20%) were collapsed in “40% or less” (see Table 
7).  
 
Table 7: Percent of Duties Focused on IT Related Tasks 
Percent of Duties Cases Percent 
40% or less 22 16.7% 
60% 16 12.8% 
80% 39 31.2% 
100% 47 37.6% 
 N = 124  
 
The second variable measured the number of employees, whose job only  
supports IT, that the Director supervises (SUPERVIS; N=124). The original responses 
options were “0”,”1”,”2”, …to ”25”, and finally “more than 25”. Again to lessen the effects 
of a non-normal distribution of responses, the variable was recoded as ordinal (see 
Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Number of Employees Supervised (N=124) 
Employees Cases Percent 
0 27 21.6% 
1-4 41 32.8% 
5-14 27 21.6% 
15 or more 29 23.2% 
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The final independent variable derived from the survey was a composite, or index 
variable. Specifically, a composite variable is created by summing several indicators to 
produce a single scale of measurement (Rowe, 2002; SPSS, 1999; Hair et. al, 1998). 
Often indicators are selected because they are found to be statistically correlated via 
such data reduction tests as factor analysis with Cronbach's Alpha test for reliability. 
However, these tests assume normally distributed data. Univariate analysis of the 
pertinent factors using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality followed by visual 
inspections of probability plots consistently revealed non-normal distributions. 
Therefore, tests of reliability were inappropriate for creating this index variable.  
While the use of statistical test to extract factors is desired, developing theoretical 
grounded composites variables is an acceptable alternative (Borsboom et. al, 2003; 
Wollman, 2002) hence this third variable was created to measure the adequacy of 
funding for several core IT needs (IBUDGET; N=79). This variable summed seven 
questions (see Table 9) that were all measured “Above Adequate” (=1), “Adequate” 
(=2), “Below Adequate” (=3), and “Far Below Adequate” (=4), with the additional option 
“Not Applicable” (=5). Respondents who did not answer all seven questions or who 
selected the option “Not Applicable” for any question were excluded from the index.  
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Table 9: Questions Used to Create the Independent Index Variable “Adequacy of Budget” 
QUESTION:  
How adequate is the funding you are able to apply to each of the following needs: 
 Above 
Adequate 
Adequate Below 
Adequate 
Not 
Adequate 
IT equipment/ software/ hardware 6 4.9% 87 71.3% 20 16.4% 8 6.6% 
IT security equipment/ software/ 
hardware 
8 6.4% 73 58.4% 26 20.8% 11 8.8% 
Hiring outsource vendors 0 0% 68 54.4% 20 16% 10 8% 
Hiring IT personnel and support staff 2 1.6% 65 52% 32 25.6% 12 9.6% 
Training IT personnel 2 1.6% 68 54.4% 39 31.2% 7 5.6% 
Computer security education for NON 
IT employees 
0 0% 43 34.4% 40 32% 15 12% 
Risk assessment/ management 1 0.8% 55 44% 43 34.4% 10 8% 
 
However, in order to construct a more logically intuitive index, it was first 
necessary to recode the variables to reverse the scores. The resulting scale ranged 
from a summed score of 7, indicating the respondent perceived available funds to be far 
below adequate for all IT needs, to a summed score of 28, indicating that the 
respondent perceived their budget to be above adequate for all IT needs. To use this 
index variable to test for group difference, it was necessary to recode the summed 
scored as ordinal (see Table 10).   
 
Table 10: Independent Index Variable for “Budget 
Adequacy” Recoded as Ordinal 
Index Score Groups Cases Percent 
7-11 
12-16 
17-21 
22-28 
Far Below Adequate 
Below Adequate 
Adequate 
Above Adequate 
6 
22 
46 
5 
4.8% 
17.6% 
36.8% 
4.0% 
 
An additional index variable was to be created from a series of eight questions 
regarding which online services were provided by the office (see Table 11). Specifically, 
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response options were “provided by the county itself”, “outsourced”, or “not provided at 
all” with an additional option of “Do Not Know”.  
 
Table 11: Question Regarding Online Services 
QUESTION:  
Thinking about the areas YOU SUPERVISE, please indicate whether each of the following 
ONLINE SERVICES are outsourced, provided by the county itself, or not provided at all: 
     Permit or License Applications 
     Searchable Public Records 
     Voter Registration 
     Payment of Utility Bills  
     Payment of Tickets or Fines  
     Payment of Taxes 
     Filing electronic employment applications 
     Requests for services (streetlight repair, potholes, etc.) 
 
However, review of the data showed that many respondents either skipped this 
set of questions outright or overwhelming selected “Do Not Know” which would suggest 
that they were unaware of whether/or how these services were being provided within 
the areas they supervised. As it does not seem typical for a supervisor to –not- know 
this information, the conclusion was reached that the question was not clear and 
therefore all responses were excluded from this analysis.  
In the end, this analysis included nine independent variables (see Table 12). 
Based on the responses to these variables, the majority of IT Director in Florida 
constitutional offices focus 100 percent of his/her time to the IT related needs of one 
office, which has an adequate budget, and is staffed by one to four employees whose 
job only supports IT. The average county constitutional office services a population 
between 200k and half a million, of which between 15 and 23 percent of individuals over 
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the age of 25 have a bachelor’s degree or higher. Further the average county 
intergovernmental revenue received is between $25 million and $74.9 million. 
  
Table 12: Independent Variables 
Variable  N 
Type of Office Supervised 102 
Number of Offices Supervised 125 
Number of Employees Supervised 124 
Percent of Duties Related to IT or information security 124 
Adequacy of Budget 79 
County Intergovernmental Revenue Totals 125 
County Population 125 
Percent of County Population with Bachelors Degrees or Higher 125 
State Zones 125 
 
Dependent Variable Coding 
The survey was constructed in two parts, whereas the first half collected 
information for independent variables, the second half probed for the dependent 
variables. Collectively, the survey yielded 50 5-point ordinal dependent variables as 
respondents were asked about the frequency that they engage in eight activities with 
each of five types of governments (8 x 5 = 40 variables) plus two questions to gauge the 
overall importance and development of their relationships with each of five types of 
governments (2 x 5 = 10 variables).  
Initial visual inspection of the dependent variables overwhelmingly revealed that 
IT Directors have an extremely low frequency of intergovernmental contact, regardless 
of activity or type of government contacted. Consequently, univariate analysis using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for normality in conjunction with probability plots consistently 
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revealed non-normal distributions due to these large skews in the data. Efforts to 
normalize the distributions through data transformation failed and attempts to collapse 
groups masked the true sense of the data. As a result, the decision was made not to 
alter the variables but instead to analyze all data with non-parametric tests which do not 
require data to be normally distributed. Specifically, the non-parametric tests Kruskal-
Wallis One-way ANOVA and Mann-Whitney U for independent samples were selected 
and are discussed in the next section. 
 For the purposes of this analysis, each of these 10 groups of five questions was 
seen as a “set” and each set was used to create a separate composite variable to 
measure the common underlying dimension (see Table 13). Each index was created by 
summing cases were the respondent answered all five indicator questions. 
 
Table 13: Dependent and Index Variables 
Dependent Variable Label Indicators for each Level of 
Government 
Index 
Variable 
1. Seek technical assistance  …with Federal: TECHF; 
…with State: TECHS; 
…with another County: TECHC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: TECHG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: TECHD 
= ITECH 
 N = 118 
2. Seek NON-technical assistance …with Federal: NONTECHF; 
…with State: NONTECHS; 
…with another County: NONTECHC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: NONTECHG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: NONTECHD 
= INONTECH 
N = 117 
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3. Seek information on an IT security 
program or project 
…with Federal: INFOF; 
…with State: INFOS; 
…with another County: INFOC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: INFOG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: INFOD 
= IINFO 
N = 114 
4. Seek funding or resources to 
improve IT security efforts 
…with Federal: RESOURCF; 
…with State: RESOURCS; 
…with another County: RESOURCC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: RESOURCG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: RESOURCD 
= IRESOURC 
N = 114 
5. Seek legal or policy guidance 
regarding IT security 
…with Federal: LEGALF; 
…with State: LEGALS; 
…with another County: LEGALC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: LEGALG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: LEGALD 
= ILEGAL 
N = 115 
6. Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 
regarding IT security 
…with Federal: FLEXF; 
…with State: FLEXS; 
…with another County: FLEXC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: FLEXG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: FLEXD 
= IFLEX 
N = 115 
7. Attempt to modify duties or 
procedures of an established 
partnership/agreement relating to IT 
security 
…with Federal: DUTIESF; 
…with State: DUTIESS; 
…with another County: DUTIESC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: DUTIESG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: DUTIESD 
= IDUTIES 
N = 115 
8. Attempt to modify resource-
sharing or funding obligations of an 
established partnership/agreement 
related to IT security 
…with Federal: OBLIGAF; 
…with State: OBLIGAS; 
…with another County: OBLIGAC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: OBLIGAG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: OBLIGAD 
= IOBLIGA 
N = 115 
9. Degree of relationship importance …with Federal: IMPORTF; 
…with State: IMPORTS; 
…with another County: IMPORTC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: IMPORTG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: IMPORTD 
= IIMPORT 
N =114 
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10. Degree of relationship 
development 
…with Federal: DEVELOPF; 
…with State: DEVELOPS; 
…with another County: DEVELOPC; 
…with another Government located 
within the County: DEVELOPG; 
…with another Department located within 
the County: DEVELOPD 
= IDEVELOP 
N = 117 
 
The original ordinal scale used for all eight dependent variables measuring an 
activity was “Weekly” (=1), “Monthly” (=2), “Several times a year” (=3), “A few times a 
year” (=4), and “Never” (=5). In order to construct more logically intuitive index 
variables, it was first necessary to recode these variables to reverse the scores. The 
resulting scale ranged from a summed score of 5, indicating the respondent never 
performed ‘said’ activity with any type of government, to a summed score of 25, 
indicating that the respondent performed ‘said’ activity weekly with each type of 
government.  
The same procedures were undertaken for creating the index variables for the 
two questions which gauged the overall importance and development of different 
relationships but were measured on different 5-point ordinal scales. The resulting scales 
for these two variables ranged from a summed score of 5, indicating the respondent did 
not perceive any of his/her intergovernmental relationships as important/developed, to a 
summed score of 25, indicating that the respondent perceive all of his/her 
intergovernmental relationships as extremely important/developed. 
Beyond these 10 indexes variables, five more composite variables were created 
by summing the eight activity questions by each type of government. For example, the 
composite variable “Frequency of Contact w/ Federal Offices” (IFED; N= 111) was 
created by summing responses to TECHF; NONTECHF; INFOF; RESOURCF; 
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LEGALF; FLEXF; DUTIESF; and OBLIGAF. In that eight variables were used to create 
the index, the resulting scale ranged from a summed score of 8, indicating the 
respondent never contacts federal offices for any of the eight activities, to a summed 
score of 40, indicating that the respondent contacts federal offices weekly for all eight 
activities. Constructed the same way, the final four index variables were “Frequency of 
Contact w/ State Offices” (ISTATE; N= 108); “Frequency of Contact w/ other Counties” 
(ICOUNTY; N= 107); “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government located within the 
County” (IGOV; N= 111); and “Frequency of Contact w/ another Department located 
within the County” (IDEPT; N= 110). To explore the relationships between these 15 
dependent index variables and the nine independent variables previously discussed, the 
researcher turned to non-parametric testing. 
 
Non-parametric Tests 
In instances where parametric assumptions are violated non-parametric test are 
preferred because they use the ranks of the data rather than the raw values to calculate 
the test statistic (Olsen, 2003; Norusis, 1998; Lehmkuhl, 1996). However, since interval 
and ordinal information is lost in the conversion to ranks, these tests are not as powerful 
as their parametric counterparts. Further, for the same number of observations, 
parametric test are more conservative than non-parametric tests, meaning they produce 
fewer false positives or Type I Errors were one incorrectly rejects the null hypothesis 
(Chan, 2003; Wuensch, 2001). Using the conventional parametric alpha level of .05 for 
 117
non-parametric tests inadvertently increases the chance of making Type I Errors. To 
reduce this probability and make a test more conservative, a lower alpha level should 
be set (Hair et. al, 1998). Therefore, to decrease the likelihood of false positives, the 
level of required significance for all tests in this analysis was lowered from the standard 
parametric level of .05 to .01. Tests approaching significance was set at p ≤ .02. 
To test the null hypothesis that all samples come from identical populations, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent groups was used. This test is the non-parametric 
alternative to ANOVA for independent groups to be used when data violate parametric 
assumptions (Norusis, 1998). The Kruskal-Wallis test statistic is calculated on the sums 
of ranks for combined groups after data from all groups are ordered (Garson, 2003). A 
significant p-value suggests that the differences observed are not coincidence. 
However, a significant test does not necessarily mean that every group differs from 
every other group; it only means that at least one group differs from the others (Hair et 
al. 1998). Therefore, a significant test is interpreted only as an overall difference 
between the groups. Unlike its parametric counterpart, ANOVA, there are no post-hoc 
tests available for Kruskal-Wallis (SPSS, 1998). Therefore, to determine what is driving 
significance, that is which group(s) differ from which other group(s), Mann-Whitney U for 
two independent samples was used to test group differences for significant independent 
variables. 
The Mann-Whitney U test of difference is the nonparametric alternative to the 
two-sample t-test (Olsen, 2003). Valid for data which are either continuous or discrete, it 
works by comparing the medians of two groups rather then the means and is used to 
test the hypothesis that there is no difference between them (Chan, 2003). It computes 
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the test statistic ‘U’ by pooling the two samples and listing cases in order by their rank 
level and then test whether the ranks are randomly mixed between two samples. When 
the size of both groups exceed 20, as is the case for all dichotomous variables created 
for this analysis, the sampling distribution of U approaches a normal curve. For this 
study, Mann-Whitney tests were conducted only for two purposes:. First, they were 
used to further explore significant Kruskal-Wallis tests (note: independent variables 
were prepared for Mann-Whitney testing by creating a new dichotomous indicator-
coded (0/1) variable for each group of the independent variable). Second, they were 
used in situations were an independent variable was dichotomous and therefore 
Kruskal-Wallis testing was not possible (note: no variable recoding needed). 
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V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
For this research, reporting test scores and significance levels was the primary 
manner used to represent findings. Measures of central tendency, such as means and 
standard deviations, were not reported as they generally do not provide a very useful 
description of data that is not normally distributed (Olsen 2003; Lehmkuhl, 1996). 
However, means were used in figures when they did help illustrate trends. Descriptive 
statistics better suited to explain nonparametric data include mode, median, and 
percentile rank (Bickel, 2002). After a thorough examination of the data, the researcher 
chose to report modes as they most effectively illuminated differences in this particular 
data. Specifically, a mode is the most frequently occurring response (Lehmkuhl, 1996). 
In non-normally distributed data, it is possible to have no mode however, this situation 
did not occur with any variable in this study. 
 
General Analysis 
To uncover patterns and norms with regard to this largely invisible population, 
frequencies and Crosstabs were initially used to examine the data. Several trends were 
observed and noted in this section. However, generalizations made herein presuppose 
that study respondents are representative of the true population. Further, these 
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generalizations only extend to IT Directors and their departments in Florida 
constitutional offices. 
In the end, this analysis included 15 dependent index variables. Review of these 
variables revealed that the majority of intergovernmental or interorganizational contact 
preformed by IT departments in Florida constitutional offices for reasons related to IT or 
IT security happens only “A Few Times a Year” or “Never” regardless of the activity (see 
Table 14).  
 
Table 14: Total Percent of Respondents who Contact Each Type of 
Government only “ A Few Times a Year” or “Never” Regardless of the 
Activity 
Government Contacted  Percent 
Federal 92.8% 
State 84.3% 
Another County 89.7% 
Another Government Located within the Jurisdiction of their County 82.0% 
Another Department Located within their County 65.5% 
 
Specifically, 92.8 percent of respondents only contact federal offices a few times 
a year or never; 84.3 percent of respondents only contact state offices a few times a 
year or never; 89.7 percent of respondents only contact an office in an another county a 
few times a year or never; 82 percent of respondents only contact an office in an 
another government located within their county jurisdiction a few times a year or never; 
and 65.5 percent of respondents only contact departments located within their own 
county government a few times a year or never.  
Largely consistent with their reported frequency of contact, the percent of 
respondents who perceived the overall relationship between their IT Department and 
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each the other types of governments as only ‘Somewhat Developed’ or “Not Developed’ 
was generally much higher than the percent who perceived the relationship as ‘Very 
Developed’ or “Extremely Developed’ (see Table 15).  The exception was with 
departments located within their own county government 
 
Table 15: Perceived Overall Relationship Development with Each Contact by Percents 
 Extremely 
Developed 
Very 
Developed 
Developed  Somewhat 
Developed 
Not Very 
Developed 
Federal 0.0 2.6 2.6  15.4 79.5◄ 
 = 2.6%   = 94.9% 
State 5.1 11.1 25.6  34.2◄ 23.9 
 = 16.2%   = 58.1% 
County 2.6 7.7 27.4  31.6◄ 30.8 
 = 10.3%   = 62.4% 
Other Governments 5.1 12.8 19.7  30.8 31.6◄ 
 = 17.9%   = 62.4% 
Other Departments 24.6 26.3◄ 17.8  21.2 10.2 
 = 50.9%   = 31.4% 
    
“◄” : Mode 
      
However, respondents’ perception of relationship development is in slight discord 
with perceived importance of several types of governments specifically with regard to 
federal  and state (see Table 16). 
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Table 16: Perceived  Importance of Each Contact to Overall IT Success  
 Extremely 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Important Somewhat 
Important 
Not Very 
Important 
Federal 2.4 8.0 8.0 25.6 51.8◄ 
 = 10.4%  = 77.4% 
State 7.9 19.3 24.6 30.7◄ 17.5 
 = 27.2%  = 48.2% 
County 0.9 8.8 19.3 34.2 36.8◄ 
 = 9.7%  = 71.0% 
Other Governments 7.0 13.2 17.5 21.9 40.4◄ 
 = 20.2%  = 62.3% 
Other Departments 24.3◄ 18.3 17.4 21.7 18.3 
 = 42.6%  = 40% 
    
“◄” : Mode 
 
These figures would indicate that the relationships counties maintain with federal 
and state offices are not as developed as perhaps they should be considering the level 
of importance respondents place on these offices with regard to their information 
security efforts. 
Examining the data according to overall frequency of each activity reveals that 
regardless of the type of government contacted, the eight intergovernmental or 
interorganizational activities addressed in this research also occur only a few times a 
year or less (see Table 17). Specifically, 60.2 percent of respondents seek technical 
assistance a few times a year or less; 71.8 percent of respondents seek non-technical 
assistance a few times a year or less; 76.3 percent of respondents seek information on 
a program or project a few times a year or less; 92.1 percent of respondents seek 
funding or resources to improve their information security efforts a few times a year or 
less; 87.8 percent of respondents seek legal or policy guidance a few times a year or 
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less; 93 percent of respondents seek regulatory of policy flexibility a few times a year or 
less; 96.3 percent of respondents attempt to modify duties or procedures of an 
established partnership/agreement relating to IT a few times a year or less; and 95.7 
percent of respondents attempt to modify resource-sharing or funding obligations of an 
established partnership/agreement relating to IT a few times a year or less.  
 
Table 17: Percent of Respondent who Engage in Each Activity “ A Few Times a 
Year or Less” Regardless of the Intergovernmental or Interorganizational Contact 
Activity  Percent 
Seek technical assistance 60.2% 
Seek non-technical assistance 71.8% 
Seek program or project information 76.3% 
Seek resources or funding 92.1% 
Seek legal or policy guidance 87.8% 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 93.0% 
Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement  96.3% 
Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement 95.7% 
 
Of 124 respondents, the largest concentration (37.6 percent) indicated that 100% 
of their duties focus on IT or information security related issues (see Table 18). 
However, nearly one-third of respondents (“40% or Less” [22] + “60% or Less” [16] = 
38/124 = 30.6%) indicated that less than 60% of their duties are dedicated to IT related 
issues. This means on average nearly one out of every three constitutional offices in the 
state does not have a full-time director supervising critical local information systems.  
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Table 18: Percent of Duties Focused on IT Related Tasks 
Percent of Duties Cases Percent 
40% or less 22 16.7% 
60% 16 12.8% 
80% 39 31.2% 
100% 47 37.6% 
 N = 124  
 
The 38 respondents who indicated that less than 60% of their duties are 
dedicated to IT related issues disproportionately reside in Zones 1 and 2 which are the 
west and north respectively (see Table 19)5.  
 
Table 19: Zone by Percent of Duties Focused on IT Related Tasks 
 40% or 
less 
60% 80% 100% 
Zone 1 (west) N=14 5 1 5 3 
 = 6 (42.8%)   
Zone 2 (north) N= 33 9 7 7 10 
 = 16 (48.4%)   
Zone 3 (central) N= 38 3 5 16 14 
 = 8 (21.0%)   
Zone 4 (south) N= 39 5 3 11 20 
 = 8 (20.5%)   
Total N=124 Total= 38 (30.6%)   
 
Specifically, 42.8 percent of Zone 1 respondents and 48.4 percent of Zone 2 
respondents are only able focus less than 60% of their duties to IT related issues. 
Meaning, the number of constitutional offices in the northern quarter of the state with 
                                            
5 Once again it should be noted that Zone 1 was under-represented in relation to the other three zones 
which could in turn potentially impact findings. 
 125
less than full-time IT Directors is disproportionately higher than the rest of the state. 
However, more than half of all respondents (20 out of 39) working in the 17 counties of 
Zone 4 in the south of the state indicated that 100% of their duties are dedicated to IT 
related issues. 
In addition, one-third of all respondents working in Zone 2 counties indicated that 
they supervise two or more offices (see Table 20). At the other end of the spectrum, 
less than one-sixth of Zone 4 directors (6 out of 39) and less that one-seventh of Zone 3 
directors (5 out of 34) supervise two or more offices. However, of the 14 respondents 
from Zone 1 in the panhandle, only one (7.1 percent) indicated that s/he supervised two 
or more offices.    
 
Table 20: Zone by Number of Offices Supervised 
 Only One 
Office 
Two or More 
Offices 
Zone 1 (west) N=14 13 1 (7.1%) 
Zone 2 (north) N= 33 22 11 (33.3%) 
Zone 3 (central) N= 39 34 5 (12.8%) 
Zone 4 (south) N= 39 33 6 (15.4) 
 
Of 101 respondents, the largest concentration (34.6 percent) indicated that they 
supervise between one and four employees (see Table 21). However, one in four 
respondents (23 cases or 22.7 percent) indicated that they supervise no employees. 
Even more alarming, 47.8 percent of these respondents (11 of the 23 cases) also 
indicated that they are part-time Directors. This means that an average of 10.8 percent 
of constitutional offices in the state (11 out of 101 cases = 10.8) do not have a full-time 
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IT director or any supportive staff ensuring that crucial patches are installed and that 
vital data is backed-up.  
 
Table 21: Number of Employees Supervised by Percent of Duties Focused on 
IT Related Tasks 
 40% or 
less 
60% 80% 100% Totals 
0 7 4 6 6 23 (22.7%) 
 = 11 (47.8%)    
1-4 9 2 13 11 35 (34.6%) 
 = 11 (31.3%)    
5-14 2 3 13 4 22 (21.7%) 
 = 5 (22.7%)    
15 or more 1 3 5 12 21(20.7%) 
 = 4 (19.0%)    
Total N=101 Total= 31 (30.6%)    
 
Of the respondent who indicated that they supervise no employees, 36.3 percent 
(12 cases) work for counties located in Zone 2 (see Table 22).   
 
Table 22: Number of Employees Supervised by Zone 
 [ 0 ] [ 1 – 4 ] [ 5  - 14 ] [ 15 + ] 
Zone 1 (west) N=14 4 
(28.5%) 
7◄ 
(50%) 
1 
(7.1%) 
2 
(14.2%) 
Zone 2 (north) N= 33 12 
(36.3%) 
14◄ 
(42.4%) 
5 
(15.1%) 
2 
(6%) 
Zone 3 (central) N= 38 4 
(10.5%) 
7 
(18.4%) 
14◄ 
(36.8%) 
13 
(34.2%) 
Zone 4 (south) N= 39 7 
(17.9%) 
13◄ 
(33.3%) 
7 
(17.9%) 
12 
(30.7%) 
Total N=124 27 41◄ 27 29 
“◄” : Mode   
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Whereas IT departments in the 20 counties of Zone 2 seemed stretched thin for 
employees, offices located in the 14 counties of Zone 3, the central band across the 
state, appear to be the best staffed of the four zones. Of the respondents working in 
Zone 3 counties, only 10.5 percent (4 cases) indicated that they had no employees. 
Moreover, 34.2 percent (13 cases) have 15 or more employees and an additional 36.8 
percent (14 cases) noted that they have between 5-14 employees.   
As this analysis revealed, there appear to be trends in the data which coincide 
with zone membership. However, the question arose whether these similarities could 
more likely be attributed to underlying economic patterns occurring regionally rather 
than management decisions, for instance, regarding the appropriate number of 
employees. To explore this notion, the researcher ran Crosstabs between the variable 
“Zone” and the variable “Intergovernmental Revenue” and the index “Adequacy of 
Budget” and (see Tables 23 and 24). 
 
Table 23: Zone by the Independent Variable “Intergovernmental 
Revenue 
 Less than 
$11.9 
million 
$12 – 24.9 
million 
 
$25 – 74.9 
million 
$75 + 
million 
Zone 1 (west) N=14 2 
(14.2%) 
8◄ 
(57.1%) 
4 
(28.5%) 
0 
(0%) 
Zone 2 (north) N= 33 18◄ 
(54.5%) 
12 
(36.3%) 
3 
(9%) 
0 
(0%) 
Zone 3 (central) N= 39 2 
(5.1%) 
9 
(23.%) 
15◄ 
(38.4%) 
13 
(33.3%) 
Zone 4 (south) N= 39 7 
(17.9%) 
5 
(12.8%) 
13 
(33.3%) 
14◄ 
(35.8%) 
Total N=124 29  
(23.3%) 
34 
(27.4%) 
35◄ 
(28.2%) 
27 
(21.7%) 
“◄” : Mode   
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Based on the overall distribution of intergovernmental revenue, the majority of 
counties receive between $12 and $74.9 million. Whereas Zone 3 and specifically Zone 
4 receive more monies on average; Zone 1 and particularly Zone 2 receive less. While 
intergovernmental revenue provides a glimpse into county funds, it provides an 
incomplete picture of overall county budget. Further, the real question here is how 
adequately county funds filter to IT departments.  
A review of index variable “Adequacy of Budget” reveals that the majority of 
Directors in Zones 1, 3, and 4 perceived overall available funds for several core IT 
needs to be adequate.  
 
Table 24: Zone by the Index variable “Adequacy of Budget” 
 Far Below 
Adequate 
(7-11) 
Below 
Adequate 
(12-16) 
Adequate 
(17-22) 
Above 
Adequate 
(23-28) 
Zone 1 (west) N=8 1 
(12.5%) 
1 
(12.5%) 
5◄ 
(62.5%) 
1 
(12.5%) 
Zone 2 (north) N= 25 3 
     (12%) 
8 
(32%) 
12◄ 
(48%) 
2 
(8%) 
Zone 3 (central) N= 24 0 
(0%) 
6 
(25%) 
16◄ 
(66.6%) 
2 
(8.3%) 
Zone 4 (south) N= 22 2 
(9%) 
7 
(31.8%) 
13◄ 
(59%) 
0 
(0%) 
Total N=79 6 22 46◄ 5 
“◄” : Mode   
 
While the largest concentration of Zone 2 directors (48 percent) also indicated 
that their overall IT budget was adequate, a total of 44 percent (12% + 32%) noted that 
their budget was below adequate. Specifically, one-third indicated that funds were 
below adequate and 12 percent noted that their funding was far below adequate. As 
such, one might want to conclude that budgets were driving staffing decisions because 
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relative to the other zones, Zone 2 IT departments have smaller staffs; nearly one out of 
ever two Directors (48.4 percent) are only able to dedicated 60% or less or their duties 
to IT related issues (refer to Table 19); and one-third of Directors simultaneously 
supervising two or more constitutional offices (refer to Table 20). However, a total of 
40.8 percent of Zone 4 Directors (9% + 31.8%) also indicated that their overall budgets 
were inadequate. Yet 30.2 percent of offices in this zone have 15 or more employees 
(refer to Table 22); only one in five Directors (20.5 percent) are only able to dedicated 
60% or less or their duties to IT related issues (refer to Table 19); and only 15.4 percent 
of Directors supervise two or more constitutional offices (refer to Table 20). As such, it 
seems that budget adequacy alone was not the driving force behind staffing differences 
and the researcher must conclude that there remains an underlying regional quality(s) 
or influential dynamic(s), or perhaps some other spurious factor not readily perceptible 
via the demographics explored in this research which is the reason of these regional 
differences. 
Beyond regional differences, collectively the majority of respondents found 
funding for each core IT need to be adequate or better (refer to Table 24). However, at 
least one in five respondents indicated that it was below or far below adequate. 
Specifically, 56 percent, or one out of every two Directors indicated that funding for 
computer security education for non-IT employees was below adequate (see Table 25).  
Nearly half (48.6 percent) indicated that they did not have enough funding for risk 
assessment and risk management. And nearly 40 percent of respondents indicated that 
their funding for hiring IT employees was below adequate.  
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Table 25: Core IT Needs by Percent of Respondent who Indicated 
that Funding was Inadequate 
Core IT Needs Percent 
IT equipment/ software/ hardware 
(N=121 ) 
23.1% 
IT security equipment/ software/ hardware 
(N=118 ) 
31.3% 
Hiring outsource vendors 
(N=98 ) 
30.6% 
Hiring IT personnel and support staff 
(N=111 ) 
39.6% 
Training IT personnel 
(N=116 ) 
39.6% 
Computer security education for NON IT employees 
(N=98 ) 
56.1% 
Risk assessment/ management 
(N=109 ) 
48.6% 
 
Further analysis revealed distinct difference according to office type. For 
instance, the majority of IT Directors in Board of Commissioners offices (53 percent) 
and the largest concentration of IT Directors in Sheriff’s offices (32 percent) supervise 
15 or more employees (see Table 26). However, the largest concentration of IT 
Directors in Property Appraiser’s offices (33.3 percent) and Supervisor of Elections’ 
offices (30.4 percent) supervise no employees. Whereas the largest concentration of IT 
Directors in Tax Collectors offices (46.4 percent) and Clerk of Court offices (33.3 
percent) supervise between one and four employees. 
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Table 26: Number of Employees Supervised by Type of Office 
Office [ 0 ] [ 1 – 4 ] [ 5  - 14 ] [ 15 + ] 
Board of Commissioners (N=32) 3 
(9.3%) 
6 
(18.7%) 
6 
(18.7%) 
17◄ 
(53.1%) 
Clerk of Court (N=30) 5 
(16.6%) 
10◄ 
(33.3%) 
9 
(30.0%) 
6 
(20.0%) 
Property Appraiser (N=23) 8◄ 
(33.3%) 
6 
(25.0%) 
5 
(20.8%) 
4 
(16.6%) 
Sheriff (N=34) 7 
(20.5%) 
8 
(23.5%) 
8 
(23.5%) 
11◄ 
(32.3%) 
Supervisor of Elections (N=23) 7 
(30.4%) 
10◄ 
(43.4%) 
2 
(8.6%) 
4 
(17.3%) 
Tax Collectors (N=28) 7 
(25.0%) 
13◄ 
(46.4%) 
4 
(14.2%) 
4 
(14.2%) 
“◄” : Mode   
 
The different types of offices also have different rates for supervising two or more 
offices (see Table 27). For instance, 65.6 percent of IT Directors supervising Board of 
Commissioners offices also supervise another office. However, only 11.7 percent IT 
Directors supervising Sheriff’s offices also supervise another office.  
 
Table 27: Percent of IT Directors who Supervise 
Two or more Office by Type of Office Supervised 
Office Percent 
Board of Commissioners 65.5% 
Clerk of Court 46.6% 
Property Appraiser 37.5% 
Sheriff 11.7% 
Supervisor of Elections 47.8% 
Tax Collectors 35.7% 
 
Finally, the type of office a director supervises also impacts what percent of their 
duties will likely focus solely on IT related issues (see Table 28).  For instance, 62.5 
percent IT Directors supervising Board of Commissioners offices, 100% of their duties 
are IT related. However, for IT Directors in Property Appraisers offices, only one in four 
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(6 out of 24) report the same, whereas 43.4 percent (“40% of Duties” [12.5%] + “60% of 
Duties” [29.1%]) are only able to devote 60% or less of their duties to IT related issues. 
In contrast, 82.1 percent (“80% of Duties” [39.2%] + “100% of Duties” [42.8%]) of IT 
Directors in Tax Collectors’ offices focus 80% or more of their duties to IT related 
issues. 
 
Table 28: Percent of IT Director’s Duties Focused on IT Related Issues by Type of 
Office Supervised 
Office [40% of 
Duties ] 
[ 60% of 
Duties ] 
[ 80% of 
Duties] 
[ 100% of 
Duties] 
Board of Commissioners (N=32) 4 
(12.5%) 
5 
(15.6%) 
3 
(9.3%) 
20◄ 
(62.5%) 
Clerk of Court (N=30) 7 
(23.0%) 
4 
(13.3%) 
6 
(20.0%) 
13◄ 
(43.3%) 
Property Appraiser (N=24) 3 
(12.5%) 
7◄ 
(29.1%) 
7◄ 
(29.1%) 
6 
25.0%) 
Sheriff (N=34) 8 
(23.5%) 
5 
(14.7%) 
10 
(29.4%) 
11◄ 
(32.3%) 
Supervisor of Elections (N=23) 4 
(17.3%) 
3 
(13.0%) 
4 
(17.3%) 
12◄ 
(52.1%) 
Tax Collectors (N=28) 2 
(71.%) 
3 
(10.7%) 
11 
(39.2%) 
12◄ 
(42.8%) 
“◄” : Mode   
 
Being exploratory, this study did not endeavor to establish causal relationships 
nor was it bound to hypotheses. Instead it sought to uncover patterns, like the ones just 
discussed, and to answer the following three questions: 1) is there a relationship 
between office/county demographics and the IGM activities its IT Directors most often 
engage in on behalf of information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 
2) which IGM activities do county IT Directors most often engage in on behalf of 
information security and critical digital infrastructure protection; 3) do county IT Directors 
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make more use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships on behalf of information 
security and critical digital infrastructure protection? However, to help facilitate this 
analysis, these questions were tested as hypotheses. These findings and the 
conclusions are discussed next.  
 
Question 1: Prevalence of IGM Activity 
The first research question inquires into which IGM activities county IT Directors 
most often engage in as part of their information security efforts. As noted in the 
previous chapter, statistics such as mean and standard deviation do not provide useful 
descriptions of non-normally distributed data. Therefore, the researcher examined 
frequencies and modes as they most effectively describe the current data .  
To recap, respondents were asked to indicate how often they engage in eight 
activities with each of five intergovernmental partners (federal, state, county, other 
governments, and other departments) using a scale of 1-5 [“Weekly” (=5), “Monthly” 
(=4), “Several times a year” (=3), “A few times a year” (=2), and “Never” (=1)]. Of the 40 
resulting questions, 31 (77.5 percent) had a mode of “Never” while nine had a mode of 
“A few times a year” (see Table 29). None had modes of “Weekly”, “Monthly”, or 
“Several times a year”. 
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Table 29: The Nine Activities with Modes of ‘A Few Times a 
Year or Less’  rather than ‘Never’ 
Activity  
Seek technical assistance from a STATE office 
Seek technical assistance from another COUNTY 
Seek technical assistance from a another DEPARTMENT 
Seek program or project information from a STATE office 
Seek program or project information from another COUNTY 
Seek program or project information from a another DEPARTMENT 
Seek legal or policy guidance from a STATE office 
Seek legal or policy guidance from another COUNTY 
Seek legal or policy guidance from a another DEPARTMENT 
 
Of the nine questions for which “A few times a year” was the mode, they were 
equally divided among three activities; seek technical assistance; seek program or 
project information; and seek legal or policy guidance. Beyond the fact that only these 
three activities have modes other than ‘Never’, another dynamic clearly evident was that 
each of these more frequently performed activities occurs only with either a State office, 
another County, or another Department within the respondents own county. However, 
patterns of vertical or horizontal relationships are addressed in the next section. 
Another way to determine which IGM activities county IT Directors most often 
perform was to look at frequencies. Doing so revealed that of the eight activities, 
seeking technical assistance was the most frequently preformed activity (see Table 30). 
Examining all 40 combinations of ‘activity by partner’ revealed that of the five most 
frequently performed activities ‘seeking technical assistance’ appears on the list three 
times, while ‘seeking non-technical assistance’ and ‘seeking program or project 
information’ each appeared once. It should also be pointed out that four of five activities 
 135
occur horizontally with other Departments within the respondents own county or with 
another Government within the jurisdiction of the respondents county.   
 
Table 30: Five Most Frequent Activities by Percent of Respondents who Perform the 
Activity Several Times a Year or More 
Activity Percent 
Seek technical assistance from another Department in own county 31.1% 
Seek non-technical assistance from another Department in own county 17.6% 
Seek technical assistance from another Government in the county 14.9% 
Seek technical assistance from a State office 12.5% 
Seek program or project information from another Department in own county 12.2% 
 
While the earlier examination of modes revealed that the largest concentration of 
respondents ‘seek legal or policy guidance’ “A Few Times a Year” (whereas the majority 
of respondents “Never” perform five of the other activities), a review of frequencies 
revealed that this activity is rarely performed more than a few times a year regardless of 
the intergovernmental contact. 
Another important facet of exploring the frequency of IGM activities was to look 
which activities occur the least. Again, examining all 40 combinations of ‘activity by 
partner’ revealed that seeking to modify either the duties/procedures or the 
resources/funding obligations of an established partnership/agreement relating to IT 
with either a Federal office or another county rarely occurs (see Table 31). Another 
infrequent activity is seeking resources or funding from another County.   
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Table 31: Five Least Frequent Activities by Percent of Respondents who Never Perform 
the Activity 
Activity Percent 
Seek to modify duties/procedures of an agreement with a Federal office 94.8% 
Seek to modify resource/funding obligations of an agreement with a Federal office 94.8% 
Seek to modify duties/procedures of an agreement with another County 87.0% 
Seek resources or funding from another County 85.5% 
Seek to modify resource/funding obligations of an agreement with another County 81.9% 
 
In reference to research Question One, which IGM activities county IT Directors 
most often engage in as part of their information security efforts, the data indicated that 
seeking technical assistance followed by seeking non-technical assistance and 
program/project information are the most frequently performed activities. The data also 
indicated that the least frequently performed activities are seeking to modify either the 
duties/procedures or the resources/funding obligations of an established 
partnership/agreement relating to information technology. 
 
Question 2: Vertical vs. Horizontal Relationships 
The second research question inquires whether county IT Directors make more 
use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships as part of their information security efforts. 
As with research Question One, exploring frequencies helped to delineate which 
intergovernmental relationships county IT Directors most often call upon. Examining the 
frequency of each activity as performed with each type of contact revealed that ‘other 
Departments within the respondents own county’ were most frequently contacted for six 
of the eight activities (see Table 32). For the other two activities, seeking 
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regulatory/policy flexibility or legal/policy guidance, State offices were most frequently 
contacted. 
 
Table 32: Most Frequent Partner for Each Activity 
Activity Partner 
Seek to modify duties/procedures of a agreement with… another Department in own county 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility from… State 
Seek program or project information from… another Department in own county 
Seek legal or policy guidance from… State 
Seek NON-technical assistance from… another Department in own county 
Seek to modify resource/funding obligations of a 
agreement with… 
another Department in own county 
Seek resources or funding from… another Department in own county 
Seek technical assistance from… another Department in own county 
 
Examining the frequency of each activity as performed with each type of contact 
revealed that Federal offices were contacted the least for six of the eight activities (see 
Table 33). Of the other two activities, seeking legal/policy guidance was performed the 
least often with other Governments with the respondents county and seeking 
resources/funding was performed the least often with other Counties. 
 
Table 33: Least Frequent Partner for Each Activity 
Activity Partner 
Seek to modify duties or procedures of a  
partner/agreement with… 
Federal 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility from… Federal 
Seek program or project information from… Federal 
Seek legal or policy guidance from… another Government in the county 
Seek NON-technical assistance from… Federal 
Seek to modify resource/funding obligations with… Federal 
Seek resources or funding from… another County 
Seek technical assistance from… Federal 
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In reference to Research Question Two, whether county IT Directors make more 
use of vertical or horizontal IGM relationships as part of their information security efforts, 
the data indicated -horizontal- as six of the eight activities were most often performed 
with other departments in the respondents county. Further, six of the eight activities 
were performed the least often vertically with Federal offices.  
However of the eight activities, two were performed most often vertically with the 
State and two activities were performed least often horizontally with either other 
Counties or other Governments located within the respondents county. This led the 
researcher to conclude that while IT Directors make more use of horizontal relationship, 
vertical relationships are also important to county information security efforts. 
 
Question 3: Demographics and IGM Activity 
The third research question inquires whether there are relationships between 
office/county demographics and the IGM activity of IT Directors as part of their of 
information security efforts. To address this question Kruskal-Wallis tests were run to 
determine whether respondents answers in the 15 composite variables differed 
according to each of the independent variables. Tests are presented by the independent 
variables and the null hypotheses in each instance was that there is no overall 
difference between groups.  
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Office Supervised 
 
The first point of exploration was to determine whether respondents answers in 
the 15 composite variables differed according to the type of office they supervised. 
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences returned four of the 15 test significant 
at .01 (see Table 34).  
 
Table 34: Kruskal-Wallis Tests Significant at p≤.01 for the Independent Variable “Office 
Supervised” & the Composite Dependent Variables 
Variable H* Sig. 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL Offices 32.92 .000 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ another GOVERNMENT in the County 22.49 .000 
Index of Frequency to Seek Funding or Resources 20.12 .001 
Index of Relationship Importance 19.22 .002 
*NOTE: all DF = 5 
 
Of the four significant variables, two pertain to overall interaction with a types 
government- “Frequency of Contact with Federal Offices” (H=32.92; p=.000) and  
“Frequency of Contact with Other Governments within the Jurisdiction of Your County” 
(H=22.49; p=.000); one pertains to an IGM activity- “Frequency to Seek Funding or 
Resources” (H=20.12; p=.001); and one pertains to the perceived importance of each 
type of government to the success of the office- “Relationship Importance” (H=19.22; 
p=.002). In each of these instances, the null hypothesis was rejected as there was 
evidence of an overall significant difference between groups.  
Since a significant Kruskal-Wallis test does not denote that every group differs 
from every other group, Mann-Whitney tests were employed to determine specifically 
which group(s) differ from which other group(s). 
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Contact with Federal Offices 
 
For the first significant index, “Frequency of Contact with Federal Offices”, the 
differences between groups of three dichotomous variables proved statistically 
significant at .01, specifically, “Board of Commissioners versus all other offices” 
(U=796.5 p=.003), “Sheriffs versus all other office: (U=671 p=.000), and “Tax Collectors 
(U=749 p=.008) versus all other offices” (see Table 35). 
 
Table 35: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Frequency 
of Contact with Federal Offices” by Independent Dichotomous Variables 
for Type of Office Supervised 
Variable U Sig. 
Board of Commissioners 796.5 .003◄ 
Clerk of Court 862.0 .029 
Property Appraiser 733.0 .051 
Supervisor of Elections 908.0 .987 
Sheriff 671.0 .000◄ 
Tax Collector 749.0 .008◄ 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02   
  
Based on the scale of the dependent index variable (where a score of 8 indicates 
no contact across all eight activities and a score of 40 indicates weekly contact across 
all eight activities), Figure 3 reveals that on average, Board of Commissioners offices 
and Sheriffs offices contact federal offices at a higher frequency than the other types of 
offices, while Tax Collectors offices contact federal offices less frequently.  
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Figure 3: Frequencies of Index “Contact with Federal Offices” by Dichotomous “Board of 
Commissioners ”, “Sheriff”, and “Tax Collector” Variables 
 
To further explore which actions are driving the significance of these 
relationships, and thus the frequency of contact with federal offices, Mann-Whitey tests 
were run between each of the three significant dichotomous variables and the eight 
indicator variables that comprise the index variable “Frequency of Contact with Federal 
Offices”. 
 
“Board of Commissioners Offices” 
 
Starting with Board of Commissioners offices (see Table 36), the frequency with 
which this type of office contacts federal offices statistically differs from other types of 
offices for two activities; “seeking program information” (U=947; p=.002) and “seeking 
legal or policy guidance” (U=973.5; p=.005), while “seeking regulatory or policy 
flexibility” (U=1089.5; p=.017) is approaching significance.  
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Table 36: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index 
Factors of “Frequency of Contact w/ Federal Offices” 
Variable U Sig. 
Seek technical assistance 1128.5 .037 
Seek non-technical assistance 1225.5   .165 
Seek program or project information 947.0 .002◄ 
Seek resources or funding 1152.0 .176 
Seek legal or policy guidance 973.5 .005◄ 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 1089.5 .0179 
Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement  1224.0 .202 
Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement 1294.5 .708 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02 
 
Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these 
significant activities and whether the respondent supervised a Board of Commissioners 
office or not, revealed that on average this type of office more frequently engages in 
each of these three activities then other types of offices (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Frequencies of Significant Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Contact with Federal 
Offices” by “Board of Commissioners Versus All Others” 
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“Sheriff’s Office”  
 
The frequency with which Sheriff’s Offices contact federal offices (see Table 37) 
statistically differs from other types of offices for two activities included in the index; 
“seeking non-technical assistance” (U=1045.5; p=.003) and “seeking resources or 
funding” (U=714.5; p=.000). While the frequency with which they “seek legal or policy 
guidance” from federal offices (U=1033.5; p=.017) approaches significance.  
 
Table 37: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Sheriff’s Office” by Index Factors of 
“Frequency of Contact w/ Federal Offices” 
Variable U Sig. 
Seek technical assistance 1171.0 .077 
Seek non-technical assistance 1054.5 .003◄ 
Seek program or project information 1165.5 .141 
Seek resources or funding 714.5 .000◄ 
Seek legal or policy guidance 1033.5 .0179 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 1345.5 .898 
Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement  1281.0 .731 
Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement 1236.5 .188 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02 
 
Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for each these 
significant activities and whether the respondent supervised a Sheriffs Office or not, 
revealed that on average this type of office more frequently engages in each of these 
three activities then other types of offices (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Frequencies of Significant Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Contact with Federal 
Offices” by “Sheriff’s Office Versus All Others” 
 
“Tax Collector’s Office” 
 
The frequency with which Tax Collectors Offices contact federal offices (see 
Table 38) does not statistically differ from other types of offices for any specific activity 
in the index. However, the frequency with which they seek legal or policy guidance from 
federal offices (U=913.0; p=.019) is approaching significance. 
 
Table 38: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Tax Collector” by Index Factors of 
“Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL Offices” 
Variable U Sig. 
Seek technical assistance 1022.5 .066 
Seek non-technical assistance 1017.5 .048 
Seek program or project information 965.5 .046 
Seek resources or funding 964.5 .042 
Seek legal or policy guidance 913.0 .0199 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 1075.5 .191 
Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement  1136.0 .716 
Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement 1120.5 .168 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02 
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Contact with Another Government in the County 
 
Referring back to the Kruskal-Wallis tests run to determine if there were groups 
differences between type of office supervised and the 15 index variables, a second 
significant index was “Frequency of Contact with another Government located within the 
Jurisdiction of Your County”. Running Mann-Whitney tests between this variable and the 
six dichotomous office variables revealed that the difference between “Board of 
Commissioners office versus all other offices” (U=659 p=.000) was statistically 
significant (see Table 39). 
 
Table 39: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Frequency of 
Contact with another Government located within the Jurisdiction of Your 
County” by Independent Dichotomous Variables for Type of Office Supervised 
Variable U Sig. 
Board of Commissioners 659.0 .000◄ 
Clerk of Court 954.0 .111 
Property Appraiser 730.5 .102 
Supervisor of Elections 828.5 .526 
Sheriff 1144.0 .633 
Tax Collector 780.0 .035 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02  
 
Based on the  scale of the dependent index, where a score of 8 indicates no 
contact across all eight activities and a score of 40 indicates weekly contact across all 
eight activities, Figure 6 illustrates that on average, Board of Commissioners offices 
contact other governments located within the jurisdiction of their county at a higher 
frequency than the other types of offices. 
 
 
 146
Figure 6: Frequency of Index of “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government  in Your County 
Jurisdiction” by Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” 
 
To further explore which activities are driving the significance of this relationship, 
Mann-Whitey tests were run between the dichotomous variable Board of 
Commissioners and the eight indicator variables that comprise this index. As evident in 
Table 40, the frequency with which a Board of Commissioners office contacts other 
government offices located within the jurisdiction of its own county statistically differs 
from other types of offices for all but one activity- seeking to modify resource or funding 
obligations with a partner or agreement (U=1118.5; p=.053).  
 
Table 40: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index 
Factors of “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government  in Your County Jurisdiction” 
Variable U Sig. 
Seek technical assistance 930.0 .002◄ 
Seek non-technical assistance 868.5 .001◄ 
Seek program or project information 914.0 .002◄ 
Seek resources or funding 944.5 .000◄ 
Seek legal or policy guidance 1004.0 .007◄ 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 976.5 .003◄ 
Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement  893.0 .000◄ 
Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement 1118.5 .053 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02 
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Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for the seven 
statistically significant activities and whether the respondent supervises a Board of 
Commissioners office or not illustrates that on average this type of office more 
frequently engages in each of these activity with other government offices located within 
the jurisdiction of its own county then do other types of offices (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Contact w/ another Government Located within the 
Jurisdiction of Your County” by “Board of Commissioners ”  versus All Others 
 
Seeking Funding or Resources 
 
The third index denoted significant by Kruskal-Wallis testing was “Frequency of 
Seeking Funding or Resources”. Again, Mann-Whitney testing revealed the only 
statistically significant difference between groups occurs between the dichotomous 
variable “Board of Commissioners office versus all other offices” (U=889.5 p=.008) (see 
Table 41).  
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Table 41: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Frequency of 
Seeking Funding or Resources” by Independent Dichotomous Variables for 
Type of Office Supervised 
Variable U Sig. 
Board of Commissioners 899.5 .008◄ 
Clerk of Court 988.5 .098 
Property Appraiser 736.0 .067 
Supervisor of Elections 949.5 .837 
Sheriff 1078.5 .124 
Tax Collector 964.5 .206 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02  
 
To further explore which activities are driving the significance of this test, Mann-
Whitney tests were run between this dichotomous variable and the five indicator 
variables that comprise this activity index (see Table 42). Two tests were significant for 
groups differences; “seeking resources/funding from another government within the 
jurisdiction of your county” (U=944.5; p=.000) and “seeking resources/funding from 
other department within your own county” (U=996.0; p=.009). 
 
Table 42: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index 
Factors of “Frequency of Seeking Funding or Resources”  
Variable U Sig. 
from Federal 1152.0 .176 
from State 1297.5 .737 
from Another County 1158.5 .044 
from Another Government Located within the Jurisdiction of their County 944.5 .000◄ 
from Another Department Located within their County 996.0 .009◄ 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02 
 
Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these two 
significant activities and whether the respondent supervises a Board of Commissioners 
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office or not, illustrates that on average this type of office more frequently engages in 
these activity then other types of offices (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Significant Indicator Variables for “Frequency of Seeking Resources or Funding” by 
“Board of Commissioners Versus All Others” 
 
Overall Relationship Importance 
 
The fourth and final index denoted significant in Kruskal-Wallis testing was 
“Overall Relationship Importance”. While Mann-Whitney testing between this index and 
the six dichotomous office variables revealed no statistically significant differences 
between groups, “Board of Commissioners office versus all other groups” approached 
significance at p=.019 (U=918.0) (see Table 43). However, because no test was 
significant at .01, the researcher failed to reject the null hypotheses that there was no 
differences between groups.  
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Table 43: Mann-Whitney Tests for Significant Dependent Index “Overall 
Relationship Importance” by Independent Dichotomous Variables for Type of 
Office Supervised 
Variable U Sig. 
Board of Commissioners 918.0 .019◄ 
Clerk of Court 1078.5 .407 
Property Appraiser 976.0 .795 
Supervisor of Elections 950.5 .849 
Sheriff 1207.0 .732 
Tax Collector 898.0 .095 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02  
 
Because Board of Commissioners was approaching significance, the researcher 
opted to further explore which activities were driving the test. As such, Mann-Whitney 
tests were run between this dichotomous variable and the five indicator variables that 
comprise this activity index (see Table 44). Two tests were significant for groups 
differences; “overall relationship importance of other governments within the jurisdiction 
of your county” (U=782.0; p=.001) and “overall relationship importance of other 
departments within your own county” (U=890.5; p=.008). 
 
Table 44: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous “Board of Commissioners” by Index 
Factors of “Overall Relationship Importance” 
Variable U Sig. 
from Federal 1234.0 .715 
from State 1178.5 .479 
from Another County 1114.0 .247 
from Another Government Located within the Jurisdiction of their County 782.0 .001◄ 
from Another Department Located within their County 890.5 .008◄ 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02 
 
Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these two 
significant activities and whether the respondent supervises a Board of Commissioners 
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office or not, illustrates that on average this type of office more frequently engages in 
these activity then other types of offices (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Significant Indicator Variables for Dependent Index “Overall Relationship Importance” 
by “Board of Commissioners Versus All Others” 
 
Percent Duties Focuses on IT Related Issues 
 
The second point of exploration probed to determine whether respondents’ 
answers in the 15 composite variables differed according the percent of their time 
dedicated to IT and IT security related issues. This independent variable was included 
as the researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the percent of 
respondents time dedicated to IT related issues and the need for the office to seek 
outside assistance. Specifically, the less time a respondent had to tend to IT related 
issues, the more likely s/he would might need to seek assistance. 
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences produced one test approaching 
significance at less than .02. The near significant index was “Frequency of Contact with 
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Other Governments Located within the Jurisdiction of Your County” (H=10.275; DF=3; 
p=.016). However, because the test was not significant at .01, the researcher did not 
explore this variable any further and failed to reject the null hypothesis as there was no 
evidence of an overall difference between groups.   
 
Population with Bachelors Degree or Higher  
 
The third point of exploration probed to determine whether respondents’ answers 
in the 15 composite variables differed according to the percent of county population with 
Bachelors degrees or higher. This independent variable was included as the literature 
on IT Security (as discussed throughout Chapter II) points to the importance of having 
qualified IT employees on staff and the role post-secondary education plays in 
developing this workforce. The researcher reasoned that a county with a larger pool of 
educated applicants would more easily be able to staff its offices with qualified 
employees versus counties with a smaller of pool applicants with post-secondary 
degrees. Moreover, the better educated employees are, the more likely that they would 
be able to solve problems on their own and thus less likely to need to seek outside 
assistance. As such, the researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the 
percent of county population with Bachelors degrees or higher and the need for the 
office to seek outside assistance.  
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences produced one test significant at 
.01. Specifically, this test pertains to overall interaction with the state, “Frequency of 
Contact with State Offices” (H=11.72; DF=2; p=.003). Therefore, the null hypothesis 
 153
was rejected as there was evidence of an overall significant difference between groups. 
To determine specifically which group(s) differ from which other group(s), Mann-
Whitney tests were employed between the index and dichotomous variables for each of 
the groups (see Table 45). 
 
Table 45: Mann-Whitney Tests for Index “Frequency of Contact w/ State 
Offices” by Dichotomous Variables of “Percent of County Population, age 
25+,  which Hold Bachelor’s Degrees or Higher” 
Dichotomous Variable U Sig. 
14.9% or less w/ bachelors degree or higher 1070.0 .064 
15 – 22.9% w/ bachelors degree or higher 1008.5 .125 
23% or more w/ bachelors degree or higher 758.5 .001◄ 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02  
 
These tests revealed significant differences in frequency of contact with State 
offices between counties where 23 percent or more of the population have bachelors 
degrees or higher versus all other counties (U=758.5; p=.001). Based on the scale of 
this index variable, where a score of 8 indicates no contact across all eight activities and 
a score of 40 indicates weekly contact across all eight activities, Figure 10 reveals that 
on average, counties where 23 percent or more of the population have at least a 
bachelors degree contact state offices at a lower frequency than counties with a smaller 
population of residents with a similar education.  
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Figure 10: Frequencies of Index “Frequency of Contact w/ State Offices” by Percent of County 
Population, age 25+,  which Hold Bachelor’s Degrees or Higher” 
 
To further explore which actions are driving the significance of this test, hence 
the frequency of contact with state offices, Mann-Whitey tests were run between the 
eight indicator variables that comprise the index variable and the dichotomous variable 
created to capture differences between this population versus the others. As evident in 
Table 46, the frequency with which offices serving counties where “23 percent or more 
of the population (age 25+) have at least bachelor’s degrees” “seek technical assistant 
from the state” statistically differs (U=1133.5; p=.006) from counties with a lower 
percentage of post-secondary graduates. Differences between groups approach 
significance with regard to two other state-related activities, namely, “seeking non-
technical assistance” (U=1128.0; p=.014) and “seeking program or project information” 
(U=111.5; p=.011).   
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Table 46: Mann-Whitney Tests for Dichotomous Variable “23% or More of Population Hold 
Bachelor’s Degrees or Higher” by Index Factors of “Frequency of Contact w/ State Offices”  
Variable U Sig. 
Seek technical assistance 1133.5 .006◄ 
Seek non-technical assistance 1128.0 .0149 
Seek program or project information 1111.5 .0119 
Seek resources or funding 1149.0 .022 
Seek legal or policy guidance 1164.0 .024 
Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 1289.5 .211 
Seek to modify duties or procedures w/ a partner or agreement  1267.5 .187 
Seek to modify resource or funding obligations w/ partner or agreement 1279.0 .164 
“◄” : Significant p ≤ .01     |   “9” : Approaching Significance p ≤ .02 
 
Examining clustered bar charts between the means of frequency for these three 
activities and whether the respondent does or does not supervise an office in a county 
where 23 percent or more of the population have at least bachelor’s degrees revealed 
that, on average, offices in counties with a higher percent of post-secondary graduates 
less frequently contact state offices for these activities then other offices in counties with 
a lower percent of post-secondary graduates (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Significant Factors from “Frequency of Contact w/ STATE Offices” 
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Adequacy of Funding 
 
The forth point of exploration probed to determine whether respondents’ answers 
in the 15 composite variables differed according to the overall perceived adequacy of 
funds s/he is able to apply to the core IT needs as measured in the composite variable 
“Adequacy of Budget”. This independent variable was included as the researcher 
reasoned that an office with insufficient funds to meet its needs would more likely need 
to seek outside assistance.  
Running Kruskal-Wallis tests for rank differences produced two test approaching 
significance at less than .02. The near significant indexes were “Frequency of Contact 
with Other Governments Located within the Jurisdiction of Your County” (H=10.49; 
DF=3; p=.019) and “Overall Relationship Importance” (H=9.83; DF=3; p=.020). 
However, because neither test was significant at .01, the researcher failed to reject the 
null hypotheses that there is no overall difference between groups.  
 
Non-significant Demographic Variables 
 
This research also probed to determine whether respondents’ answers in the 15 
composite variables differed according five other independent variables, however none 
of these proved statistically significant. The first non-significant variable was the 
“number of offices supervised”, specifically if an IT Director supervised two or more 
offices versus supervising just one (see Table 47). This dichotomous independent 
variable was included as the researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the 
number of office supervised and the need for the office to seek outside assistance.  
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Table 47: Mann-Whitney Test for the Independent Variable “Supervise Only One Office”  
Variable U Sig. 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices 857.0 .333 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices 867.5 .720 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES 736.5 .188 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County 739.0 .072 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County 701.5 .123 
Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance 957.5 .357 
Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance 881.5 .250 
Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information 733.5 .073 
Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding 1046.0 .997 
Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance 887.0 .227 
Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 938.5 .390 
Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership   791.5 .076 
Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership  936.0 .503 
Index of Relationship Importance 997.0 .914 
Index of Relationship Development 846.0 .163 
 
 
The second non-significant variable looked at “the number of employees 
supervised” by each IT Director (see Table 48). This variable was included as the 
researcher suspected an inverse relationship between the number of IT employees on 
staff and the need for the office to seek outside assistance. That is, the more employees 
in an office, the less likely the need would arise to seek outside assistance. 
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Table 48: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “Number of Employees Supervised” 
Variable H* Sig. 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices 8.752 .033 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices 2.844 .416 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES 1.199 .753 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County 6.248 .100 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County 1.412 .703 
Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance 2.449 .485 
Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance .342 .952 
Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information 1.053 .788 
Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding 4.043 .257 
Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance 2.284 .516 
Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility .088 .993 
Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership   1.588 .662 
Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership  .198 .978 
Index of Relationship Importance 2.339 .505 
Index of Relationship Development 2.394 .495 
*NOTE: all DF = 3 
 
The third non-significant variable was the size of the county population the 
respondent serviced (see Table 49). This was explored as the researcher suspected 
that offices in counties with larger populations might have more sophisticated IT 
systems which might in turn lead to and/or require more intergovernmental an 
interorganizational contact.  
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Table 49: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “Number of Office Supervised” 
Variable H* Sig. 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices .875 .831 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices 6.500 .090 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES 5.827 .120 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County 1.299 .729 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County .654 .884 
Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance 3.736 .291 
Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance 4.308 .230 
Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information .375 .945 
Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding 1.119 .773 
Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance 1.682 .641 
Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 3.480 .323 
Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership   .074 .995 
Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership  .943 .815 
Index of Relationship Importance 2.685 .443 
Index of Relationship Development 4.437 .218 
*NOTE: all DF = 3 
 
The forth non-significant variable was the level of intergovernmental revenue 
received by the county the respondent serviced (see Table 50). This variable was 
included as the researcher suspected that there might be a positive relationship 
between the amount of intergovernmental funding received and the rate of 
intergovernmental an interorganizational contact.  
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Table 50: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “County Intergovernmental Revenue”  
Variable H* Sig. 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices 1.431 .698 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices 8.394 .039 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES 6.669 .083 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County .810 .847 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County .582 .901 
Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance 3.018 .389 
Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance 3.756 .289 
Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information .520 .914 
Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding 1.476 .688 
Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance 2.934 .397 
Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 4.088 .252 
Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership   1.247 .742 
Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership  1.192 .755 
Index of Relationship Importance 3.801 .284 
Index of Relationship Development 3.580 .311 
*NOTE: all DF = 3 
 
The fifth and final non-significant variable was the zone of the state which the 
county, hence office, is located (see Table 51). This variable was included as the 
researcher attempted to capture any regional characteristics and behaviors thus 
illuminate underlying qualities and influential factors not readily perceptible via other 
demographics. Specifically, does any particular zone exhibit unique patterns of 
intergovernmental contact. It should be noted that Zone 1 (see Figure 2) was 
underrepresented in this study which could have contributed to test outcomes. 
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Table 51: Kruskal-Wallis Tests for “ Zone”  
Variable H* Sig. 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ FEDERAL offices 2.341 .505 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ STATE offices 4.958 .175 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other COUNTIES 5.226 .156 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other GOVERNMENTS in the County .755 .860 
Index of Frequency of Contact w/ Other DEPARTMENTS in the County 3.335 .343 
Index of Frequency to Seek technical assistance 1.084 .781 
Index of Frequency to Seek non-technical assistance 3.809 .283 
Index of Frequency to Seek program or project information 1.780 .619 
Index of Frequency to Seek resources or funding 1.376 .711 
Index of Frequency to Seek legal or policy guidance 3.50 .320 
Index of Frequency to Seek regulatory or policy flexibility 4.773 .189 
Index of Frequency to Modify duties/procedures of a partnership   .318 .957 
Index of Frequency to Modify resource/ funding obligations of a partnership  .859 .835 
Index of Relationship Importance .796 .850 
Index of Relationship Development 3.598 .308 
*NOTE: all DF = 3 
 
In reference to Research Question Three, which under-lays the various points of 
exploration just discussed, the data indicated that there is a relationships between 
certain office/county demographics and the IGM activity of IT Directors. Specifically, a 
relationship exists between the IGM activities of an IT Director and: the type of office 
supervised; the percent of duties which the Director focuses on IT related issues; the 
percent of county population with post-secondary education; and the overall adequacy 
of IT budget.  
Conversely, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between 
the IGM activity of an IT Director and: the regional zone in which an office/county is 
located; the number of employees which the IT Director supervises; the number of 
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offices which the IT Director supervises; the population size of the county; or the level of 
intergovernmental revenue received by the county in which the office is located. 
 
Summary 
An analysis of the data obtained from this electronic survey of 125 IT Directors of 
constitutional offices of Florida counties has been presented in this chapter. Grounded 
in the literature on information technology and security, as well as the theory of 
intergovernmental management, this analysis explored the relationships between nine 
independent variables and 15 dependent index variables. Through univariate analysis, it 
was determined that most variables violated the assumptions of parametric tests due to 
heavily skewed data or non-normal distributions. While the skews of most independent 
variables were lessened via ordinal recoding, none of the dependent variables could be 
corrected without losing valuable information. This proved to severely limit the intended 
analysis as parametric tests were no longer appropriate. In light of the violated 
assumptions, non-parametric tests were used, specifically, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-
Whitney.  
Since non-parametric tests are not as conservative as parametric tests in 
preventing Type I errors, the significance level was lowered from .05 to .01. However, 
as Hair at al (1998) note, by attempting to lessen the chance of committing Type I 
Errors one concurrently reduces the power of the statistical test which dictates the 
probability of successfully finding differences when they actually exist. Therefore, the 
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statistical results presented here most likely underestimate true difference as the 
researcher increased the probability of committing Type II errors, that is, failing to reject 
a null hypothesis when it is actually false.   
To explore research questions one and two descriptive statistics, specifically 
modes and frequencies were examined. Analysis revealed that county IT Directors most 
often seek intergovernmental assistance horizontally, from other Departments within 
their own governments. Further, they seek intergovernmental assistance the least often 
vertically, from Federal offices. The most frequently performed intergovernmental 
activity was seeking technical assistance, however seeking program/project information 
was also perform more frequently then the six other activities explored in this research. 
The two least frequently performed activities were seeking to modify either the 
duties/procedures or the resources/funding obligations of an established 
partnership/agreement relating to IT. 
To explore research question three, whether there were relationships between 
select office/county demographics and the IGM activity of IT Directors, non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent groups were used when the independent variable 
had three or more groups. Eight of the nine independent variables satisfied this 
condition (the ninth independent variable was dichotomous, “supervise one office 
versus supervise more than one office” therefore Mann-Whitney U was used, however, 
no statistical relationships were found). Testing these eight variables with each of the 15 
indexes resulted in 126 tests of which five were statistically significant at .01. These 
significant tests were followed up with Mann-Whitney U tests to determine specifically 
which group(s) differ from which other group(s). Of these tests, seven were statistically 
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significant. Finally, in an effort to determine what was driving the significance, Mann-
Whitney U tests were re-run between the seven groups which proved statistically 
different and the underlying factors of the relevant index variable. Of these tests, 14 
were statistically significant.  
Four of the five significant Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that differences between 
respondents intergovernmental and interorganizational behaviors were due to difference 
in the type of office supervised. Specifically, the frequency with which a respondent: 
contacts federal offices; contacts offices in other governments located within county 
jurisdiction; seeks funding or resources; and the overall perceived importance of their 
relationships with different governments were not the same for all six types of offices.  
Further exploration revealed that most of the differences occur between IT 
departments in Board of Commissioner’s offices versus the IT departments of other 
types of constitutional offices. While perhaps it could be expected that Board of 
Commissioners offices would have a higher level of INTRA-county horizontal contact as 
this office is often the anchor for county-wide programs; however data revealed that this 
higher contact extended beyond the county. In particular, when compared to other 
constitutional offices, IT departments in Board of Commissioners offices more frequently 
contact other governments located within the jurisdiction of their county for seven of the 
eight activities included in this research (the exception being “seeking to modify 
resource/funding obligations with a partner/agreement” for which differences were not 
significant).  
IT departments in Board of Commissioners offices also more frequently contact 
federal offices to seek program/project information and regulatory/policy flexibility than 
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other offices. Additionally, they contact federal offices to seek legal/policy guidance 
more frequently than the other offices with the exception of Sheriff’s offices which 
contact federal offices to seek legal/policy guidance the most frequently. The IT 
departments in Sheriff’s offices also contact federal offices seeking non-technical 
assistance and resources/funding more frequently than the other types of offices, even 
Boards of Commissioners. At the other end of this spectrum, IT departments in Tax 
Collectors offices are the least likely to contact a federal office, particularly for legal or 
policy guidance.  
Board of Commissioners offices also more frequently seek resources/funding 
from other departments within its county than do the other types of offices. Further the 
data suggests that compared to other types of constitutional offices, Boards of 
Commissioners place a higher level of relationship importance on both other 
departments within its own county as well other government within the jurisdiction of its 
county.  
Exploring the fifth significant Kruskal-Wallis test revealed that on average, offices 
in counties with a higher percent of post-secondary graduates (23 percent or more) less 
frequently contact state offices seeking technical assistance, non-technical assistance, 
or program/project information then do offices in counties with a lower percent of post-
secondary graduates.  However, it is not know if that is because the employees are truly 
more competent. 
The analysis presented in this chapter examined the prevalence of 
intergovernmental and interorganizational contact and activities as preformed by IT 
Directors in Florida county constitutional office as part of their information security 
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efforts. Findings are limited to this populations and are no generalizations should be 
beyond this population. However, the patterns and trends uncovered here serve as the 
first step toward understanding this unseen population and for developing a baseline for 
future comparison studies. The implications of these findings, the limitations, as well as 
suggested future research are discussed next in the final chapter. 
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VI. IMPLICATIONS 
 
The purpose of this research was to explore the roles of intergovernmental 
management, activity, and communication in protecting the information systems of our 
critical infrastructure. Specifically, the aim was to investigate how county-level 
Information Technology Directors use intergovernmental relations and activities in 
securing critical information systems under their charge. To that end, this research 
sought to answer the questions: 1) which IGM activities do county IT Directors/staff 
most often perform; 2) do county IT Directors make more use of vertical or horizontal 
IGM relationships; 3) is there a relationship between office/county demographics and 
the IGM activities its IT Director/staff most often performs? The significance of the 
findings are twofold as there are theoretical implications as well as practical 
implications. Each of which are presented in this final chapter. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
The impetus for this research was not to test suppositions of the theory of 
Intergovernmental Management. Rather, the theory was used to guide research 
questions in an effort to discover and explain patterns of activity. Despite this fact, the 
research findings do have theoretical connotations which add to the body of research on 
intergovernmental management.  
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First, these findings challenge the theoretical notion that IGM involves the regular 
application coping strategies, in addition to problem solving and networking (Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2001, 1998; Nelson, 2001; Bolman & Deal, 1999; Perry & Kraemer, 1999; 
Intergovernmental Advisory Board, 1998; Wright, 1998, 1992; Agranoff & Lindsay, 1983; 
Mandell, 1979). While these three activities are presented in the literature as unique 
functions, they naturally overlap in practice. For instance, a manager might employ 
coping strategies to best solve a certain problem however, not all problems can be 
solved using these solutions.  
Of the eight activities explored in this research, three activities fall more closely 
inline with the application of coping strategies rather mere problem solving activities 
(see Chapter III for distinctions). Specifically, seeking regulatory/policy flexibility; 
seeking to modify the duties/procedures of an established partnership/agreement; and 
seeking to modify the resources/funding obligations of an established 
partnership/agreement are all fundamentally coping strategies. Likewise, two activities 
fall more closely inline with problem solving activities rather than coping strategies, 
specifically, seeking technical assistance and seeking non-technical assistance. 
However, of all eight activities in this study, the respondents performed the three coping 
activities the least often and performed the two problem solving activities the most 
frequently. Therefore, findings from this research would suggest that employing coping 
strategies is not a regular a part of intergovernmental management as the literature 
would imply.  
Indeed local governments are regularly required to comply with vague policies 
and implement ill-fitted programs from state and federal agencies. In such situations, 
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where a policy must be adhered or a program produces unintended negative outcomes, 
the literature states that a primary function of intergovernmental management is to 
provide coping mechanisms (Agranoff, 2000; Bohte & Meier, 2000; Cooper et al., 1998; 
Center for Technology and Government, 1997a; Stever, 1993; Turner, 1990; Stenberg, 
1984). Specifically, localities often revert to coping strategies to attempt to either change 
official policy/program specifics or they seek regulatory/statutory relief, flexibility, or 
waivers (Radin, 2000; Wright, 1983).  
Yet, employing coping techniques and mechanisms do more than just 
accommodate jurisdictional idiosyncrasies; they inadvertently test and refine the details, 
structure, and overall viability of the very relationships and initiatives they preserve. By 
challenging policies, rules, procedures, and relationships, coping strategies, enacted via 
intergovernmental management, extend the principle of checks and balances and 
enliven experimentation and innovation. By implementing reactive coping techniques, 
intergovernmental managers can more effectively and efficiently fulfill mutual goals 
without a prolonged period of laboring through legislative channels (Chi, 2000, Radin, 
2000). However adaptation and innovation require an investment of time and resources 
which often works to discourage such endeavors. When these barriers can be 
overcome, the coping function of intergovernmental management has the ability to 
generate more mature initiatives and foster progress (Falcone and Lan, 1997). 
However, based on the discrepancy between the literature and these study 
findings, either the bulk of policies governing county IT Departments in Florida 
constitutional offices are adequate and on target or IT Directors lack the time and 
resources to develop innovative solutions. Thus the theoretical implication of this finding 
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is that either coping strategies are not a regular function of IGM or that only particular 
types of  government offices are prone to use of coping strategies regularly. Only 
additional research could determine which is truly the case. 
These research findings have another implication for the theory of 
intergovernmental management. Specifically, these findings support the notion that IGM 
occurs within two distinct environments, vertical and horizontal, with each often 
employing specific and distinct management activities (see Chapter II for discussion). 
As outlined in Chapter III, this research looked at how county IT directors interact 
vertically, with federal and state agencies above them, as well as horizontally, with 
external contemporaries including other counties, other governments located within the 
jurisdiction of the respondents own county, and other departments within the 
respondents own county. Analysis of the data found that while county IT Directors make 
more use of horizontal IGM relationships- they also make vertical contacts as part of 
their information security efforts.  
Specifically, the data indicated that six of the eight activities were most often 
performed horizontally with other departments in the respondents county and two 
activities were most often performed vertically with the State. The two activities most 
often performed vertically are seeking regulatory/policy flexibility and seeking 
program/project information. It should be noted that it was anticipated to find that 
seeking regulatory/policy flexibility would be performed most often vertically as it is 
primarily a coping strategy which are regularly employed within subordinate/ordinate 
relationships. Thus the only way these problems can be addressed is vertically. Yet as 
mentioned in the prior discussion, this activity is rarely performed by the study 
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population (93 percent perform this activity only a few times a year or less). Other 
problems, however, can be addressed through horizontal efforts. Included among the 
six activities that are regularly performed horizontally are the predominantly problem 
solving activities; seeking technical and non-technical assistance. This would suggest 
that county IT Directors most often attempt to solve problems horizontally rather than 
vertically.  
Taken together, findings from this research do not support the theoretical 
supposition that coping strategies are a regularly performed intergovernmental 
management activity. However, this research does support the assumption that IGM 
does indeed occur in both vertical and horizontal environments, whereby certain 
activities are more likely to be performed in one environment versus the other. 
 
Practical Implications 
Beyond the two theoretical implications of this research just discussed, there are 
also four distinct practical implications. The first practical implication of this research 
begins with the newly acquired knowledge that overwhelmingly, county IT Directors in 
Florida constitutional offices rarely -if ever- contact federal offices regarding IT related 
issues- be it to seek technical assistance or legal guidance, et cetera. This knowledge 
has practical significance because the federal response to critical infrastructure 
protection is driven in part by policies which state that federal agencies should be 
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providing outreach to state and local governments to aid their infrastructure protection 
efforts (see Chapter II for discussion).  
This federal strategy, supported in large part by Presidential Decision Directive 
63 of 1998, the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security, promotes a strong policy preference for consensus-
building and voluntary cooperation rather than regulatory actions. Indeed, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office avers for infrastructure protection to succeed, “It is critical 
that all participating federal, state, and local agencies interact in a seamless manner” 
(2001c, p. 31). To this end, several federal offices have been tasked to work with state 
and local governments “…to ensure that systems are created and well managed to 
share threat warning, analysis, and recovery information among government network 
operation centers…” (Executive Order 13231, 2001, section 5a). Toward this end, 
collaborative pubic-private endeavors have been designed for sharing best practices; 
evaluating new technologies; raising cybersecurity awareness; increasing criminal 
justice activities; and developing national security programs to deter future cyber 
threats.  
Yet, as discussed in Chapter V, the literature on information security suggests 
that local, state, and national agencies have yet to truly function in the spirit of 
cooperation, do not share enough information, and generally lack a coordinated working 
plan to deal with cyber attacks. This current research supports this assertion as study 
respondents overwhelmingly indicated that they never contact federal agencies for six 
of eight intergovernmental activities. Therefore, it appears that a main path of the 
national strategy, federal-to-local, is not an effective channel for disseminating elements 
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critical to information security including best practices, risk management, 
alerts/advisories, incident handling, and legislation. 
This leads directly into the second practical implication of this research, namely 
the knowledge that local IT Directors, specifically  those responsible for county 
constitutional offices, are more like to turn to a State office than a federal office for IT 
related assistance.  Knowing that state offices, rather federal offices, are more preferred 
by local governments as a point of contact for IT related issues provides program and 
policy makers with a prudent direction from which to set about improving the national 
strategy.  
Yet this research also found that the county IT Directors/staffs in this study 
population rarely initiate contact other government offices or departments for IT related 
assistance. Recall that all of the activity-related questions asked in the survey were 
presented in an active voice, for example, …how often do you or your office seek to or 
attempt to ‘xyz’. This research did not probe to find out how the directors/offices 
responded to being contacted. As such, the third practical implication of this research is 
by knowing that county IT Directors/staffs in the study population are not likely to initiate 
contact with other government offices on their own -program and policy makers could 
consider revising the national strategy whereby federal or state offices initiate regular 
interaction and thereby actively disseminate information rather than function as passive 
resources.  
The fourth practical implication of this study goes beyond constitutional offices to 
the larger arena of public affairs. That is, knowing that IT Directors/staffs in the study 
population do not wholly operate in accordance with the national infrastructure 
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protection strategy by contacting federal offices, should serve to alert program and 
policy makers to the possibility that IT Directors in other types of offices in other types of 
local government may also slip through the national strategy. The implication of this to 
the various public affairs sectors, such as criminal justice, public administration, and 
social work, rest in the reality that beyond the 66 counties in Florida, there are over 
87,000 units of local government providing vital services to the American public ranging 
from public safety, to health and social welfare, to public works (refer to Chapter II for 
full discussion). The operation of these local offices depends on the critical digital 
infrastructure, whether it is to supply them with power, to correctly route their financial 
transactions, or to enable them to communicate with the public. Therefore, the provision 
of such vital services depend on the unfettered operation of CDI.  
These vital services are at the core of public affairs. For example, if a computer 
network supporting the criminal justice system were breached or cut off from other CDI 
elements, Fire Rescue, EMS, police, and others might be unable communicate to one 
another during emergencies. Dangerous fugitives or potential terrorists could 
unknowingly be admitted into the country or released from custody because police are 
unable access databases containing criminal histories. If a computer network supporting 
the public administration sector were compromised, programs supporting social 
security, unemployment, official records, passport applications, and drivers licenses, to 
name but a few, could be brought to a standstill. If a computer network supporting the 
social work and social services sector were penetrated or exploited, vital services from 
food stamps to Medicaid could not be provided because client files would inaccessible, 
corrupt, or even erased. Overall, numerous essential daily services could grind to a halt 
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if key elements of the CDI or any element therein were maliciously breached. In 
conjunction with our reliance on secure information networks, the findings of this current 
study point to the need for all public affairs sectors to determine the effectiveness of 
interorganizational and intergovernmental management and communication in the 
information security efforts of their local offices. It is critical that each sector, from 
criminal justice, to public administration, to social work be certain that its computer 
networks are supported by effective policies and procedures which are in accordance 
with the national infrastructure protection strategy. 
As the literature reviewed for this research consistently avers, threats to the 
critical digital infrastructure do not just pertain to the information technology industry but 
rather to all sectors of the critical infrastructure and all parts of government. From 
regional correctional facilities to branch offices of the Department of Children and 
Family Services, local government offices increasingly rely on information and 
communication technologies to provide and improve the services they provide. As such, 
more and more units of local government, much like Florida county constitutional 
offices, are likely to retain their own IT Director or employ one between two or more 
offices. Literature on information management highlights three responsibilities unique to 
IT managers, (1) anticipating and understanding technological change, (2) anticipating 
and understanding information security, and (3) maintaining effective communication 
between IT and non-IT divisions. Merging these ideas, managers musty approach 
information security as a mosaic, whereby each piece, or element, is understood in 
terms of the effect on the sum total. This also requires a mindfulness of elements which 
exist outside of a manager’s immediate area of responsibility or authority, such as other 
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organizations with which relations take place. This is perhaps most especially true with 
regard to government information systems, for as the Center for Technology and 
Government (1997a) points out, "No government information system stands completely 
on its own. Each system is implemented in a work environment that includes people, 
processes, organizational relationships, and other systems" (p. 36). Therefore, if other 
units of local government follow  patterns of behavior similar to Florida county 
constitutional offices, then best practice are not being shared, risk assessment is 
partitioned, and incident handling is fragmented, thus leaving the security of the critical 
digital infrastructure, and hence public affairs, in jeopardy.  
 
Limitations 
By and large there are five limitations to this research. First, an operational 
limitation stems from the ethical considerations inherent in studying security issues. The 
need to obscure specific details intrinsic to the configuration of each county’s 
information security naturally curtails the potential depth of analysis. However, despite 
this limitation, this research was able ascertain the current breadth and interplay 
between intergovernmental activities and information security in Florida counties.  
There are three limitations with the design of the research. Specifically, when 
conducting email or Internet surveys, there can be considerable variation among 
respondents systems, such as different screen sizes, set preferences, and email clients, 
such as Microsoft Outlook, GroupWise, or Hotmail. The various system permutations 
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can result in disparities between the visual design of the questionnaire, such as 
misalignment (Dillman, 2000). However, in a personal correspondence to the 
researcher (dated 03/27/03), a technician at Surveymonkey.com reassured that the 
company was aware of this issue and they continually test and modify their 
programming to compensate for such variations. Thus, lessening this limitation. The 
third limitation of this research was the narrow study population. While this drawback 
limits generalizability, the findings can be used as a baseline for future comparison 
studies with counties in other states and as well as city governments. As such, this 
research serves as a first step to illuminate the prevalence of intergovernmental 
management activities in information security efforts. 
The fourth limitation is due to the fact that IT Directors were asked to quantify the 
intergovernmental activities of the staffs they supervise. Although IT Directors were 
asked to provide this second-hand observation, in this instance, they are functioning as 
Key Informants reporting the activities that regularly occur in the offices under their 
purview.  
The fifth limitation is due to the non-normal distributions of the data. While every 
effort was made to produce a sound and rigorous examination of the issues under 
study, unavoidable limitations in the data restricted the statistical depth of this analysis. 
Because the alpha level was lowered to increase to power of the non-parametric tests, 
the statistical findings of this analysis should be viewed as conservative as true 
significant differences may have existed where none were reported.  
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Future Research 
This research sought to investigate how county-level Information Technology 
Directors use intergovernmental relations and management activities as part of their 
information security efforts. However, to determine if intergovernmental assistance does 
indeed improve information security as claimed by the federal government and others, a 
future study should simultaneously assess the success each office has had in securing 
the information systems under their charge (i.e. noting rates of intrusion and denial of 
service) along with patterns and rates of intergovernmental activity.  
It would be equally valuable for a future study to employ personal interviews to 
qualitatively explore why Florida county IT Directors rarely engage in intergovernmental 
contact. In particular, is it because they are able to solve most problems on their own? 
Perhaps because they turn to private or non-governmental sources for help? Or do they 
limit outside input, hence interaction, in an effort to protect their turf?  
A third direction for future research would be to explore the information security 
of the 18 percent of Florida constitutional office that outsource their IT needs. As noted 
in Chapter V, when developing the population list for this current research, 72 offices 
indicated that they hire a private company to take care of their information technology 
and security. In actuality, this number is most likely much higher as the researcher was 
unable to determine the IT Director for 63 other offices, even after multiple attempts, 
leading the researcher to believe that many of these offices do not have one on staff. 
Nonetheless, offices without a public IT Director were not included in this research as a 
private vendor could not function intergovernmentally in the truest sense. This creates 
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many questions, such as where do these vendors turn for IT assistance or 
legislative/policy guidance? How do these contracted vendors interact with the myriad of 
government offices involved in critical infrastructure protection, such as Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, State Technology Office of Florida, the FBI, and 
Department of Homeland Security, to name but a few? And perhaps the most pertinent 
question which could be answered from the convergence of the studies proposed here, 
which offices are the most secure- the ones supervised by a county IT Director who 
rarely engages in intergovernmental contact; the ones supervised by a county IT 
Director who regularly engages in intergovernmental contact; the ones supervised by a 
private vendor who rarely contacts government offices; or finally, the ones supervised 
by a private vendor who regularly contacts government offices? 
A fourth area for future research would address differences between the 
structure of IT departments in the various zone of the state which were identified here. 
Specifically, a qualitatively study using focus groups could help to determine what is 
driving the differences. The insight gained could then be utilized to attempt to gauge the 
effectiveness of the variously configurations and develop state-wide standards and best 
practices. 
A final direction for future research would address the issue of generalizability. 
As noted in the previous section, the knowledge gained from this study can only be 
transferred to the larger public affairs arena to alert program and policy makers to the 
possibility that IT Directors may be slipping through the national strategy. However, 
these study findings, in and of themselves, can not be generalized to different 
populations. Therefore, future research should expand beyond constitutional offices, 
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counties, and the state of Florida to explore information security in different settings and 
local government environments. Only then would there be a clear picture as to the role 
and effectiveness of intergovernmental management and communication in securing 
local elements of the national critical infrastructure. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
From military operations to hospital nursing stations, networked computers have 
come to play a role in most every sphere of modern public affairs. The literature 
reviewed for this research indicates that a well-coordinated large-scale cyber attack has 
the potential to disrupt daily life in America and across the global. As cyber attacks 
become more sophisticated, the risk to ALL networked systems increases. Whether 
public or private, whether federal, state, or local, the threat is equally real.  
Consequently, county leaders must respond accordingly to understand the 
threats, take measures to protect themselves, and determine how they will respond in 
the event that they are attacked, or if parts of the critical digital infrastructure were 
rendered inoperable. Along side their national and subnational peers, county 
Information Technology Directors work on the frontlines trying to balance public 
demands and entrepreneurial growth with the realities of cyber security and national 
defense. By working intergovernmentally, they make use of innate networks, seek to 
solve problems, and to a lesser extent employ coping strategies. 
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The rise of the Information Age challenges us to update antiquated modes and 
ideas of security, government, privacy, and borders. Information security incidents do 
not respect geographic or administrative boundaries therefore, management must be 
prepared to instantly interact with other governments, agencies, and at the very least 
departments, to contain a system breach. The lack of good communication can breed 
confusion, poor coordination, and loss of services. The U.S. General Services 
Administration firmly states that intergovernmental management will be the challenge 
for information security the next 20 years (McDonough, 2002). Several converging 
conditions support this position including a demonstrated need to integrate distinct 
databases to meet homeland security needs and the presence of program overlap 
between numerous agencies in a time of budget deficits. Collectively, these and other 
conditions point toward the growing importance of integrated systems and collaboration 
which are at the heart of intergovernmental management.  
In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, the U.S. Comptroller General stated the indisputable need to 
“…clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, states, and local entities 
and build a framework for partnerships for coordination, communication, and 
collaboration” (Walker, 2002, p. 4). Discerning the roles of interorganizational and 
intergovernmental management, activities, and communication in the information 
security efforts of local government is a necessary step toward these ends.  
Critical digital infrastructure protection is a complex social, economic, and 
administrative issue that affects the health, welfare, and security of citizens in all 
communities. Without assessing the effectiveness of intergovernmental collaboration 
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and communication, which lay at the heart of the federal protection strategy, our 
national security remains vulnerable. Only by examining actual information security 
efforts, as this current research has done, will we be able to effectively protect our 
critical digital infrastructure from the largely invisible threats discussed in here. As 
illustrated in this chapter, the findings of this current research have both theoretical and 
practical implications. It is the express hope of this researcher that they be used to 
generate dialogue as well as a deeper inquiry into the intergovernmental and local 
dimensions involved in protecting the U.S. critical digital infrastructure and ensuring our 
modern way of life.  
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«first» «last» 
«Title» 
«street» 
«city», «state» «zip» 
 
November 4, 2003 
 
Dear «salutation» «last», 
 
My name is Joah Devenny, I am a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Central Florida. Next week I will 
conduct a survey that explores how Florida county Information Technology Directors interact with their 
peers to stay on top of changing technology and threats. I am writing you to ask you to take part in this 
valuable research. 
 
You have been chosen to participate because of the critical role you play in protecting local aspects of the 
critical digital infrastructure. By learning how you interact with your peers, officials will be able to develop 
policies better suited to your actual day-to-day activities, rather than what they think you do.  
 
On Monday, November 10th, you will receive an email from  infosec@mail.ucf.edu. This email will include 
a hyperlink to a web survey hosted by surveymonkey.com.  
 
**The survey is ONLY 16 questions and will take just 7 minutes to complete.  
 
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations. You will 
ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers and basic questions about your county.  
 
Your participation is voluntary and responses will be strictly CONFIDENTIAL. Only summary data will be 
discussed in the final report. For more details of this research, please review the enclosed information 
sheet.  
 
To verify the authenticity of this research request feel free to call the UCF Public Affairs Doctoral Program 
at (407)-823-0170. Should you have any question please contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064. 
 
Thank you for your consideration, 
 
 
Joah Devenny, M.A. 
Doctoral Candidate/Principle Researcher 
 
Advisory Committee 
Eileen Abel, Ph.D. 
Stephen Holmes, Ph.D. 
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D. 
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D. 
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Research Information Sheet 
 
Please read the following information to decide if you would like to participate in this study. This 
information will be represented to you in the survey. It will be followed by a question asking whether you 
have read the study procedure and voluntarily agree to participate. If you agree, please check the box 
that will be provided in the survey. 
 
Research title: Critical Digital Infrastructure Protection and the Intergovernmental 
Activities of Information Technology Directors in Florida Counties 
Research purpose: To investigate how county-level Information Technology Directors use 
intergovernmental relations and management activities in securing 
critical information systems and assets under their charge. 
What you will be asked 
to do:  
You will be asked 1) to click on a hyperlink you will receive in a email 
which will take you to an Internet survey; 2) you will then be asked to 
answer 16 non-sensitive multiple-choice questions. 
Time required: Seven (7) minutes 
Risks: There are no known risks for participation. 
Benefits and 
Compensation: 
There is no compensation or other direct benefit to you for 
participation. 
Confidentiality: All answers will be kept in an encrypted data file in the researcher’s 
secure office. Your identity and the county you work for will be kept 
confidential and not used in any report. 
Voluntary participation: Your participation is voluntary. There is no penalty for not 
participating. You do not have to answer any question you do not 
wish to answer. 
Right to withdraw from 
the study: 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
consequence 
Whom to contact if you 
have questions:  
Joah Devenny, M.A., Doctoral Candidate, Public Affairs Doctoral 
Program, Orlando, FL 32816; (352)795-5064 -or- Eileen Abel, Ph.D., 
Research Supervisor, (407)823-0170. 
Whom to contact about 
your rights:  
UCF-IRB Office of Research, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 207, 
Orlando, FL 32826; (407) 823-2901. 
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Dear {recipient}, 
 
A few days ago, you should have received a letter asking you to take part in an important survey on 
information security approved by the University of Central Florida.  
 
Specifically, this research explores how county Information Technology Directors interact with other 
governments. Please volunteer a moment of your time to represent {xx county} and share your 
experiences. 
 
** The survey is ONLY 16 questions and takes just 7 minutes to complete. 
 
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations.  
 
** You will ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers for 10 activities plus 6 basic 
questions about your county.  
 
 
To complete the survey please click the link below or type the link into a browser window. 
 
[Survey Link] 
 
The survey begins with dome general information about the research. It is followed by a question asking 
whether you have read the details and voluntarily agree to participate. If you agree, you will be asked to 
check the box provided before you begin the survey. 
 
Should you have *any* question please feel free to contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064.  
 
Thank you for your valuable time, 
 
 
 
Joah Devenny, M.A. 
Principle Researcher 
 
Advisory Committee 
----------------- 
Eileen Abel, Ph.D. 
Stephen Holms, Ph.D. 
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D. 
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D. 
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Intergovernmental Information Security Activities 
of Florida Counties 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this important research.  
Please take a moment to read the following study details. 
 
 
Research Purpose: To investigate how county-level Information Technology Directors use 
intergovernmental relations and management activities in securing critical information systems and assets 
under their charge.  
 
What you will be asked to do: You were already asked to click on a hyperlink to take you to this survey; 
now you will be asked to answer 16 multiple-choice questions.  
 
Risks: There are no known risks for participation.  
 
Benefits and Compensation: There is no compensation or other direct benefit to you for participation.  
 
Voluntary participation: Your participation is voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. You do 
not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer.  
 
Right to withdraw from the study: You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without 
consequence  
 
Confidentiality: All answers will be kept in an encrypted data file in the researcher’s secure office. Your 
identity and the county you work for will be kept confidential and not used in any report.  
 
Whom to contact about participants' rights: UCF-IRB Office of Research, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 
207, Orlando, FL 32826; (407) 823-2901. 
 
 
Please select one of following statement: 
  
  
[ ]  I have read the study description just provided and I voluntarily AGREE to participate in the study.  
  
[ ]  I have read the study description just provided and I DO NOT AGREE to participate in the study. 
 
 
Next -- >> 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Thank you for agreeing to participate. For all questions, the following definition is implied:  
 
Information Security: actions taken to reduce the probability that a threat will exploit a system 
vulnerability. This includes measures to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of system assets. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
1. Which Florida county do you work for?  
 
[drop box with all counties listed] 
 
 
 2. Please select ALL of the following county units that fall under your supervision for their information 
security needs: 
  
  ALL county departments and offices fall under my supervision  
  Board of County Commissioners  
  Clerk of Court  
  Property Appraiser's Office  
  Supervisor of Elections' Office  
  Sheriffs Office  
  Tax Collector's Office  
  County Administration/Management  
  Emergency Management  
  Fire and Rescue Services  
  Health and Human Services  
  Public Works  
  Utilities  
  Other (please specify)  
 
 
3. Thinking about the areas YOU SUPERVISE, please indicate whether each of the following ONLINE 
SERVICES are outsourced, provided by the county itself, or not provided at all: 
 
 Currently 
outsourced 
Currently provided by 
the county itself 
Not currently 
provided   
Permit or license application    
Searchable Public Records    
Filing electronic employment 
applications 
   
Requests for services (streetlight 
repair, potholes, etc.) 
   
Payment of Utility Bills    
Voter Registration    
Payment of Tickets or Fines    
Payment of Taxes    
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4. How adequate is the funding you are able to apply to each of the following needs?  
  
 
Above 
Adequate Adequate 
Below 
Adequate 
Far Below 
Adequate 
Not 
Applicable 
IT equipment/ 
software/ hardware 
     
IT security 
equipment, software, 
and hardware                
     
Hiring outsource 
vendors 
     
Hiring IT personnel 
and support staff 
     
Training IT personnel      
Computer security 
education for NON IT 
employees 
     
Risk assessment/ 
management 
     
 
 
5. Faced with shrinking budgets, counties often require managers to perform more than one job. For 
example, a county might combine the job of "Administrative Services Director" with that of "Facilities 
Management Director".  
 
Thinking about your own job, what percent of your duties focus on information technology or information 
security related issues? 
  
  100%  
  80%  
  60%  
  40%  
  20%  
  less than 20%  
 
 
6. How many employees do you supervise whose job deals ONLY with information technology or 
information security?   
  
[drop box with 0-“25 or more” listed] 
 
 
<< -- Previous              Next -- >> 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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The final 10 questions ask how often YOU OR YOUR STAFF engage in certain activities with the each 
following TYPES of governments.  
 
FEDERAL: any office, agency, or department, such as FBI, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, 
CERT, etc... 
 
STATE: any office, agency, or department, such as FDLE, State Technology Office, Secure Florida, etc... 
 
OTHER FLORIDA COUNTIES: any office or department located in ANOTHER county government, such 
as another county's Department of Information Technology; Clerk of Court office; Sheriffs Office; etc... 
 
OTHER GOVERNMENTS LOCATED WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF YOUR COUNTY: any part of a 
government unit located within the jurisdiction of your county, such as a city or township; etc... 
 
OTHER DEPARTMENTS WITHIN YOUR COUNTY 
 
 
<< -- Previous              Next -- >> 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
How often do YOU OR YOUR STAFF engage in the following activities with each of the following types of 
governments: 
  
 
7. Seek technical assistance related to information security... 
  
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
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8. Seek NON-technical assistance related to information security... 
 
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
     
 
 
 
9. Seek information on an information security program or project...  
 
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
     
 
 
10. Seek funding or resources to improve information security efforts... 
 
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
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11. Seek legal or policy guidance regarding information security... 
 
 
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
     
 
 
12. Seek regulatory or policy flexibility regarding information security... 
 
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
     
 
 
13. Attempt to modify duties or procedures of an established partnership/agreement relating to 
information security... 
 
 
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
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14. Attempt to modify resource-sharing or funding obligations of an established partnership/agreement 
related to information security... 
 
 
 Weekly Monthly Several 
times a 
year 
A few times 
a Year 
Never 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
     
 
 
15. Overall, how IMPORTANT is each of the following TYPE of government to the success of your 
information security efforts... 
 
 Extremely 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Important Somewhat 
Important 
Not very 
Important 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located WITHIN 
the jurisdiction of your county 
     
Other departments in YOUR county 
governments 
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16. Overall, how DEVELOPED is the relationship between your IT department and each of the following 
TYPES of government... 
 
 
 Extremely 
Developed 
Very 
Developed
Developed Somewhat 
Developed 
Not very 
Developed 
Federal      
State      
Other Florida Counties      
Other governments located 
WITHIN the jurisdiction of your 
county 
     
Other departments in YOUR 
county governments 
     
 
 
 
<< -- Previous              Next -- >> 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your valuable time. 
 
Should you have any questions or would like to receive an electronic summary of the research findings, 
please contact:  
 
Joah Devenny, M.A. 
Principle Research 
 
Public Affairs Doctoral Program 
University of Central Florida 
Orlando, FL 32816 
infosec@mail.ucf.edu 
352-795-5064 
  
  
  
<<-- Previous              Click here to close window. 
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Dear {recipient}, 
 
Last week you should have received an email asking you to take part in an important survey, approved by 
the University of Central Florida, which explores how county-level Information Technology Managers 
interact with other governments. 
 
If you have not yet completed the survey,  please know that your participation is *VERY IMPORTANT*.  
Only YOU can shed light on this important aspect of information security. 
 
By learning how you and your peers interact,  policy makers will be able to develop legislation better 
suited to YOUR day-to-day activities rather than what they THINK you do. Please take a moment of your 
time to represent {xx county} and share your experiences. 
 
** The survey is ONLY 16 questions and takes just 7 minutes to complete. 
 
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations.  
 
** You will ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers for 10 activities plus 6 basic 
questions about your county.  
 
To complete the survey please click the link below or type the link into a browser window. 
 
[Survey Link] 
 
Should you have any question please contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064 or Dr. Eileen Abel at 
(407) 823-3967.  
 
Thank you for your cooperation, 
 
 
 
Joah Devenny, M.A. 
Principle Researcher 
 
 
Advisory Committee 
--------------------- 
Eileen Abel, Ph.D. 
Stephen Holms, Ph.D. 
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D. 
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D. 
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Dear {recipient}, 
 
It was a pleasure speaking with you on the phone today regarding the important role you play  in 
protecting local information security systems. Also, thank you for allowing me to explain my current 
research into how county-level Information Technology Managers interact with other governments.  
 
I’d like to take a quick moment to remind you how vital this research is to understanding how you and 
your government peers interact. The findings of this research will help policy makers develop legislation 
better suited to YOUR day-to-day activities. 
 
Your participation is *VERY IMPORTANT*.  Only YOU can shed light on this important aspect of 
information security. Please take a moment of your time to represent {xx county} and share your 
experiences. 
 
** The survey is ONLY 16 questions and takes just 7 minutes to complete. 
 
** You will NOT be asked ANY sensitive questions about your information security configurations.  
 
** You will ONLY be asked how often you interact with certain peers for 10 activities plus 6 basic 
questions about your county.  
 
To complete the survey please click the link below or type the link into a browser window. 
 
[Survey Link] 
 
Should you have any question please contact Joah Devenny at (352) 795-5064 or Dr. Eileen Abel at 
(407) 823-3967.  
 
Thank you for your cooperation, 
 
 
Joah Devenny, M.A. 
Principle Researcher 
 
Advisory Committee 
---------------------- 
Eileen Abel, Ph.D. 
Stephen Holms, Ph.D. 
Ronnie Korosec, Ph.D. 
Mary Van Hook, Ph.D. 
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